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Abstract 
 
Post-1994 the South African government has introduced a system of participatory 
democracy “within a base framework of constitutional and electoral democracy” (Fifteen 
Year Review, 2007, p. 18). The aim is to deepen the South African democracy at all levels of 
government. However, as local government is “the closest to the people” it is regarded by 
government as the most appropriate sphere to implement participatory democracy 
mechanisms. Pertaining to this, ward committees were introduced as the main participatory 
vehicle of local governance and in addition, the government has also implemented 
alternative instruments such as izimbizos and the integrated development planning (IDP) 
process to engage citizens in local governance. However, research so far indicates that 
participatory local governance in South Africa is weak and is not working optimally (Piper 
2010, Smith and Visser 2009, Piper and Deacon 2008, Buccus, Hemson, Hicks and Piper 
2007). Given this, urgent reforms are needed for the South African local governance 
especially in terms of participation, representation and accountability.  
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At face value the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU), an infrastructure 
development project in the City of Cape Town, appears to be exactly the successful model of 
participation, representation and accountability that local government ought to be; hence 
the investigation of this thesis.  For this investigation the researcher used a qualitative and 
an interpretative approach to make sense of the VPUU methodology. The researcher also 
made use of the case study approach to get greater insight into how the VPUU methodology 
specifically works in Harare Khayelitsha. The research found that the VPUU methodology 
does not encourage any real representation but rather a ‘development trusteeship’. Piper 
(2012) initially argued that the VPUU’s ‘community participation model’ is actually a form of 
representation that he terms ‘development trusteeship’.  
 
After closer inspection, the researcher found that while the VPUU’s approach can be 
described as a form of ‘development trusteeship’ but even here representation is closer to a 
form of co-option designed to assimilate community leaders in such a way it legitimate the 
project. In terms of representation it found that the VPUU local leadership structure – called 
the Safe Nodal Area Committee (SNAC) - do not represent the community as leaders were 
co-opted and the community has no power over the election or the co-option of SNAC 
members. The researcher also found that the form of participation practised is pseudo-
participation in that it is merely a necessity for ratifying decisions that has been already 
taken. In addition, both the project and the councillor are using ‘political gatekeeping’ to 
regulate the flow of information to the community at large.  Lastly, the researcher also 
found that accountability flows upwards to the project as leaders are held accountable to 
the project and not to the community, and that it is difficult to gain access to information by 
external members of the public. From this it clear that the measures in place are intended to 
legitimize the project rather than democratise the project. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Apartheid denied the majority of South Africans participation and representation in the 
decision-making machinery of government. The dawn of democracy in 1994 promised South 
Africans the right to participate and to be represented in a government they elect. These 
rights, and others, were embedded in the South African Constitution of 1996, to protect 
citizens from any form of discrimination and to give life to the ideal of democratic 
government. Section 19 of the South African Constitution of 1996 ensures citizens are free 
to make political choices, to participate in the activities of political parties, and to stand for 
public office. Furthermore, section 152 of the 1996 Constitution states that local 
government must foster democratic and accountable government to local communities. This 
means local government must create ways through which they engage communities and vice 
versa. In addition to the constitutional framework for democracy, the government post-1994 
introduced a system of participatory democracy aimed at deepening democracy at all levels 
of government. As a result, a number of Local Government Acts followed to provide a legal 
basis as to how communities must participate in local government.  
 
It was through one such Act, the Municipal Structures Act of 1998, that ward committees 
were legalised as the ‘space’ for communities to engage their local municipal councils. Since 
the implementation of ward committees in 2001, various scholars (Piper 2010, Smith and 
Visser 2009, Piper and Deacon 2008, Buccus, Hemson, Hicks and Piper 2007) have conducted 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
research on them. Findings indicate that ward committees and other participatory 
mechanisms of local governance are not responsive to the needs of local communities, as 
these structures tend not to represent the interest of communities. In addition, Jain (2010) 
argues that so-called ‘service delivery’ protest marches between elections are another 
indication of the ineffective nature of local municipal councils. Scholars have also argued 
that apart from the corruption and nepotism that plagued the South African local 
government, there is also a general lack of accountability to local communities (Piper 2010, 
Piper and von Lieres 2008, Mafunisa and Xaba 2008). This, therefore, raises issues of 
participation, representation and accountability at local governance.   
 
Apart from the above mentioned issues, local government is also largely considered to be 
ineffective as suggested by the 2010/11 Auditor General’s report. According to Heese and 
Allan (July 29, 2012) for the financial year 2010/11 only 13 or a mere 5 percent of the 
municipalities received an unqualified audit. It is also reported by the Auditor General that 
irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure increased from R6 billion in 2009/10 to more 
than R10 billion in 2010/11 (Heese and Allan, July 29, 2012). Given this poor management of 
funds and the general ineffectiveness of local government, the growing number of protest 
marches is understandable. Jain (2010, p. 31) reports that protest marches are mainly about: 
housing, water, electricity and sanitation. With regards to protest marches, the Municipal IQ 
(August 6, 2012) has reported a record 113 protest marches for 2012.  
 
At face value the high number of protest marches might be seen to signal a systematic revolt 
against the ruling ANC. Conversely, Booysen (2007) found that leading up to the 2006 local 
government elections and after the elections, election turnout was maintained and support 
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for the ANC increased. She argues that protest and voting – or as she terms it the ‘brick and 
ballot’ – are to be understood not as contradictions but as ways that ANC supporters 
attempt to keep their preferred representatives accountable (ibid.). In an attempt to curb 
this crisis, the government developed policy documents such as Project Consolidate in 2004 
and in 2009 the Local Government Turnaround Strategy. However, these policies have 
proven to be ineffective as reflected by the Auditor General’s 2010/11 and 2009/10 reports. 
Evidently, local government appears ineffective and unable to respond adequately to the 
needs of local communities. Consequently, this research argues that local governance needs 
to be reformed in terms of representation, participation and accountability to enable it to be 
more responsive to the needs of local communities. 
 
The necessity to reform South African local governance affirms the importance of exploring 
alternative governance practices such as those claimed in the Violence Prevention through 
Urban Upgrading (VPUU) project. The VPUU might offer some solutions in this regard as they 
promised a model of local development that is more democratic and more effective than 
current local government. The VPUU was launched in 2005, as a cooperative agreement 
between the CoCT and the German Development Bank, to prevent crime through upgrading 
public spaces in Harare and Site C Khayelitsha. Crime in Khayelitsha is best contextualised by 
the historical underdevelopment of Khayelitsha during apartheid. Khayelitsha was 
established in the 1980s by the apartheid government to move black people out of the city 
to the Cape Flats. This was not only a deliberative attempt to enforce apartheid legislation 
but also a way of discriminating against black people. Due to Khayelitsha’s 
underdevelopment by the Apartheid government, Khayelitsha became one the biggest slums 
in South Africa with number of socio-economic problems that were crime related. 
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Since its inception in Harare Khayelitsha, the VPUU has had a number of successes in its 
attempts to reduce crime in Khayelitsha and they claim they achieved this by operating in a 
participatory way. In this regards, VPUU makes three claims: (1) VPUU successes are 
contributed to their community participation model (Graham and Krause, 2007); (2) they 
have “a representative leadership forum [which] aims to integrate the wealth of social 
capital in an area” (Krause, 2012, p. 3) and; (3) one of VPUU’s guiding principles is 
accountability (Krause, 2012, p. 3). This research, therefore, explored the forms of 
democratic practice (participation, representation and accountability) in the VPUU 
methodology. The aim was to explore whether the VPUU model could inform the current 
ineffective practices of local government in striving towards a more democratic and effective 
local governance. 
 
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this research was to explore and evaluate the forms of democratic practice in 
the VPUU methodology to assess whether the VPUU model could guide the reform of the 
current ineffective practices of local government in South Africa. To achieve this, the 
research used the first site of the VPUU project in Harare in Khayelitsha as a case study to 
investigate the VPUU project methodology in participation, representation and 
accountability terms.  
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The objectives of this study are: 
 To outline the VPUU methodology; 
 To describe the forms of representation, participation and accountability created by 
VPUU; 
 To explore the practice of the VPUU in respect of these democratic values, and  
 To assess implications of the VPUU model for local governance more generally. 
 
1.2 Delimitation of the Study 
 
The scope of the study is local governance in South Africa and not the local government of 
South Africa. According to Memela, Mantjane, Nzo and Hoof (2008, p.1) “governance is not 
just about how a government and social organisations interact, and how they relate to 
citizens, but it concerns the state’s ability to serve citizens and other actors…” Local 
governance is therefore, the practice of governance at local level that involves a wider range 
of players than just government. One can also reason that local governance in South Africa 
extends beyond elected representatives like ward councillors, proportional representation 
(PR) councillors and ward committee members, and that it potentially includes other 
representatives of communities such as traditional leaders, civil society organisations and 
others stakeholders.  
 
Furthermore, this study is limited to give insight on how local governance in the City of Cape 
Town operates, especially Khayelitsha. In addition to this, this study does not investigate all 
aspects of local governance but only those related to participation, representation and 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
accountability. Hence, in terms of democracy this study is limited to only the procedural 
dimensions of democracy (Diamond and Morlino, 2005)1. Therefore, this research is about 
procedural democracy, and participatory local government in South Africa.  
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
The systematic discrimination against black2 people during colonialism and apartheid has 
created the current service delivery backlog in South Africa. Colonialism and apartheid 
denied the majority of South Africans the right to elect a government that would serve 
everyone, and not only a racially-defined few. Since 1994, a number of laws were passed to 
allow all citizens and communities to participate in government’s decision-making processes, 
of which the local government legislation is important. The Municipal Structures Act of 1998 
encourages communities to participate in local government and this can take place through 
the ward councillor, the integrated development planning (IDP) process, and traditional 
leaders. However, the preferred mechanism of community participation by local 
government is ward committees.  
 
Ward committees are supposed to be representative community forums of (usually) 10 
elected representatives that make recommendations to ward councillors with regards to 
service delivery and the needs of communities. However, research on ward committees has 
                                         
1
 Diamond and Morlino (2005) developed a framework for assessing the quality of democracy. For this they divided 
democracy into three dimensions namely: procedure, content or substantive and results (Diamond and Morlino, 2005, p. 
xi). It is the procedural dimension of democracy which focuses on participation, accountability and representation. 
2 Race is a contentious issue in South Africa and, therefore, this research uses the term race as a way to illustrate how South 
Africa was divided into different racial groups for discrimination purposes during apartheid. It was the Population 
Registration Act (no. 30 of 1950) that divided South Africa into different racial categories, and since 1994 race was used in 
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indicated that ward committees do not possess any real decision-making power, and that 
recommendations made by ward committees are side-lined by municipal councils (Piper 
2010, Smith and Visser 2009, Piper and Deacon 2008, Buccus, Hemson, Hicks and Piper 
2007). Secondly, research also indicates that most ward committees are taken over by 
political parties to serve the interest of the political party, which raises issues of 
representation (Piper, 2010).  
 
In this regard, Butler (2009) argues that the lack of accountability in South Africa needs to be 
understood in terms of the electoral system and the party system. He argues that the ANC’s 
dominance at the polls in the past four elections and with no real opposition in parliament 
indicates that South Africa has become a dominant party system. This dominance of the 
ruling party, combined with the proportional representation (PR) electoral system at 
national and provincial level compromises accountability. This is because members of 
parliament are accountable to the party and not to voters. Taking Butler’s (2009) argument 
into account it explains the duality in the ward councillors’ role. At the local level councillors 
are chosen by a mixed electoral system which has features of both the single member 
district and the PR electoral systems. Ward councillors are directly elected by the community 
whilst PR councillors are elected from party list. However, even though ward councillors are 
directly elected their political future is still dependent on the political party. Thus, once ward 
councillors are elected, they are supposed to represent and account to everyone in their 
wards and simultaneously represent and account to political parties. Therefore, this raises a 
question about whose interest ward councillors are serving in municipal councils.  
                                                                                                                               
its original form to redress the injustice of the past. With this in mind, ‘race’ here is mere a reference point to explain how 
discrimination during apartheid worked. 
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Furthermore, Memela et al (2008) outline a number of shortcomings of accountability in 
South African local governance. Amongst other things, there is a poor flow of information 
between municipal council and citizens, a weak civil society that does not make full use of 
existing mechanisms of accountability (Heller 2009, Jagwanth 2003) and an absence of 
municipal mechanisms in place for citizens to review council decisions. Heller (2009, p. 15) 
also indicates that apart from these issues “*t+he privatization or out-sourcing of many 
government functions and increased reliance on consultants has virtually crowded out 
community structures.” Vital services and functions of civil society are therefore outsourced 
to external organisations that do not know local communities. The failing nature of 
participatory local governance (Piper 2010, Smith and Visser 2009, Piper and Deacon 2008, 
Buccus, Hemson, Hicks and Piper 2007), the general lack of accountability at all levels (Butler 
2009, Schulz-Herzenberg 2009 and Brooks 2004), the dual nature of representation for the 
ward councillor and a weak civil society (Idasa 2012, Heller 2009 and Jagwanth 2003) all 
serve as indicators that local governance in South Africa needs to be reformed.  
 
However, in 2005 VPUU was introduced as a way of preventing violence and reducing crime 
in Harare Khayelitsha. VPUU is a project within the CoCT and, so far, has claimed a number 
of successes. Since, its implementation in Harare the VPUU claims to have reduced crime in 
the site by 33 percent, and the murder rate in particular by 20 per cent (Ndenze, May 04, 
2011). The VPUU is currently operating six areas in Khayelitsha namely: Harare; Kuyasa; Site 
C, TR Section; Site B; and BM Section (Plato, 2011). The CoCT also implemented the VPUU 
programme in Hanover Park, Lavender Hill and Mannenberg in 2011. The VPUU 
methodology in generally appears to yield better results in comparison to the local 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
governance participatory model seems to be the ideal case to investigate for alternative 
forms of participation, representation and accountability.  
 
1.4 Research Question 
 
The research was guided by the following research question: Is the VPUU methodology of 
community participation, representation and accountability a suitable model to reform the 
South African local governance model? 
 
In addition the research question, the research was also guided by theoretical and empirical 
sub-research question. These sub-research questions assisted the researcher to answer the 
main research question. The theoretical sub-research questions are: 
 
 What is representation? 
 What is participation? 
 What is accountability? 
 
The empirical sub-research questions are: 
 How does participation, representation and accountability in the methodology of the 
VPUU project work? 
 Will the VPUU methodology improve the current forms of decision-making in South 
African local governance? 
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1.5 Rationale of the Study 
 
This study contributes to the growing literature on participatory democracy in South Africa 
(Piper 2010, Thompson and Conradie 2010, Butler 2009, Heller 2009, Smith and Visser 2009, 
Piper and Deacon 2008, Buccus et al 2007 and Chanza and Piper 2006). Democracy for 
citizens means more than just free and fair elections - for the poor majority it is a vehicle 
through which they can improve their quality of life. However, democracy also bestows 
citizens with certain responsibilities such as participation and representation in the decision-
making structures of government. Therefore, participation, representation and 
accountability are essential to improve the quality of South Africa’s democracy. This study 
investigated how participatory local government works and how it can be improved in terms 
of participation, representation and accountability (procedural dimension of democracy).  
 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
 
The methodology of this study was qualitative and interpretive. Neuman (1997, p. 421) 
explains that “*a+ qualitative researcher analyses data by organizing it into categories on the 
basis of themes, concepts, or similar features.” The researcher categorised the data into 
different categories. This helped to make sense of the data and to examine the relationship 
of participation, representation and accountability in practice and in theory. The researcher 
compared, evaluated and synthesized the data with social theory. The aim of this research 
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was to make sense of the VPUU methodology in democratic terms and the qualitative 
method was the best approach to give the researcher the desired results. The qualitative 
approach, therefore, allowed the researcher to see how people experience democratic 
inclusion and, thus, the subjectivity of participants was an important indicator of the nature 
of the decision-making in VPUU. 
 
According to Neuman (1997, p. 68) “the interpretive approach is the systematic analysis of 
socially meaningful action through the direct detailed observation of people in natural 
settings in order to arrive at understanding and interpretations of how people create and 
maintain their social worlds.” This is ideally what this research wanted to achieve. It wanted 
to understand how the people of Harare Khayelitsha perceive and experience the VPUU 
process. It also wanted to determine whether VPUU has added value to their lives. 
 
The case study method enabled the researcher to make sense of the research question and 
how the VPUU methodology works in a particular case and in this case Harare Khayelitsha. 
According to Rule and John (2011, p.4) “*a+ case study is … a systematic and in-depth 
investigation of a particular instance in its context in order to generate knowledge.” There 
are generally three forms of case study namely, exploratory, explanatory and descriptive 
(Yin, 2003).  
 
A descriptive case study presents a complete description of a phenomenon within its 
context. An exploratory case study often examines a phenomenon that has not been 
investigated before and lays the basis for further studies. An explanatory case study 
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attempts to explain what happens in a particular case or why it happens (Rule and 
John, 2011, p.8). 
 
This research was an exploratory case study as it assessed the forms of democratic practice 
in the VPUU project in Harare Khayelitsha. In addition to this, the case study also narrowed 
the scope of the sub-research questions and this helped the researcher to unpack 
participation, representation and accountability in much greater depth. It also allowed the 
researcher to identify how the VPUU methodology works in practice. 
 
1.6.1 Research Methods 
 
The study used observations, informal interviews and in-depth interviews to collect data 
which enabled the researcher to answer the empirical sub-research questions. Neuman 
(1997) also indicated that these methods are the best to generate qualitative data. Informal 
interviews allowed the researcher to engage with participants when they most comfortable, 
and this provided the researcher the opportunity to verify information that were provided in 
the in-depth interviews. Most informal interviews took place at the Khayelitsha 
Development Forum’s (KDF) head office and the newly build Harare library. Besides informal 
interviews, the researcher also made observations and took a number of photos at the site 
in Harare. The researcher kept a reflective journal of all informal interviews and 
observations. Finally, in-depth interviews were used to collect raw data which was analysed 
for the purpose of this research.  
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
1.6.2 Data and Data Sources 
 
There are two types of data sources. The first data source is secondary. According to 
Neuman (1997, p. 398) secondary data sources are found in books, articles, official reports, 
reference books and statistics. Secondary data for this research was collected from journal 
articles, government legislation, books online newspaper archives and official VPUU 
documentation (strategies, baseline surveys, annual reports, etc). 
 
Furthermore, this research made use of primary data sources. According to Neuman (1997, 
p. 396) primary data sources can be letters, diaries, newspapers, movies, novels, and 
photographs. They are usually found in archives or in museums. Primary data sources for 
this study include interviews, observations, project documents and photos of the VPUU 
project in Harare Khayelitsha.  
 
 
1.6.3 Selection of Participants 
 
Participants were selected based on their level of involvement in the VPUU project and 
whether they were substantially acquainted with the work of VPUU in Harare Khayelitsha. 
The reason for this is that seniors in the project helped to design and implement the VPUU 
project in Khayelitsha and this means these participants experienced the VPUU’s apparent 
democratic practices first hand and hence their selection. 
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The research sample comprised of 12 participants. A number of the participants re-
scheduled the interviews and participant 5 in particular re-scheduled the interview 
repeatedly from January 2012 to May 2012. Moreover, the researcher interviewed two 
SNAC members, a ward councillor, two professors who are the leading scholars on 
participatory democracy in South Africa, the project leader of VPUU, and a Khayelitsha 
Development Forum (KDF) official, a KDF executive member, 3 Community Development 
Workers (CDWs) and a facilities manager in site C. These participants were the best choices 
as the councillor is representing Harare, the facilities manager in Site C was part of the initial 
process of establishing VPUU, KDF is VPUU’s primary partner, the three community 
development workers were field workers of the initial VPUU baseline survey in Harare and 
the Safe Nodal Area Committees (SNACs) are VPUU structures which are tasked with the 
implementation of the project. 
 
Furthermore, the researcher also conducted 6 informal interviews with people who are part 
of the project in Khayelitsha and others who are well informed about local governance. The 
aim of these informal interviews was to triangulate the VPUU data and to give greater 
insight into South African local governance. These participants were the KDF administrator, 
the librarian of the new Harare library, the chairperson of KDF, the ward councillor of ward 
90 in Khayelitsha and a PR councillor of the West Coast District Municipality.  
 
1.6.4 Limitations of the Study 
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The research was limited by money, time, language, race and ‘political gatekeepers’. The 
biggest limitation was political gatekeepers and it affected the time and the money of the 
research.  
 
In January 2011, the researcher and his supervisor had a meeting with the team leader of 
the VPUU, Mr Michael Krause, with regard to the research on VPUU in Harare. Mr Krause 
indicated his support for the research. In July 2011, the researcher’s proposal was accepted 
and a copy of it was send to Mr Krause. After reading the proposal, Mr Krause requested 
that the use of Monwabisi Park instead of Khayelitsha as a case study. The researcher 
declined given all the investment in background research into Khayelitsha. Mr Krause 
responded by indicating that if the researcher continued with Harare he (Krause) would not 
be able to assist the researcher as the research would not beneficial to VPUU. After a 
discussion with the researcher’s supervisor the researcher approach Mr Krause again and 
indicate his willingness to change the case study to Monwabisi Park but the researcher did 
not get any positive feedback with regards to this suggestion. This was near the end of 2011 
and the researcher decided to continue with the original case study. In 2012, the researcher 
tried a number of times to set up meetings with VPUU employees but they always indicated 
that they need speak to Mr Krause first and would get back to the researcher but this never 
happened. The VPUU seemed to be defensive3 about Harare as a case study and VPUU as a 
whole. Without the support of VPUU it was difficult at first to get participants for the 
research, although in time this obstacle was overcome.  
 
                                         
3 The reader will notice that Mr Krause’s defensiveness made sense in time because one of the key findings of this research 
is political gatekeeping which explains his defensive nature.  
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In addition to this, there were other factors that might have influenced participation in the 
research at first. These factors were language and race. Residents of Khayelitsha mainly 
speak isiXhosa and the researcher cannot speak the language. This meant that interviews 
were conducted in English. It was only after a meeting with the chairperson of the 
Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF), Mr Michael Benu that more people were willing to 
participate in the research. Mr Benu, however, asked the researcher to consider Monwabisi 
Park as part of the Harare case study as residents of Khayelitsha see the two 
neighbourhoods as one.  
 
Furthermore, the researcher did not have any transport of his own and, therefore, had to 
mainly make use of public transport and sometimes private transport. This limited the 
researcher’s interaction with the Harare community.  
 
1.6.5 Research Ethics  
 
This research was guided by the following principles: (1) privacy; (2) anonymity; (3) 
confidentiality (Neuman, 1997, p. 452); (4) truthfulness; and (5) voluntary participation. It is 
the researcher intent to protect all participants’ privacy, anonymity and confidentiality. 
According to Neuman (1997, p. 452) researchers can protect the privacy of respondents by 
not disclosing a subjects’ identity after data is gathered. Confidentiality on the other hand 
“means that information may have names attached to it, but the researcher hold it in 
confidence or keeps it secret from the public” (Neuman, 1997, p. 453).  
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In addition to this, the researcher used a written informed consent for all participants that 
were interviewed (see Appendix 1). The researcher had informed participants of their right 
to refuse to participate in the research and to withdraw their participation at any stage of 
the research. This is in accordance with the UWC Research Ethics Committee requirements 
and the Human Science Research Council’s Code of Research Ethics 
(http://www.hsrc.ac.za/Page-168.phtml). In addition to this, the researcher explained to the 
participants that their identity would be protected at all times unless express permission 
was granted. Ten of the participants requested anonymity but allowed their professions to 
be mentioned. The participants that are anonymous did not provide the researcher with 
reasons as to why they would like to be anonymous. In chapter four the researcher will refer 
to these participants as Participant 1 (P1), Participant 2 (P2), etc. 
 
Furthermore, according to Neuman (1997, p. 450) “*a+ researcher is responsible for 
protecting subjects from increased risk of arrest.” In this research the researcher did not 
deal with classified or sensitive information that might have been harmful to participants 
and the public. However, given mister Krause defensive nature the researcher is intending to 
protect the identities of the eight participants who requested anonymity as he does not 
want the research to be harmful to the participants. 
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis  
 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter provided a general introduction to 
the research problem and the research methodology. The main argument of chapter one is 
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that urgent reforms are needed for the South African local governance especially in terms of 
participation, representation and accountability. At face value the VPUU methodology 
appears to be a very successful model of participation, representation and accountability 
and hence the investigation. The aim of the research is to investigate the VPUU 
methodology to see whether some features can be used to reform the South African model 
of local governance. Furthermore, Chapter one outlines the methodological approach of the 
study and in this regard the methodology of the research is purely qualitative and 
interpretive to make sense of a deeply value-laded research question.  
Chapter two establishes a theoretical framework by providing a brief discussion as to what 
democracy is and the different forms of democracy. It then interrogates the notion of a 
democratic deficit in current liberal representative democracy before unpacking the 
concepts of participation, representation and accountability. It is currently argued that in 
both developing and advanced democracies, participation, representation and 
accountability need to be strengthened to do away with democratic deficits. The aim of this 
chapter is to establish a theoretical framework to assess the VPUU methodology with 
regards to representation, participation and accountability. 
Chapter three offers a critical insight into the particular shortcomings of local governance in 
South Africa. Since 1994 the government of South Africa have introduced a system of 
participatory democracy with the aim to enhance the constitutional and electoral democracy 
(Fifteen Year Review, 2007). In this regard, through legislation and policies they introduced a 
number of mechanisms to take the ideals of participatory democracy forward and most of 
these mechanisms were implemented at local governance. Most prominent amongst these 
mechanisms are ward committees, CDWs and the IDP. In theory participatory democracy is 
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more than just participation and extent to measures of representation and accountability. In 
this regard, the critique in chapter three is twofold. Firstly, the focus by both government 
and research has been on participation and has somewhat ignored representation and 
accountability. Given this, the chapter not only investigates the participatory mechanisms of 
local government but show the reader how accountability and representations are neglected 
in both practice and research. Secondly, this chapter illustrates how these participatory 
mechanisms are failing or are not working.  
Chapter four introduces and analyses the case study, namely the VPUU infrastructure 
development project in Harare Khayelitsha. According to Piper (2012) the decision-making 
process central to the VPUU methodology applied is anti-majoritarian, consociational and 
anti-partisan. This can be seen as an attempt to ward off the various forms of local capture 
that plague local governance, as noted in chapter three. However, the VPUU solution is not 
so much about community participation but about building community buy-in through a 
form of representation by civil society organisation in VPUU processes designed such that 
CSO representatives are held accountable to the VPUU project goals rather than the project 
being held accountable to the CSOs or the larger community. Further these project goals are 
consistent with the larger mainstream development approach. Piper (2012) argues that the 
VPUU’s ‘community participation’ is actually a form of representation that he terms 
‘development trusteeship’.  
After closer inspection, the researcher found that while the VPUU’s approach can be 
described as a form of ‘development trusteeship’ but even here representation is closer to a 
form of co-option designed to legitimate the project by projecting community buy-in and 
clearing out rival ‘gatekeepers’. In terms of representation it found that the VPUU structure 
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– SNAC do not represent the community as leaders were co-opted and the community has 
no power over the election or the co-option of SNAC members. In addition to this, the 
researcher also found that the form of participation practised is pseudo-participation in that 
it is merely a necessity for ratifying decisions that has been already taken. In addition, both 
the project leader and the councillor are using ‘political gatekeeping’ to regulate the flow of 
information to the community at large. Lastly, the researcher also found that accountability 
flows upwards to the project as leaders are held accountable to the project and not to the 
community, and that it is difficult to gain access to information by external members of the 
public. From this it clear that the measure in place is to legitimize the project rather than 
anything else. 
Chapter five is the final chapter of this thesis and focuses on lessons that can be learned 
from this research. Based the finding of chapter three and four the researcher makes a 
number of recommendations. Key suggestions include the following: (1) further empirical 
research is needed to find ways to enhance and reform local governance in South Africa; (2) 
proposed empirical research must investigate cases where participation, representation and 
accountability are successful and to see whether it can be used to reform the current local 
government system; (3) local Government legislation must extent measures of 
accountability to traditional authorities and ward committees because the current system 
do have any measures of accountability for them. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review: A Theoretical Framework 
 
2. Introduction 
 
Democracy for many people seems to be the solution for their socio-economic and socio-
political problems, and even though it is currently the system of governance that is used by 
most countries in the world, it does not mean that it has not flaws. Democracies of the 
Global North are currently experiencing declining patterns of political participation and 
democracies of the Global South are trapped between the demands of external donors and 
the demands of their citizens (Gaventa, 2006). This, however, does not discourage non-
democracies to strive towards democracy. In the late 20th century there was a third wave of 
democracy and now in the 21st century there is the ‘arab spring’. The ‘arab spring’ currently 
has scholars of political studies on the edges of their seats because citizens of Tunisia, Egypt 
and Libya brought down their tyrannical regimes to bring about democracy. This new 
development has awakened new debates on democracy (Gaventa, 2006).  
 
South Africa like many other emerging democracies in the global South is not without any 
challenges. The aim of this chapter is therefore to provide a theoretical framework for the 
study. This framework will be used in Chapter four to assess the VPUU methodology. To 
establish such a framework this chapter have mainly two parts. The first part is a discussion 
on democracy and focuses on the different types of democracy. Apart from the different 
types of democracy it discusses the shortcomings of the liberal representative democracy. 
These shortcomings can be related to the quality of democracy. Diamond and Morlino 
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(2005) developed a framework for assessing the quality of democracy. For this they divided 
democracy into three dimensions namely: (1) the procedural dimension; (2) the content or 
substantive dimension and; (3) the results dimension (Diamond and Morlino, 2005, p. xi). 
The second part of this chapter focusses on the procedural dimension of democracy which is 
participation, accountability and representation. This will include the definitions, meanings 
and practices of participation, representation and accountability, and through this it want to 
establish a framework to assess the procedural aspects of the VPUU methodology. 
 
2.1 Democracy 
 
Today’s liberal representative democracy is completely different from that of the ancient 
Greek city-states from which it derives the name. For the majority of democratic scholars 
the origins of democracy can be traced back to ancient Greece. However, the truth is that 
the form of democracy in the ancient Greek city-states is the earliest form democracy that 
scholars know a lot about. Among the ancient Greek city-states, the democracy of Athens 
“was the most stable and long-lived, and the best documented” (Arblaster, 1987, p. 14). 
Arblaster also argues that the Greeks did not invent the concept of democracy, the concept 
was devised “to describe an evolving reality – the kind of city-state in which the citizen body 
did actually govern itself” (Arblaster, 1987, p.14). This is evident if one takes a closer look at 
the word democracy. The word democracy comes from the Greek words demos (meaning 
‘the common people’) and kratia (meaning ‘power’ or ‘rule’) (O’Neil, 2007, p.135). So, it was 
the “ordinary” man that ruled.  
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The central feature of this kind of democracy was “the direct personal participation of the 
citizen body in the government of the city” (Arblaster, 1987, p.18). One has to note that 
citizenship in the Greek city-states was very different from today’s notion of citizenship. 
According to Naila Kabeer (2002, p. 3) only men with the material means were counted as 
citizens whilst women and slaves were denied citizenship. Therefore, it would have not 
qualified as a full democracy in today’s terms. Furthermore, there were two key institutions 
through which democratic rule occurred. The first institution was the assembly or the 
Ecclesia which every citizen was entitled to attend and was tasked to take final decisions 
with regards to policy. This institution was also sovereign and composed of all the citizens. It 
is argued that there were never more than 50 000 citizens in a Greek city – state, and a 
quorum of 6000 were needed for decisions on citizen rights (Arblaster, 1987, p.18). The 
second institution was the council that was composed of 500 citizens and took office for a 
year. The council was responsible for the day-to-day running of the city-state (Arblaster, 
1987, p.19). Therefore, one can make the case that democracy during the Greek city-states 
was a form of direct democracy because citizens participated directly in making key policy 
decision and law-making of the state. 
 
One needs to note that this evolution was not a smooth transition. After the Greek city-
state’s democracy somewhat lapsed and made its re-appearance in England during the 
Magna Carta nearly 1000 years later. In political history the Magna Carta signals the rise of 
political representatives in government. According to O’Neil (2007, p. 137-8) the origins of 
the modern democracy can be traced back to 1215 C.E. in England, when nobles forced King 
John to sign the Magna Carta that laid the foundations for an early legislature. After the 
Magna Carta the separation of power with checks and balances came about in the United 
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States (US). These checks and balances are a fundamental part of today’s liberal 
democracies. But today’s liberal representative democracy is much more sophisticated than 
the notion of political representatives and the separation of powers.  
 
2.2 Liberal Representative Democracy and Its Short-comings 
 
According to O’Neil (2007, p.135) “*l+iberal democracies are rooted in the ideology of 
liberalism, with its emphasis on individual rights and freedoms.” A liberal democracy must 
put individual freedom and equality first. The question democratic theorists are trying to 
solve is what is the appropriate form of government for a society of free and equal citizens 
(Piper, personal communication, August 27, 2010). Liberal democratic theorists have 
justified a set of institutions that makes liberal democracies feasible. According to Dahl 
(1998, pp. 85 - 86) the political institutions of modern representative democracy are: elected 
officials, free, fair and frequent elections, freedom of expression, access to alternative 
sources of information, associational autonomy and inclusive citizenship. In a liberal 
representative democracy, one elects representatives that will ensure that one’s freedoms 
are protected and that one is treated equally in terms of the law. Moreover, if 
representatives are not accountable there will be an opportunity to replace them in regular 
free and fair elections (Schumpeter, 1976). 
 
Even though liberal democracy is the type of democracy preferred by the majority of 
democratic states, it is not without its flaws. Many scholars believe that liberal democracy is 
in trouble because there are many concerns about the quality and the substance of liberal 
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democracy. Some scholars have noticed a number of democratic deficits or shortcomings 
from the democratic ideal. Democratic deficits include the declining patterns of political 
participation and the concern that special interests that are taking over political processes 
(Gaventa, 2006, p. 9). Gaventa (ibid.) notices that in the US citizens are treated like 
customers, who communicate to elites through opinion polls and electronic market research 
processes. Indeed, this notion of consumer democracy is increasingly common across the 
West.  
 
Contrary to the West, in Africa a different pattern is visible: 
 
democratic states are trapped between the demands by external donors for 
economic liberalisation by one on the one hand, and the needs of political majorities 
on the other. As a result the ‘good governance’ discourse has presided over the 
creation of what might be called exclusionary democracies, which allow for political 
competition, but cannot incorporate or respond to the demands of the majority in 
any meaningful way … where the voices of the poor are frequently overruled by the 
demands of external donors (Gaventa, 2006, p. 10). 
 
Democratic deficits, therefore, are not a phenomenon of the North but are also happening 
in the South.  
 
Furthermore, Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor (2000, pp. 22 – 23) have identified four types of 
democratic deficits that are visible in the North and in the South. The first deficit is hollow 
citizenship, which means that citizens do not enjoy equal rights and entitlements. For 
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example, the South African Constitution in terms of section 3 provides for common 
citizenship and in terms of section 9 that everyone is equal before the law. But these rights 
can only enforce and exercised if a citizen has the money to pay for private legal services. 
Therefore, even though the law advocates that citizens are equal, it does not mean they are 
enjoying the same benefits and privileges as wealthier citizens.  
 
Second is the lack of vertical accountability, which is the inability of citizens to hold political 
elites accountable. South Africa lacks vertical accountability partly because they use the PR 
electoral system. According to Reynolds (1999) the closed list proportional PR electoral 
system is not good for accountability. The reason for this that voters in most cases are not 
aware who the representatives are they voting for and this makes it difficult for voters to 
hold representatives accountable. In addition, representatives chosen by the closed-list PR 
electoral system causes representatives to be accountable to the party and not to the voters 
as they are trying to secure their political future. Over and above the electoral system the 
dominance of the ANC also perpetuates this particular situation (Butler, 2009). With the lack 
of any real electoral competition real authority shifts away from the Constitution to the 
ruling party which held serious concerns with regards to accountability (Brooks, 2004). 
Therefore, in South Africa under-performing MP’s can be chosen over and over again, 
despite being unpopular.  
 
The third deficit is weak horizontal accountability between the judiciary, the executive and 
the legislature. These three arms of government are usually weakened through patronage, 
corruption, etc. The researcher is of the view that checks and balances in South Africa have 
been respected so far but it does not mean that it is without any weakness. If one considers 
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Thabo Mbeki’s removal in 2008 as the president of South Africa it becomes apparent that 
parliament has become the mouthpiece and rubber stamp of the ruling party. This show that 
parliament has no real authority which can be contributed to South Africa’s status as a 
dominant party state and the PR electoral system (Butler 2009, Schulz-Herzenberg 2009 and 
Brooks 2004).  
 
The last deficit is international accountability dilemmas, which means that the policy space 
of national governments is shrinking, especially as regards macro-economic policy. South 
Africa as a developing state is experiencing tremendous pressure from the international 
community to act in a certain way. For South Africa to be accepted in the international 
environment it must adhere to the rules of the game and in this case a neoliberal economic 
framework. If South Africa does not adhere to neoliberal standards it will not be accepted as 
a player in the international system, and suffer adverse economic consequences in terms of 
its rating for trade and investment. South Africa’s policies, therefore, must be of such a 
nature that it adheres to international standards. Institutions and rating agencies such as the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary 
Fund, Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch Group (IMF) have a great impact on South 
African policy. Therefore, decisions taken at international level by states do not necessarily 
have the approval of citizens but in most cases affects citizens. 
 
These deficits, therefore, indicate that liberal democracies are experiencing problems with 
accountability, representation and participation. Given these concerns in both the North and 
the global South, a number of scholars have argued for a more participatory form of 
democracy (Gaventa 2006, Cornwall 2002, Bohman 1998 and Cohen 1996).  
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2.3 Participatory Democracy 
 
As used in most contemporary political thought, participatory democracy is seen as way of 
making existing liberal representative democracies more participatory. It also does not 
necessarily refer to a direct democratic system similar to that as ancient Greece but rather 
imagines a series of institutions and practices that complement the hegemonic 
representative system. Many types of participatory approaches have been conceptualized 
but the most well-known in the west is the deliberative democratic approach. Deliberative 
democracy made its appearance as a way to encourage more participation in the liberal 
democratic model. According to Bohman (1998, p. 402) “any conception of deliberative 
democracy ‘is organised around the ideal of political justification’ requiring free public 
reasoning of equals citizens.” In addition, Cohen (1996, pp. 99 – 100) argues that in a 
deliberative democracy “outcomes are democratic legitimate if and only if they could be 
object of a free and reasoned agreement amongst equals.” From both scholars one sees that 
in a deliberative democracy public reasoning and consensus amongst citizens over policy 
issues is the key. According to Bohman (1998, p. 408) “deliberation is indeed superior to 
other methods and principles of resolving conflict”, *this means that] citizens stand a better 
chance of resolving some of their moral disagreement” through deliberation. Many conflicts 
exist in the state because of previous exclusions. These exclusions bring to the fore the 
notion of marginalisation. The project of deliberative democracy must give voice to those 
that was previously excluded from the decision-making process and once again raises issues 
of participation and representation. However, like many other theories the normative 
theoretical account of deliberative democracy was explored empirical to test whether it 
would be successful in practice.  
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Hence, Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright have researched five cases where participation is 
successful and sustainable. These cases are: (1) functionally specific neighbourhood councils 
in Chicago, United States; (2) labour market transparency and skill formation in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin; (3) stakeholder ecosystem governance under the US Endangered Species Act; (4) 
participatory city budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil; and (5) village governance in India: West 
Bengal and Kerala. Their aim was to develop a model for participation that is inclusive and 
responsive to the needs of the poor. Their model is called ‘empowered deliberative 
democracy’ (EDD). They have designed a set of principles and a set of institutional features 
that can be used to strengthen participation between authorities and its citizens.  
 
The principles of EDD are the following: (a) practical orientation; (b) bottom-up 
participation; and (c) deliberative solution generation (Fung & Wright, 2001, p. 18). The 
principle of ‘practical orientation’ requires a “focus on practical problems such as providing 
public safety, training workers, caring for ecosystems, or constructing sensible municipal 
budgets” (ibid.). The second principle, ‘bottom-up participation’, expects of “ordinary 
citizens and officials in the field – to apply their knowledge, intelligence, and interest to the 
formulation of solutions” (ibid.). They do not mean that experts do not have a role to play 
but that experts rather do not enjoy exclusive power to make important decisions. The third 
principle, ‘deliberative solution generation’, require of participants to listen to each other’s 
positions and generate group choices after due consideration. Fung and Wright further 
explain that an important feature of genuine deliberation is that participants find reasons 
that they can accept in collective actions (Fung & Wright, 2001, p.19). The generated 
solutions must be considered fair by everyone and accepted by everyone. According to Fung 
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& Wright (ibid.) “*c+hoices will be fair if groups adopt reasonable proposals rather than those 
that garner the greatest self-interested support or political influence.” Solutions must be, 
therefore, geared towards the common good of society. 
 
The institutional design features of EDD are: (1) devolution of power; (2) centralized 
supervision and coordination; and (3) state centred, not voluntaristic. The first institutional 
design feature “entails the administrative and political devolution of power to local action 
units” (Fung & Wright, 2001, p. 21). These units “are not merely advisory, but rather 
creatures of a transformed state endowed with substantial public authority” (ibid.). The 
devolution of power will help with the implementation and decision-making processes of 
public policy. This will also ensure that lower levels are taken seriously with regards to 
decision-making. The second design feature, ‘centralized supervision and coordination’, 
ensures that local units do not operate as autonomous, atomized sites of decision making 
(Fung & Wright, 2001, p. 22). “The rigidity of *autonomy+ leads it too often to disrespect 
local circumstance and intelligence and as a result it has a hard time learning from 
experience” (Fung & Wright, 2001, p. 23). The institutional design feature, ‘state centred and 
not voluntaristic’, wants to “colonize state power and transform formal governance 
institutions” (ibid.). This design property “seeks to transform the mechanisms of state power 
into permanently mobilized deliberative – democratic, grassroots forms” (ibid.). There are 
many cases in practice where citizens and pressure groups temporarily have the power to 
force authority to implement decisions that will serve their interest. On the contrary, EDD is 
a transformative “attempt to *institutionalize+ the on-going participation of ordinary 
citizens” (ibid.).  
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It is important to note that there are generally problems with accountability, participation 
and representation in liberal democracies across the globe. The deliberative democracy 
model was an attempt by democratic theorist (Bohman 1998 and Cohen 1996) to deepen 
the liberal representative democracy in terms of participation. The EDD approach by Fung 
and Wright (2001) was therefore a notable attempt to design a model which encourages 
sustainable participation in communities. The second part of this chapter discusses the 
procedural dimensions of democracy which are participation, representation and 
accountability (Diamond and Morlino, 2005). Through this it does not only establish a 
framework to assess the South African local governance and the VPUU methodology but it 
also answers the theoretical sub-research questions.  
 
2.4 Public Participation 
 
Participation is a fairly complex concept. In its simplest form participation means to take part 
in an activity, but if the word ‘participation’ is merged with the words ‘public’, ‘political’ and 
‘community’, then it takes on many different dimensions. All three of these concepts of 
participation (public participation, political participation and community participation) refer 
to specific types of participation. For example, community participation might refer to how a 
community would take part in the decision-making processes of local governance, or in a 
non-governmental project. Political participation, on the other hand, refers to the 
participation of citizens in government, and that is mostly through electing political leaders 
and/or taking part in shaping and implementing policy (Birch, 1993, p.80). Public 
participation arguably encapsulates both community participation and political participation, 
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because the term ‘public’ refers to all the spaces regulated by the state, whether this is the 
municipal council or the community hall (The Routledge Dictionary of Politics, 2003).  
 
Furthermore, participation as a practice has a set criteria which practitioners on a daily basis 
use. According to Midgley (1986, p.25)  
 
participation requires the voluntary and democratic involvement of people in (a) 
contributing to the development effort, (b) sharing equitably in the benefits derived 
therefrom and (c) decision-making in respect of setting goals, formulating policies 
and planning and implementing economic and social development programmes. 
 
However, one need to note that there is a difference between authentic participation and 
pseudo-participation. According to (Midgley, 1986, p.26) authentic participation will involve 
all three criteria that were set above but pseudo-participation will limit community 
involvement to implementation or to ratify decisions already taken by external bodies. In 
this regard Midgley (1986, p.26) indicates that “the involvement of the population in 
implementation can hardly be considered to be community participation unless there is at 
least some degree of sharing of decisions with the community.” Authentic participation of 
communities is therefore the ideal type of participation to strive for.  
 
However, “*c+ommunity participation is said to be achieved when programmes which are 
desired and utilized by the community are effectively sustained by them after all external 
support has been phased out” (Midgley, 1986, p.27). This, therefore, means that the aim of 
participation especially community participation is to be sustainable and on-going. Given 
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this, participation can be defined as an on-going activity by which citizens or communities 
shape and implement public policy in a sustainable manner.  
 
Furthermore, according to Richard Ballard (2008, p. 168) participation as a method can be 
used for two major kinds of political purposes: (1) it can be used as an information gathering 
exercise which better informs officials about the needs of citizens, and (2) a way of engaging 
the government on the best ways of meeting social needs. In addition to the purpose of 
participation, there are also “spaces” of participation. According to Lefebvre in Cornwall, 
(2002, p. 6) “space is a social product ... it is not simply ... a neutral container waiting to be 
filled, but is a dynamic, humanly constructed means of control.” In this Cornwall (2002), 
Gaventa (2006) and Ballard (2008) have identified “invited”, “invented” and “closed” spaces 
of participation. Given this, neither invited nor invented spaces would be neutral because 
each type of space has a certain agenda to represent. In ‘closed spaces’ “decisions are made 
by a set of actors behind closed doors, without any pretence of broadening the boundaries 
for inclusion ... closed spaces may seek to restore legitimacy by creating invited space” 
(Gaventa, 2006, p. 35).  
 
According to Ballard (2008, p. 180) inviting participation might allow an authority to claim 
that there should be no need for anyone to operate outside of those invited spaces because 
it has established its moral authority as a supporter of participation, it can demand to know 
why it would be necessary to operate outside of those forums it has established for the 
purpose of participation. Furthermore “the invited kind ... is conducted on the state’s terms 
rather than the terms of the community” (Ballard, 2008, p.181). This shows that invited 
spaces do not necessarily serve the needs of citizens. 
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According to Gaventa (2006, p. 27) invented spaces “are claimed by less powerful actors 
from or against the power holders, or created more autonomously by them.” Invented 
spaces might present in different forms such as by formal invitation, by formal right, by 
creating non-state institutions, by creating civil society organisations (CSOs) or by collective 
transitory action (such as protests or land occupations) (Gaventa ibid.). Given the latter 
discussion on participation, it is important to note that in South Africa ‘invented’ spaces 
most of the time presents itself in some sort of protest. Power holders assert that protests 
and social movements have no value in the democratic dispensation because it might be 
threat to the states legitimacy (Ballard, 2008). According to Habermas in Cornwall (2002, 
p.4) developing an autonomous public sphere outside the domain of the state is a 
precondition for citizen engagement that does not simply serve to legitimate the existing 
political system. The criticism here is that legitimizing the state does not necessarily mean 
that the state is delivering most needed services.  
 
Apart from the ‘spaces’ of participation power also play a crucial role in shaping 
participation. According to Cornwall (2002, p. 8) one needs to look at what the public sphere 
comes to represent and how it is constituted to recognise the role of power. This means that 
one need to look at whose interest is being served and how participation in decision-making 
is structured. Essential questions to ask are: who makes the decisions (an elected few?) and 
who is benefitting? To clarify these questions Cornwall (ibid.) argues that power relations 
pervade any space of participation. Spaces made available by the powerful may be 
discursively bounded to permit only limited citizen influence, colonizing interaction and 
stifling dissent. She also makes this point: spaces, in which citizens are invited to participate 
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as well as those they create for themselves, are never neutral. The one party that deploys 
the most power in any particular space usually will have their interests best served. 
 
Another dimension to participation is the arena in which it takes place. Gaventa (2006, p. 36) 
argues that there are three arenas of participation namely: the global, the national and the 
local environments. According to Gaventa (ibid.) some scholars argues that participatory 
practices must begin at the local level while others believe that power is shifting towards 
globalised actors and, therefore, struggles for participation must start at that level. The 
reality, however, is that participatory practices must be at all levels because “*p+oor people 
are excluded from participation in governance. State institutions are often neither 
responsive nor accountable to the poor …” (Marayan in Gaventa, 2006, p. 26). In most cases 
the poor want to participate in the governance processes to ensure that governments 
respond to their needs but they need to be empowered. One, therefore, notices many new 
forms of inclusion by the poor: “ranging from provisions for participatory planning at the 
local government level in India and the Philippines, to participatory budgeting and 
participatory health councils in Brazil, to citizen monitoring committees in Bolivia, to forms 
of public referenda and citizen consultation in Europe” (Gaventa, 2006, p. 31).  
 
In summary, participation is a practice that requires the voluntary and democratic 
involvement of people (Midgley, 1986). It is also a method used for information gathering or 
engaging government on best ways of meeting social needs (Ballard, 2008). Participation 
also has different ‘space’ and different arenas where participation takes place (Cornwall, 
2002 and Gaventa, 2006). Lastly, power also plays a crucial role in participation as it will 
determine whose interests will be served (Cornwall, 2002). This particular framework helps 
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to identify the shortcomings of local governance in Chapter three and is used to assess the 
VPUU methodology in chapter four. 
 
2.5 Political Representation 
 
Consider the following example as a means to illustrate the complex nature of 
representation. A B.Com class consisting of 280 students has to elect a class representative 
that will represent the class at the faculty board. The students in the class nominated three 
students (student X, student Y and student Z) for election and only one can be the 
representative. The results of the voting process were as follow: student X – 93 votes, 
student Y – 93 votes and student Z 94 votes. This means that student Z was elected as class 
representative based on a simple majority. The election of Z leaves one with a number of 
questions. Firstly, does Z represent the supporters of X and Y also or is Z only representing 
his/her supporters? Secondly, if Z is representing the whole class does he/she take the 
mandate from the class or does he/she act independently. Thirdly, how would Z account to 
the class and is it necessary for him/her to account? Fourthly, would the election of the class 
representative encourage students to participate in student governance? To answer these 
questions it is necessary to start with the origins of representation and sees how this 
concept has developed over time to its modern conception.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
2.5.1 Origins of Political Representation 
 
The concept of representation can be traced back as far as the ancient Roman Empire. Pitkin 
(1972, p. 2) argues that the “concept of representation, particular of human beings 
representing other human beings, is essentially a modern one.” The “ancient Greeks had no 
corresponding word” (Pitkin, 1972, pp. 2/3), the Romans, however, had the word 
repraesentare, from which our own ‘representation’ derives by way of old French. But it was 
not before the parliamentary system emerge in England that the literal meaning was 
attached to the word in a political context. Pitkin (1972, p. 3) explains – “neither the concept 
nor the institutions to which it was applied were linked with elections or democracy nor was 
representation considered a matter of right.” In England the king’s council seems to have 
begun as a matter of royal convenience and need rather through elections. This was more of 
a duty and was reluctantly performed by nobles and as time passed parliamentary 
representation in England was used to further local interests (Pitkin, 1972, p.3). By the 
seventeenth century the right to elect a Member of Parliament could be claimed by poor 
men.  
 
Furthermore, the American Revolution added substantively to the concept of representation 
through “rallying [the] cry … taxation without representation is tyranny” (Pitkin, 1972, p. 3). 
And so was it turned into a right of man. “This representation came to mean popular 
representation, and to be linked with the idea of self-government … And that is how it 
became embodied in our institutions” (Pitkin, 1972, p. 3). For Pitkin (1972, p. 9) 
“representation ... means the making present in some sense of something which is 
nevertheless not present literally or in fact.” This explanation of representation reflects “a 
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paradox, and thus a fundamental dualism is built into the meaning of representation” 
(Pitkin, 1972, p. 9). On the one hand there is the autonomy of the representative that needs 
to be considered because the representative needs power to make certain decisions. And on 
the other hand the representative’s genuine commitment to the interest of the represented 
which one can refer to as his/her representativeness (Lavalle, Houtzager and Castello, 2005). 
It is this paradox that the majority of scholars on representation are trying to engage and 
this has caused a vast amount of literature that tried to explain this dualism.  
 
Many authors (Plotke 1997, Mansbridge 2003, Dovi 2006) refer to Pitkin’s work on 
representation as the most comprehensive. Pitkin was the first person to categorise the 
concept of representation into four categories namely: formalistic representation, 
descriptive representation, symbolic representation and substantive representation. 
According to Pitkin (1972, p. 39) the formalistic view of representation views “a 
representative *as+ someone who has been authorised to act.” The word authorization here 
explains this form of representation. Authorisation focuses on the means by which 
representatives obtain his or her standing, status, position or office (Dovi, 2006). For 
example, one will look at the institutional arrangements of representation, the mechanisms 
that brought the representative in power.  
 
Furthermore, the second categorisation is the descriptive view or representation. 
Representatives are elected because they resemble a certain feature of a certain group but 
as a representative it does not necessarily mean that he or she will act on behalf of the 
interests of the group that elected him or her. For example, people from the same race may 
want a representative of their race to represent them or people from the same gender may 
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want someone of their gender to represent them. Here the emphasis is on the appearance 
and on the description of the representative or to the extent to which a representative 
resembles those being represented (Dovi, 2006).  
 
The third category of representation is symbolic representation. Here the focus is not on the 
“authorisation” neither the “outer appearance” of the representative but on what the 
representative ‘stands for’ (Pitkin, 1972). For example, a person can be elected because he 
or she is against racism and inequality. The representative is elected as a symbol for non-
racialism and equality. The last category of representation is substantive representation. 
Here representation is an activity. The focus is “what the representative does and how he 
does it” (Pitkin, 1972, p. 143). For example, if a representative is elected because he or she 
made certain policy promises during the elections, the representative in this case will be 
assessed to which extent he or she meets his or her promises. According to Dovi (2006) the 
question that needs to be asked is whether the representative advances the policy 
preferences that serve the interest of the represented.  
 
2.5.2 Models of Representation and the Process of Representation 
 
Lavalle et al (2005) argues that there are mainly two models of representation that has been 
used by governments. The first is the parliamentary model of representation where people 
elect representatives and parliament represents the people. In this model there is a direct 
relationship between the representative and the represented (see Diagram 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
Diagram 2.5.2-1: Traditional Model 
 
 
The second is the Party Model of representation. In this model the party play a mediation 
role to ensure that the mandate of the people is on the parliamentary agenda (see Diagram 
2).  
 
 
Diagram 2.5.2-2: Party Model 
 
 
Even this model has shortcomings especially if the party appoints the members of 
parliament (MPs). In this case the party becomes the decision-maker and also decides who 
must represent or not and not necessarily the electorate.  
 
The researcher, conceptualises the process of representation as follow: an electorate elects 
representatives through certain mechanisms under certain condition to perform a specific 
mandate in government and are held to account on a regular basis as one cannot discuss 
representation without discussing accountability. 
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Diagram 2.5.2-3: The Process of Representation 
 
2.5.3 Theory versus Practice 
 
It is important to note that Pitkin’s work is conceptual and theoretical and can apply across 
contexts. Jane Mansbridge (2003) researched the actual practice of representation in the 
United States of America (USA) and found four types of representation. These forms of 
representation are: (1) promissory; (2) anticipatory; (3) gyroscopic; and (4) surrogacy. 
Promissory representation is regarded as the traditional model of representation which 
focuses on the idea that during campaigns representatives makes promises to constituents 
whom they then keep or fails to keep (Mansbridge, 2003, p.515). Dovi (2006) argues that 
promissory representation strongly resembles Pitkin’s discussion of formalistic 
representation. Representatives are, therefore, authorised to represent and would account 
to account to those who elected them.  
 
Mansbridge’s second form of representation is anticipatory representation. In this form of 
representation “the voter looks back to the past behaviour of a representative in deciding 
*on+ how to vote in the next election” (Mansbridge, 2003, p.516). Here the “representatives 
focus on what they think their constituents will reward in the next election and not what 
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they promised during the campaign of the previous election” (Dovi, 2006). The third form of 
representation that Mansbridge conceptualize is gyroscopic representation. Mansbridge 
explains that: 
 
In all versions of gyroscopic representation, the voters affect political outcomes not 
by affecting the behaviours of the representatives … but by selecting and placing in 
the political system representatives whose behaviour is to some degree predictable 
in advance based on their observable characteristics (Mansbridge, 2003, p. 521). 
 
The last form of representation is surrogate representation which “occurs when a legislator 
represents constituents outside of their districts” (Dovi, 2006). According to Mansbridge 
(2003, p.522) a surrogate representative “has no electoral relationship – [and] is, a 
representative in another district.” If one considers the work of both Pitkin and Mansbridge 
one can conclude that there are differences between practice and theory, hence, the work 
of Mansbridge brings something significant to the fore. She demonstrated that there are a 
gap between the theoretical and the actual practice of representation. This therefore implies 
that there might be ‘new’ forms of practical representation.  
 
2.5.4 Civil Organisations and the reconfiguration of representation 
 
Recently, there was a debate on the reconfiguration of representation and unlike in the past 
it looked at the role civil organisations play in reconfiguring the notion of representation 
(Manin 1997 and Lavalle et al 2005). The ‘reconfiguration’ debate is a theoretical debate 
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between two groups of scholars. The group first argues for the party model of 
representation and the group second argues for the return of the charismatic national 
leaders. Lavalle et al (2005) criticism of the ‘reconfiguration’ of representation debate is that 
it excludes the role of civil organisations. They believe that civil organisations represent 
society in matters of budget and might even play a mediation role similar to that of the 
political party.  
 
During the past decade the role of civil organisations as representatives of society has been 
examined by a number of scholars (Lavalle et al, 2005, p. 8). And it raises a number of 
questions: (1) who does civil organisations represent? (2) How do civil organisations stay 
accountable and to whom do they account? (3) Are there specific mechanisms designed for 
civil organisations? And (4) what criteria do researchers use to see whether civil 
organisations are representative or not? These are important questions to ask but it will not 
be answered in this research.  
 
2.5.5 A Framework for Analysis 
 
Given the work of Pitkin (1972), Plotke (1997), Mansbridge (2003), Lavalle et al (2005) and 
Dovi 2006 one can establish the following framework. Plotke (1997, p.28) conceptualizes a 
number of elements for representation. (i) non-identity – a particular person represents 
people in general; (ii) contextual – represent some in certain geographic areas; (iii) 
recognition – relationship is based on a social understanding; (iv) authorisation – one’s 
representative is authorize to vote on legislation; (v) truthful depictions; and (vi) decisions 
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taken is binding – outcomes of voting process is binding on everyone. Furthermore, Suzanne 
Dovi (2006) argues that political representation on any account will exhibit four 
components: (1) some party that is representing (the representative, an organisation, 
movement, state agency, etc.); (2) some party that is being represented (the constituent, the 
clients, etc.); (3) something that is being represented (opinions, perspectives, interests, etc.); 
and (4) a setting within which the activity of representation is taking place (the political 
context). In addition to this, representatives can be either delegates or trustees. 
“Representatives who are delegates simply follow the expressed preferences of their 
constituents … Trustees are representatives who follow their own understanding of the best 
action to pursue” (Dovi, 2006, n.p.). It is however difficult to be both at once.  
 
2.6 Accountability 
 
Pitkin (1972, p. 57) argues that “*i+n genuine representation, the representative must 
eventually be held accountable so that he will be responsive to the needs and claims of his 
constituents, to the obligation implicit in his position.” If one consider this statement, it is 
possible to identify a number of key ingredients for accountability. Firstly, “the 
representative must be responsible to the represented” (Pitkin, 1972, p. 55). 
Representatives have to see that the needs of the represented are met. Secondly, what the 
representative say and does must be in line with the needs and desires of their constituents. 
Therefore, he or she must be responsive to what his or her constituents need. Thirdly, if the 
representative does not adhere to the mandate of the represented, she or he must be 
removed from office. Therefore, there must be certain mechanisms that will enforce 
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accountability, and the most common mechanism of accountability is regular free and fair 
elections. Lastly, according to Pitkin (1972, p. 55) “being a representative means precisely 
having new and special obligations.” Obligation here refers to the actions of the 
representative by which he or she is morally or legally bound. For Mansbridge, the basis on 
which someone is authorised will inform the basis on which they are held accountable 
(Mansbridge, 2003, p. 516).  
 
Given this, one is able to provide a workable definition of accountability that can be utilised 
for this study. According to Memela et al (p.3, 2008) “*accountability is+ the extent to which 
political actors are seen to be acting responsibly and responsively to their constituents and 
the way information is made available to enable the constituency to hold the political actors 
directly accountable.”  
 
At a practical level there are two opposing views with regards to accountability. The one 
view is about how the representative spends public money. According to Moncrieffe (1998, 
p. 388) accountability is a contract between the state and the public, which means the 
political representatives in government will be held accountable for their actions through 
periodic elections. Goetz and O’Brien (1998) have a different conception of accountability, 
for them a government is accountable when it is able to address the needs of the poor. Here 
the focus is on how public money is spent, the spending might be transparent, but if it is 
misguided it means that government is not accountable.  
 
Furthermore, accountability is the responsibility of three groups of stakeholders in a 
democratic society. Firstly, there is the government who is “responsible for implementing 
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policies and strategies that enhance democratic objective and reduce oppression” 
(Moncrieffe, 1998, p. 393). Secondly, there are public officials that are “answerable to the 
government and to the electorate for how policies are administrated” (Moncrieffe, 1998, p. 
393). The last group is, interest groups, factions and citizens, and they “are accountable to 
each other and to the agreed policy objectives” (Moncrieffe, 1998, p. 393). Therefore, 
accountability it is not only the responsibility of the government, but everyone’s in a 
democratic society.  
 
There are also ways to measure political accountability. The traditional way of measuring 
accountability is to look at the openness and transparency of managing public expenditure 
(Moncrieffe, 1998, p. 393). In addition to this, there is another way of measuring 
accountability, and it is to look at “the extent to which the government provided timely 
information and opportunities for deliberation and debate” (Moncrieffe, 1998, p. 393). 
There are also ‘checks and balances’ in a democratic society. These checks and balances 
generally refer to the separation of powers between the judiciary, the legislature and the 
executive. Checks and balances in most cases are enshrined in the Constitutions of states to 
prevent one arm acquiring more power than others. Lastly, accountability can also be 
measured by looking at the effectiveness of government’s monitoring and evaluation 
component (Moncrieffe, 1998, p. 393).  
 
Moreover, there are also certain values to accountability, according to Cornwall and Gaventa 
(2001) “*t+here is a fundamental inseparability of accountability, transparency and trust.” 
From this it is possible to identify two values which are central to the concept of 
accountability: transparency and trust. Transparency refers to how information and taxes of 
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the public are handled. This means that information government and public money must 
freely accessible and open to public scrutiny. Trust on the other hand refers to the level of 
confidence stakeholders have in one another’s agenda.  
 
However, apart from the values of accountability, and the ways to measure accountability, 
there are also constraints to accountability. Moncrieffe (1998, pp. 399-400) mentions the 
following three constraints: political culture, institutions and power relations. Political 
culture in a democratising country such as South Africa is of such a nature that citizens 
distrust ‘invited’ spaces to participation, and therefore in most cases citizens opt for violent 
protest marches to voice their concern, as it in the past under apartheid it was the only 
available mechanism of engaging the state. 
 
2.6.1 Accountability in Development Projects 
 
Accountability in development projects is rather complex. Most development aid is from 
donors agencies that impose certain requirements for financial accountability on NGOs. 
According to Cronin and O’Regan (2002, p.5) in development projects accountability in most 
cases are directed upwards rather than downwards. This is because accountability in 
development works has been referred to in the domain of finance, which infer that it 
neglects measures of accountability towards the community. In development projects 
“*a+ccountability exists between peer groups and operates at many levels” (Cronin and 
O’Regan, 2002, p. 6). The diagram below illustrates the complexity of accountability and the 
multiple stakeholders that are involved to ensure accountability in development projects. It 
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shows that upwardly NGOs responsible for the development is accountable to trustees, 
donors and host governments and downwardly to partners, staff and communities.  
 
 
Diagram 2.6.1-1: Accountability in Development projects 
 
2.6.2 The Components of Accountability in Development Projects 
 
According to Cronin and O’Regan (2002, pp. 10 -13) accountability comprises of four main 
stages namely:  
(i) Responsibility 
The first stage focuses on the agreement of clear roles and responsibilities of the 
organisation, with compliance to agreed standards. Responsibility refers to the 
“clarity of roles and responsibilities for all concerned” (ibid). A Memorandum of 
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Understanding or Code of Good Practices is use in practice to ensure 
stakeholders take responsibility for the project. Taking action for which an 
organisation is responsible, and evaluating that action 
(ii) Action and Evaluation 
To ensure accountability it is necessary to monitor the process and evaluating the 
difference between the plans and the results of the project. Furthermore, 
financial accountability is also necessary which is to ensure that taxpayer, donor 
and government funds are not misused. 
(iii) Reporting 
Reporting must be based on factual and balanced information. Annual reports 
are good instruments but in most cases it is not accessible to the broader 
communities. The best is to encourage a two-way reporting system.  
(iv) Responsiveness 
Responsiveness refers to responding to and complying with agreed standards of 
performance and the views and needs of their stakeholders. Responsiveness also 
means to encourage greater participation from primary stakeholders. 
Furthermore, it is also necessary for Aid actors to respond to primary. “Power 
relations within the aid process should therefore be carefully analysed” (Cronin 
and O’Regan, 2002, p.13). 
 
In summary, when representatives are elected they are expected to fulfil a particular 
mandate given by their constituents. These representatives must be held accountable if they 
are non-performing. Central to accountability are values of transparency and trust. If the 
representative does not adhere to the mandate or do not respective these values voters 
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must have the opportunity to sanction the representative. In addition, accountability in 
development projects tends to be upwards toward to the sponsor of the project as well as 
horizontal to partners. These insights will prove critical in our forthcoming analysis. 
Considering this it, it provides a framework to assess the VPUU methodology and local 
governance in South Africa.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter demonstrated that the liberal representative democracy evolved over a long 
period of time. Central to liberal democracies are the liberal values of individual freedom 
and equality. However, even though liberal democratic institutions are the preferred choice 
of the majority of states around the world, they are not without their flaws. Gaventa (2006) 
and Luckham et al (2000) have indicated that liberal democracies in the global North and the 
global South are experiencing a number of democratic deficits. Since these deficits became 
visible, democratic theorists have tried to deepen liberal democracies by making it more 
participatory. One notable attempt was that by Fung and Wright (2001) with EDD. The aim 
of EDD is to ensure sustainable participation by communities in the decision-making of 
government.  
 
Furthermore, there generally seem to be problems with participation, representation and 
accountability in democracies in both the global North and the global South. Given this, this 
chapter took a closer look at these concepts. Participation generally refers to how citizens 
participate in the decision-making structures of the state. Representation refers to elected 
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representatives who represent the interest of their constituencies in governance. 
Accountability refers to ways in which these representatives are held responsible for the 
decisions they take on behalf of citizens. The discussion on participation, representation and 
accountability allowed the researcher to establish a framework to assess the South African 
look governance and the VPUU methodology. The next chapter focuses on the South African 
system of local governance in terms of participation, representation and accountability. 
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Chapter 3 – Participation, Representation and Accountability 
in South African Local Governance 
 
3. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter indicated that democracies in the global North and the global South 
are experiencing democratic deficits. South Africa as a developing country in the global 
South is no different to those democracies. In order to sustain and deepen South Africa’s 
young democracy, it is imperative that it has strong mechanisms of participation, 
representation and accountability. Post 1994, the South African government introduced a 
system of participatory democracy “within a base framework of constitutional and electoral 
democracy” (Fifteen Year Review, 2007, p. 18). The aim is to deepen the South African 
democracy at all levels of government and seeing that local government is the closest to the 
people, it is their responsibility to ensure participatory democracy is practised by citizens. 
Thus, at the local level participatory democracy is extended by a number of policies of which 
the White Paper on Local Government of 1998, the Local Government: Municipal Structures 
Act of 1998 and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act of 2000 are the most notable. 
According to the Fifteen Year Review (2007, pp. 7/8): 
  
[s]uccessive policies and laws have helped deepen participatory democracy. The 
mechanisms include mandatory community consultation in formulating municipal 
integrated development plan (IDPs), izimbizo (executive interaction with 
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communities around services and development), ward committees, Thusong Service 
Centres (previously multi-purpose community centres [MPPCs]) and community 
development workers (CDWs). 
 
According to Aragones and Sánchez-Pagés (2004, p.2) “*p+articipatory democracy is a 
process of collective decision making that combines elements from both Direct and 
Representative Democracy: Citizens have the ultimate power to decide on policy and 
politicians assume the role of policy implementation.” Given this explanation, forms of 
public participation, representations and accountability are enhanced and reformed to 
respond to the aims of participatory democracy. It is worthy to note that South Africa has 
through legislation and policy began to strengthen forms of public participation but 
neglected representation and accountability dimensions of deepening democracy. The aim 
of this chapter is therefore twofold. Firstly, it provides a policy framework with regards to 
public participation, representation and accountability, and the secondly it investigates 
these forms in practice. In doing so, it draws on policy documents, government reports and 
empirical research conducted on the South African local governance.  
 
Additionally, this chapter will indicate that although a substantial literature exists on public 
participation in local governance, a relatively smaller amount been published on 
representation and accountability. In addition to this, this chapter will highlight the major 
weaknesses in terms of participation, representation and accountability in local governance. 
This indicates a need to reform and enhance the current forms of participation, 
representation and accountability to strengthen participatory democracy in local 
government.  
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3.1 Public Participation as Conceptualise by the White Paper on Local 
Government 
 
As indicated in Chapter one, numerous scholars believe that the local governance 
mechanisms for participation such as ward committees and IDP forums are malfunctioning. 
The South African Constitution provides the basis for participation at local government. 
According to Section 152 of the South African Constitution, services must be provided in a 
democratic manner. The local governance system must be accountable and it must also 
encourage participation of local communities and organisations in matters of local 
municipalities. This laid the foundation for the White Paper on Local Government of 1998.  
 
The White Paper on Local Government (WPLG) of 1998 provides a good frame of reference 
for participation in local governance. According to the WPLG, it is the responsibility of 
municipalities to adopt inclusive approaches to foster community participation. This must 
include strategies aimed at removing obstacles to, and actively encouraging the participation 
of marginalised groups in the local municipality. The WPLG also mention levels of 
participation. According to the WPLG of 1998, there are four levels of participation in 
municipal affairs. The first is as voters. It is important that municipalities constantly make 
citizens aware of the need to vote. This can be done through civic education programmes, 
ward-level activities to continuously connect elected leaders and their constituencies and 
active electoral campaigning around clear policy choices that affect the lives of citizens.  
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The second level is as participants in the policy process. At this level municipalities should 
develop mechanisms to ensure citizen participation in policy initiation and formulation, and 
the monitoring and evaluation of decision-making and implementation municipalities can 
also use the following approaches: forums initiated within or outside local government; 
structured stakeholder involvement in certain council committees; participatory budgeting 
initiatives and focus group participatory action research conducted (WLPG of 1998). The 
third level is focused at the consumer and end-user level. As consumers, the main contact of 
citizens with local government is through the consumption of municipal services. So, it is 
here that municipalities need to begin to build relationships with citizens and communities. 
It is therefore important for municipalities to apply the Batho Pele principles as set out by 
the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (Batho Pele) of 1997 to achieve 
this. The fourth level is as partners in resource mobilisation. Partnerships are vital to 
promote emerging businesses, non-governmental organisations and community-based 
organisations (WPLG of 1998). From this, it is apparent that the WPLG set the tone as to how 
public participation at community level must take place. The local government acts guided 
by the WPLG institutionalises community participation in local governance.  
  
3.1.1 Community Participation in Local Government 
 
The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998 and the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act of 2000 borrows heavily from the White Paper on Local Government 
to institutionalise public participation in the South African local government. According to 
section 72 (3) of the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 “the object of a ward committee is to 
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enhance participatory democracy in local government.” Participatory democracy here must 
be seen as a project rather than an actual democratic system; the aim is to make the existing 
representative model more participatory as highlighted by section 16 of the Municipal 
Systems Act. Furthermore, the aim of participatory democracy is to give voice to the 
marginalised and those that were previously excluded from the decision-making processes. 
Consequently, in a participatory democracy all citizens are actively involved in all of the 
important decisions of government. Firstly, Municipalities are mandated to encourage, and 
create conditions for local communities to participate in the affairs of the municipality. 
Municipalities must come up with ways to include the community in the IDP process, in the 
performance management process, in the budgeting process and in strategic decisions 
relating to the provision of municipal services (Section 16). Participating in the Integrated 
Development Planning (IDP) process and the budgeting process was proposed by the WPLG 
of 1998. The second responsibility of municipalities is to build the capacity of local 
communities to enable them to participate in the affairs of their municipalities (Section 16 
(1) (b) (i)). A third responsibility is to use its resources and annually allocate funds in its 
budget to encourage community participation and to build the capacity of the community to 
participate in the affairs of the municipality.  
 
The Municipal Structures Act proposes various mechanism, processes and procedures for 
community participation. Mechanisms include ward committees, councillors, petitions, 
complaints, public meetings, consultative sessions and advisory committees (Section 17). 
Chief among these mechanisms is the ward committee. Ward committees were first 
mentioned by the WPLG. Ward committees were first proposed for Metropolitan 
municipalities only. The WPLG proposed two types of metropolitan government, namely: a 
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metropolitan government with Metropolitan Substructures, or a metropolitan government 
with Ward Committees. In addition, the WPLG proposed that Ward Committees are area-
based committees whose boundaries coincide with ward boundaries. Ward Committees 
have no original power and duties, rather their power and duties must be delegated by the 
Metropolitan Council. The extent of their power must be advisory. The Paper also proposed 
that the metro council establishes a ward committee for each ward and that it must be 
chaired by the Ward councillor. Furthermore, the role of Ward Committees “is the 
facilitation of local community participation in decisions which affect the local community … 
*and+ the articulation of local community interest” (The White Paper on Local Government 
of 1998, p. 55). Therefore, if one considers their lack of ‘original’ power, their advisory role 
in council and their role to facilitate local community participation, it is clear ward 
committees were conceptualise to legitimise decisions of local governance. Furthermore, 
the roles, duties and functions of Ward Committees in the Municipal Structures Act are 
almost exactly the same as it was conceptualised in the White Paper. The difference is that 
the Municipal Structures Act legalised Ward Committees as the preferred mechanism of 
community participation in local governance.  
 
As illustrated below, so far research indicates that citizens are not actively involved in ward 
committee and that ward committees do not encourage the majority of citizens to 
participate in it. From government’s framework one notices that they identified the 
following mechanism of participation: ward committees, the IDP process, public meetings 
and the budgetary process. But apart from these mechanisms there are other forms of 
public participation at the local level. The following section discusses what research indicates 
thus far in terms of these mechanisms of participation.  
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3.1.2 Ward Committees and Other Forms of Participation 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, ‘spaces’ are not neutral because it is constructed to serve a 
particular interest (Cornwall 2002 and Gaventa 2006). A ward committee is an ‘invited’ 
space that is created to serve the interest of the state because it has to consist of ten 
members with the ward councillors as the chairperson. With the ward councillor in control 
of the agenda, he or she can dictate the terms of engaging the community. In addition, 
research on ward committees indicates that most ward committees experience the 
following problems: 
 No clear role in local governance; 
 No real power to influence the municipal council; 
 Representivity, functionality and politicisation; 
 Have limited resources to function properly; and  
 Tensions between ward councillors and ward committee members as some of them 
have aspirations to become ward councillors themselves (Buccus and Hicks 2008, 
Smith and Visser 2009, and Piper 2010). 
 
These problems hamper optimal community participation in the decision-making structures 
of the municipality. It is evident from the manner in which ward committees are structured 
that the political elites want to control the how, when, what and where the community must 
participate. The failure of the ward committees as the primary mechanism of community 
participation is a potential reasons for citizens preferring delivery ‘service protest’ marches 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
over ‘invited spaces’ (Nleya, Thompson, Tapscott, Piper and Essau, 2011). Apart from ward 
committees there are other forms of public participation that have been employed at local 
government level.  
 
Research conducted by Buccus et al (2007) identifies four forms of public participation at 
local governance level. These are the following: public consultations; organisation driven 
participation; legalised participation; and participation through third parties. Firstly, public 
consultations usually take place through Imbizo’s, public meetings, community workshops 
and stakeholders summits. According to Mathagu (2010, p. 4) “*t+he word ‘imbizo’ is a Zulu 
term meaning the gathering of the subjects of the Kings.” However, as late “imbizos” is a 
concept first introduced by former president Thabo Mbeki as a way of bring national and 
provincial government closer to the people. According to Smith (2007, p. 23) “*i+zimbizo 
would appear to be geared as forums enabling government to communicate its programmes 
and plans, and for citizens to raise problems and concerns.” However, this particular 
mechanism of participation is very irregular and is not formally institutionalised (Buccus et 
al, 2008).  
 
Secondly, the difference between organisational driven participation and legalised 
participation is that organisational driven participation is an innovative institutional driven 
form of participation and is not prescribe by the Local Government Acts. Organisational 
driven participation on the other hand uses mechanisms that are institutionalised but 
usually focus on a particular process, for example IDP forums. IDP forums however is not 
formally recognised in terms of the Local Government Acts but can be created by 
municipalities in terms of the Municipal Systems Act (Buccus et al, 2008). In terms of section 
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29 of the Municipal Systems Act it the states the following with regards to public 
participation in the IDP process: 
 the community must be consulted on its development needs and priorities 
 the local community must participate in the drafting of the integrated development 
plan; and  
 organs of state, including traditional authorities, and other role players must be 
consulted on the drafting of the IDP. 
According to Smith (2007, p.21) IDP representative forums may include the councillors, 
traditional leaders, ward committee members, head of departments, civil society 
organisations, resource people or advisors and community representatives. However, IDP 
Forums strictly focus on the IDP process and not all municipalities have these forums. 
 
One needs to bear in mind that there are ‘invited’ and ‘invented’ spaces of public 
participation (Cornwall, 2002). Therefore, one can classify these four types of public 
participation as ‘invited’ spaces. In ‘invited’ spaces the state determines the terms and 
conditions through which communities can engage municipal councils. However, citizens 
also ‘invent’ spaces to engage local government on issues of service delivery. 
 
A protest march is a form of an ‘invented’ space. Communities prefer this mechanism of 
participation because it is where they can demonstrate power and control the agenda 
(Ballard, 2008). Service delivery protest marches are a common mechanism of public 
participation in the local governance system and seem to be the preferred type of 
participation for the majority of citizens. The majority of these protest marches get good 
media coverage and this usually forces municipalities to respond faster to the demands of 
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citizens (Jain 2010 and Booysen 2007).  
 
 
 
Graph 0-1: Number of Protest Marchs4 
 
The graph indicates that since 2009 there has been a drastic increase in the number of 
service delivery protest marches at municipality level. The graph indicates that half way 
through 2012 a record number of protest marches were recorded (Municipal IQ, July 2012).  
 
As mentioned in Chapter one, Jain (p.31, 2010) reported that the top four reasons 
communities protesting are housing, water, electricity and sanitation. This indicates that 
communities are frustrated with the rate service delivery and will opt for protest marches 
rather than using the structures put in place by government in place. In addition, the nature 
of most of these protest marches is violent. According to Karamoko and Jain (2011, p. 10) 
“*v+iolent protests have been defined … as those protests where some of the participants 
have engaged in physical acts that either cause immediate harm to some person, or are 
substantively likely to result in such harm.” It has also been reported of “instances where 
rocks are thrown at passing motorists, tires are burned to blockade roads, and other similar 
acts …” (ibid.). However, it is important to note that “labelling a protest as violent fails to 
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distinguish between protests that were initially violent, from those that became violent after 
aggressive responses by police” (Karamoko and Jain, 2011, p.11). Therefore, the nature of 
the protest marches might be dependent on the response from the state. 
 
Furthermore, Karamoko and Jain (2011, p.17) identified a trend with regards to the size of 
community protest marches. “In 2007, roughly 26% of protests were large protests, while in 
2008 and 2009 roughly 32% were large protests. In 2010, approximately 38% of protests 
were large protests, and *until June+ 2011 43% of protests have been large protests.” 
Moreover, participation in community protests marches in informal settlements are 
suspected to be higher to that of formal settlements. Research, conducted by Nleya (2011, 
p. 11) in Khayelitsha found that “that participation in protests is relatively higher in informal 
settlements than in formal settlements with attendance rates of 50 per cent in informal 
settlements and 36 per cent in formal settlements.” 
 
This serves as an indication that “community protests are an expected consequence of 
systematic failures in the provision of basic services to the poverty-stricken members of 
South African society” (Karamoko and Jain, 2011, p. 33). Protest marches are indeed a 
worrying trend for South Africa’s democracy if one consider the nature, the size and the 
frequency of these protest marches. This holds the potential to escalate beyond the control 
of the state, and with serious economic implications. 
                                                                                                                               
4 Source: Municipal IQ: Municipal Hotspots Monitor 
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3.1.3 Factors influencing community participation 
 
Netswera (2008, pp. 513-521) found four factors that influence community participation in 
South Africa. These four factors are the following: income and living standards; accessibility 
of the municipality; trust in municipal institutions; and satisfaction with municipal services 
delivery. Netswera (2008, p. 514) argues that “income levels … are a better determinant of 
household participation in the municipality.” This, however, have to be considered with the 
other three factors. To this end, he argues that local government is supposed to “be the 
most accessible sphere of government to local communities through the ward committee 
system” (Netswera, 2008, p. 515).  
 
Netswera (2008) uses the ward committee as a means to test whether a municipality is 
accessible or not. He found “that the worse-off townships … are more likely to participate in 
ward committees that the well-off townships” (Netswera, 2008, p. 516). This simply means 
that the poorer communities will use the ward committees to access the municipality 
whereas richer communities would not. Netswera also argues that trust in municipal 
institutions often influence a community’s participation. Therefore, if a community trusts 
the local municipal institutions they will participate more. He found that people trust the 
church, the media, fellow community members and the police more than they trust local 
government. He also found that local government on the other hand is trusted more than 
both political parties and municipal councillors (Netswera, 2008, p. 518). Lastly, he did not 
found any conclusive evidence that level of satisfaction of communities with regards to 
service delivery affect community participation.  
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In summary, local government wants participation to take place via ward committees, IDP 
forums and public meetings. Local government has also resorted to other forms of 
participation such as the Imbizo to encourage community participation. However, most 
municipalities do not have effective ward committees or IDP forums. Netswera (2008) found 
that communities do not trust local government, political parties and municipal councillors 
as much as they trust the media, the church and following community members. This, 
therefore, might be an explanation why protest marches are the preferred mechanisms to 
engage local government. This, clearly, shows that reforms are needed for participation it 
local governance.  
 
3.2 Representation in South African Local Governance 
 
There is limited research conducted on representation in South African local governance or 
at least as extensively as on community participation. In terms of representation, 
communities are represented by politicians, civil society, traditional leaders and other 
interest groups. In South Africa the most common way of representing the community is 
through elected officials in government. The Constitution of South Africa of 1996 (sections 
46 (1) (d) and 105 (1) (d)) requires national and provincial representatives to be chosen 
through a proportional representation electoral system. This system allows political parties 
to choose representatives when elections take place (Reynolds, 1999). Communities do not 
have much of a choice to elect political representatives because it is ultimately the 
responsibility of the political party to decide who they want as their representatives.  
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At the local level political representatives are chosen by a mixed electoral system. Section 
157 (2) (a) and (b) of the South African Constitution states representatives to a Municipal 
Council must be elected through a system of proportional representation and ward 
representation. Representatives elected through the PR system must be elected from party 
lists (Constitution, section 157 (2) (a)). Therefore, there are two types of representatives at 
the local level. The Municipal Structures Act (Schedule 1 Part 1) recognises two ways of 
representing the ward. The first is through the councillor and the second is through the ward 
committee. Section 73 (2) (a) states that a ward committee must consist of a ward councillor 
who represents the ward in a municipal council. The act makes it clear that ward councillor 
will be the only person in the municipal council to represent the ward. It also set specific 
guidelines as to how ward councillors and PR councillors are elected. Ward councillors are 
directly elected whilst PR councillors are elected from party lists. Therefore, ward councillors 
represents their ward and PR councillors represents their party. In representation terms this 
would mean that ward councillors must represent the interests of the community in 
municipal councils and PR councillors must represent the interest of political parties in 
municipal councils.  
 
In addition to this, the act also recognises that the ward committee plays a representative 
role and it also set a certain framework as to how a representative ward committee will look 
like. Section 73 wants the equitable representation of women as well for a diversity of 
interests to be represented in this regard the Act also “seeks to ensure that fifty percent of 
the candidates are women and that women and men candidates are evenly distributed 
through the list” (Municipal Structures Act, Schedule 1 Part 1). Representation here is very 
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descriptive (see Pitkin 1972) where the description of the candidate is central to the notion 
of representation. 
 
Further, for many years in South Africa women were under represented in local councils but 
post-1994, women representatives at local municipalities have increased mainly due to the 
ANC’s quota system. The ANC was the first political party in South Africa that committed 
itself to a quota system for women in Parliament. It all started with the participation of the 
ANC Women’s League during the constitutional negotiations. Upon the ANC’s formation in 
1912, women were not allowed to participate as members. This led to the formulation of the 
Bantu Women’s League (BWL). The BWL represented, contributed and articulated the 
concerns of African women. In the 1920’s, the ANC accepted the BWL as a branch of the ANC 
and in 1944 women were bestowed ANC membership. In 1948 the ANC Women’s League 
was officially formed.  
 
As the struggle against the apartheid regime intensified, women became increasingly 
involved in the armed struggle. A large number of women joined Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). 
Evidently, both women and men contributed to the struggle against apartheid and 
therefore, during the constitutional negotiations the ANC Women League initiated the 
Women’s National Coalition. The Women’s National Coalition consisted of over a 100 
women’s organisations and groups throughout the country tasked to draw up a charter for 
Women’s rights (Myakayaka-Manzini, 2003, pp. 1-2). 
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It was also during this period that the ANC Women’s League deepened their understanding 
of the structural and complex nature of gender oppression. At the 1991 ANC Conference in 
Kimberley, the ANC Women’s League decided to push for the constitutional recognition of 
30 percent female representation in ANC decision-making structures. The motion was 
rejected at the 1991 ANC conference mainly because branch and provincial candidates 
argued they did not have the mandate to support such a motion (Myakayaka-Manzini, 2003, 
pp. 2-3). After the conference, this decision drew significant bad press for the ANC. 
Moreover; the ANC Women’s League started strategically aligning themselves with leaders 
such as Mandela to support their agenda for a quota system for women (Preece, n.d.). The 
ANC Women’s League preserved and initiated a debate on a quota system in all structures of 
the ANC. This approach finally paid off as the ANC decided on a one-third quota for women 
in the national and provincial decision-making structures of the ANC (Myakayaka-Manzini, 
2003, p. 3) prior to the 1994 election.  
 
Since 1994, the number of women in politics has grown and women’s power has increased. . 
This is attributed to the ANC adopting the principle of parity at their 2007 conference. 
According to the ANC President, Jacob Zuma:  
 
the ANC have to congratulate the ANC Women’s League on its efforts to assert the 
voice and right of women in ANC decision-making processes. [The] Constitution [had] 
been unanimously amended to increase the women quota in [the] structures, from 
30 to 50 percent (Jacob Zuma, 20 December 2007). 
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So far the only other political party that has committed itself to a women’s quota and parity 
is the Congress of the People (COPE). Based on the ANC’s history in supporting women and 
their quota system it is clear that the ANC encourages equal political representation in 
government. However, having more women in parliament or in municipalities does not 
mean there are more women activists in these structures. So far, to a certain extent, the 
ANC quota system yielded positive results especially in terms of the number of women in 
legislatures. According to Morna and Mbadlanyana (p.4, 2011) since 1995 to 2006 women 
representation in local municipality councils has increased but has seen a decrease in the 
2011 elections. According to the authors, in 1995 there was 19 percent, in 2000 29 percent, 
in 2006 40 percent and 2011 38 percent of women in local municipality councils. Apart from 
councillors, representation also takes place via traditional leaders, ward committees, civil 
society and CDWs. The next sections will discuss this in more detail.  
 
3.2.1 Traditional Leadership 
 
Communities can also be represented by traditional leaders at the local level. The South 
African Constitution states that national legislation may provide a role for traditional leaders 
as an institution at local level on matters affecting local communities. In this regard, it was 
the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 that first made provision for how traditional leaders 
have to represent their customary communities. According to the Municipal Structures Act 
of 1998 (section 81 (1), traditional leaders have the right to “participate in the proceedings 
of a municipal council.” The Act however puts a limitation to the number of traditional 
leaders that can participate in a municipal council. According to section 81 (2) (b) of the 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
Municipal Structures Act “*t+he number of traditional leaders that may participate in the 
proceedings of a municipal council may not exceed 20 percent of the total number of 
councilors in that council ...” Moreover, the Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act, 41 of 2003 restrict traditional leaders to district and metropolitan 
municipalities. According to Section 17 (3) (a) of the Act states that the “functions of a local 
house of traditional leaders are to advise the district municipality or the metropolitan 
municipality on matters pertaining to customary law, traditional leadership and traditional 
communities …” 
 
There is current debate regarding the relevance of traditional leadership in a democratic 
South Africa. According to Sithole (2009, p. 41) there are two schools of thought on the 
relevance of traditional leaders; the first one is democratic pragmatism and the second is a 
school of organic democracy. Democratic pragmatists argue that traditional leadership does 
not give everyone a chance to be elected. Further, they also see it as a system that favours 
men via patriarchy and therefore it is detrimental to women’s rights in rural areas. In 
addition to this, they also make the case that traditional leadership was re-inserted because 
of political trade-offs between the government and traditional leadership for purposes of 
facilitating national and local elections (Sithole, 2009, pp. 41-44). 
 
The organic democracy argument on the other hand argues that traditional leadership is a 
unique system of democracy that has been there before colonialism and apartheid. Adding 
to this, “organic democracy proponents believe that traditional leadership offers unique 
attributes of leadership that fulfil specific social and governance needs of people as 
communities (Sithole, 2009, p. 45). Furthermore, organic democrats also see traditional 
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leadership serving a unique purpose in communities which people are entitled to. In 
addition, Cele (2011) identifies a contestation between municipal councilors and traditional 
leaders. According to Cele (2011, p. 10): 
 
Many traditional leaders are arguing that their powers to govern local matters have 
been taken by the municipal councillors. Consistent with its commitment to 
democratic government, the Constitution assigns to local government many of the 
service delivery responsibilities that chiefs assume are theirs. 
 
This might explain why the Status of Local Government in South Africa reported that, “in … 
municipalities with traditional leaders in their areas of jurisdiction, many have reported a 
poor working relationship between themselves and the traditional leaders (Department 
Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs, 2009, p.17). 
 
3.2.2 Ward Committees 
 
Communities can also be represented by ward committees. According to section 73 (2) of 
the Municipal Structures Act a ward committee must consist of the ward councillor and 10 
other people from the community. Ward committees are representative structures of the 
community to deliberate on community issues. Resolutions made by the ward committee 
will be given to ward councillor who in turn will table these resolutions in the municipal 
council.  
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With regards to representation, research indicates that ward committees are not as 
representative as they ought to be to be (Smith and Visser 2009, Piper and Deacon 2008 and 
Chanza and Piper 2006). Smith and Visser (2009, p, 56) found that ward committees are not 
inclusive and that “the process of representation in most of the cases appears to be 
structurally inadequate.” Piper and Deacon (2008) reported that ward councillors have a 
direct hand in deciding on the ward committee members and came across cases in the 
Msunduzi Municipality where the ward committee and the political party branch is the same 
structure. In addition, Chanza and Piper (2006) found that the youth was inadequately 
represented on ward committees in the Msunduzi Municipality. This indicates that 
representative nature of ward committees is questionable. 
 
3.2.3 Civil Society 
 
Civil society can also represent the community (Lavalle et al, 2005) but civil society in South 
Africa has become too weak to fulfil this function. This weakens civil society at local 
governance level started with the transformation of the post-apartheid state. During 
apartheid civil society had common goal and that was to bring down apartheid. However, 
“*o+ne of the most difficult issues facing civil society in post-apartheid South Africa is how to 
maintain the delicate balance between support for the new Government while maintaining 
sufficient independence from it” (Jagwanth, 2003, p.13). This situation worsen post-1994 
after many of the leaders of civil society was co-opted into government, as it weakened the 
leadership of civil society. 
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Furthermore, post-1994:  
 
[t]he political terms of engagement for civil society have eroded as a result of the 
ANC‘s increasingly centralized and dirigist style of politics. Since coming to power, 
the ANC has sought to consolidate its electorally dominant position by asserting its 
right, as the agent of the ― National Democratic Revolution‖ to demand political 
subordination of mass organizations (Heller, 2009, p.25).  
 
The South Africa National Civic Organisation (SANCO) is considered to be part of this 
National Democratic Revolution. SANCO was established in 1992 and are largely perceived 
as an ANC-based organisation (Thompson and Conradie 2010 and Zuern 2006). In addition to 
this, one also notices that “*t+he state still transacts significantly with civil society, but does 
so in a highly selective and controlled manner. Across a wide range of sectors, the preferred 
mode of intermediation has become partnerships‖ with professionalized NGOs that carry 
out contracted services” (Heller, 2009, p. 24). Therefore, it is no surprise that civil society at 
community level is forgotten or none existent.  
 
Due to the selective nature of the state, it has created a two tier system of civil society in 
South Africa: a subaltern civil society and organised civil society. According to Heller (2009, 
p. 24)  
[s]ubaltern civil society in South Africa has also become estranged from political 
society, but through a different process. Civil society has become deeply bifurcated 
between an organized civil society that effectively engages the state and a subaltern 
civil society that is institutionally disconnected from the state and political society. 
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Business groups, professionalized NGOs, the middle class beneficiaries of South 
Africa‘s ―Black Economic Empowerment‖ policies, and organized [labour] continue 
to be well positioned to engage the state. But subaltern civil society, and especially 
the urban poor, has more or less been side lined from the political process in South 
Africa. 
 
Therefore, civil society is poorly represented,  if represented at all in municipalities, not least 
because the importance of civil society representation is not recognised by the Municipal 
Structures Act and the Municipal Systems Act. Ironically, the White Paper on Local 
Government, on which the abovementioned acts are supposedly based, recognises the 
importance of civil society representation in local government. The White Paper states that 
municipalities amongst other must build social conditions favourable to development 
through working in open partnerships with community-based organisation or civil society. It 
is noticeable that the White Paper stresses a partnership which means equal say in the 
matters of local government but this does not seems to be case in practice. According to 
Ranchod (2007, p. 21) “*l+ocal governments in South Africa have not adequately begun to 
tap into this social capital [working with civil society] for the advantage of society at large.” It 
must be said that there are cases where there are some sort of partnerships between 
municipalities and civil society, most notable of these is the ‘partnership’ between the KDF 
and the City of Cape Town. However, even the partnership between KDF and the City of 
Cape Town is selective and it reiterates the argument of Heller (2009).  
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3.2.4 Community Development Workers 
 
Communities can also be represented through third parties. Common third parties at local 
governance level are community development workers (CDWs), councillors and traditional 
leaders. The community development workers programme (CDWP) was announced by 
former President Thabo Mbeki in his state of the nation address in 2003. According to 
Baatjies and Hintsa (2005, p.10), the CDWP is an effort to deepen democracy at local level 
and is intended to give citizens direct access to government services. It will involve all three 
spheres of government. The primary role of CDWs is to assist the government with the 
removal of its service delivery backlog and strengthen the contact between the government 
and the people (Hlabane, 18 November 2005).  
 
3.2.5 Shortcomings of Representation at Local Governance 
 
The first shortcoming of representation at local governance is the visibility of municipal 
councillors and ward committee members. According to Booysen (2007, p. 28) ‘*a+cross all 
demographic ... and ascribed-status groups, municipal councillors and ward committee 
members were virtually invisible to 80 percent of South Africa’s metropolitan and urban 
population.” The report on the Status of Local Government in South Africa (2009) provides a 
possible explanation for this because “the number of people per ward and the geographic 
size of the wards is a factor that influences democratic representation and participation” 
(Department Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs, 2009, p.14). According to the 
report, the number of people per ward ranges between 6000 in the Northern Cape and 
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24 000 in Gauteng (Department Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs, 2009, 
p.14).  
 
Secondly, it is also reported that many ward councillors do not attend ward committee 
meetings even though they are the chairpersons (Department Cooperative Government and 
Traditional Affairs, 2009, p.15). The reason for this might be because of contestations 
between the ward councillor and members of the ward committee. A case study on ward 
committee conducted in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality reported that ward 
committee members were not functioning well with their respective ward councillor on 
policy matters (Raga and Taylor, 2005, p. 249). This is problematic because both ward 
committee members and ward councillors are representatives of the community and if they 
are not working together on policy matters there will not be an agreement on how to 
develop communities.  
 
Thirdly, Smith (2007, p. 12) pointed out that the “quality of representation through elected 
councillors” is another shortcoming. Smith (2007, p. 12) explain that “this has to do with the 
kind of individuals who political parties nominate to become ward councillors.” Smith (2007) 
make the case that individual political parties perceive as good candidates might not have 
the capabilities and abilities to be a councillor. Once again it proves that the current 
electoral system and the nature of the party system give political parties too much power to 
decide who is fit to represent the community and through this limits and disenable the 
power communities have over representatives. Furthermore, 40 percent of councillors in 
district councils are directly elected by communities. Smith (2007, p. 13) indicates that 
“representation of community interests on district councils appears to be weak and poorly 
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defined.” This is mainly because there are no mechanisms in place for district councils to 
receive input from communities (Smith, 2007). 
 
Fourthly, even though traditional leadership represent their communities and their interests 
at district municipality level, it must be noted that the under representation of women 
amongst traditional leadership cannot be ignored. According to Ramjee, van Donk, GGLN 
and Isandla Institute (2011, p.21) “unbalanced representivity and inequitable power 
relationships make it important to consider the extent to which traditional leaders fairly and 
equitable represent the voices of all members of their community.” 
 
The final shortcoming is the level of representivity of the ward committees. As outlined 
above, ward communities in many cases are not representative of the broader community 
and this poses a challenge for inclusive decision-making (Smith and Visser, 2009). 
Considering these shortcomings, it is clear that local governance need to be reformed in 
terms of representation.  
 
3.3 Accountability in South African Local Governance 
 
Accountability in South Africa is mainly affected by the party system and the electoral 
system. South Africa can be classified as a one-party dominant system based on three 
reasons. Firstly, the ANC’s dominance in all of the elections so far. Secondly, “the ANC 
possesses a self-conception that fits the dominant party mould in key respects” (Butler, 
2009, p.2). It “conceives of itself as a national liberation movement that represents a project 
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which transcends class, region and race” (Butler, 2009, p. 2). Thirdly, “scholars have drawn 
on the histories of one party states across post-independence Africa … to speculate about a 
likely deepening of ANC domination” (Butler, 2009, p. 2).   
 
Furthermore, South Africa also uses the closed party list PR electoral system. Reynolds 
(1999, p. 92) states that “*t+he government and elected members of parliament must be 
accountable to their constituents to the highest degree possible.” He argues that “*t+he level 
of influence a voter has over his or her representative depends on both geographical 
constituency size and the level of choice between candidates as opposed to parties” will 
influence accountability. Schulz-Herzenberg (2009, p.1) argues that “*r+egular elections 
provide an important accountability mechanism by allowing citizens to decide whether or 
not to extend a government’s tenure.” Therefore, the electoral system is one of the 
mechanisms to keep representatives accountable. Furthermore, “*f+or elections to act as an 
effective accountability mechanism, voters must be willing to sanction incumbent by looking 
at their past performance and punish poor governance by withdrawing their support” 
(Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009, p.2). But this is not the case in South Africa. 
 
It is worthy to note that accountability is an inherent problem of the PR electoral system. 
According to Meadowcroft (1990, p.3) the PR “gives immense power to the political parties 
to determine which candidates get elected – … the system encourages conformity to the 
party in order to secure an electable place on the list.” If one takes this into account a one-
party dominant system will perpetuate this situation which means that accountability will be 
compromised. Therefore, assessing accountability at any level of governance in South Africa 
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one needs to take these two variables (electoral system and the party system) into 
consideration. According to Idasa (2012, p.7): 
 
[a] disjuncture seems to currently exist in South Africa between the rhetoric of 
political parties around election times on the one hand and, on the other, the 
absence of participation and accountability in periods between elections. This 
challenge is to some extent the result of South Africa’s proportional representation 
electoral system in conjuncture with single party election dominance. 
 
Brooks (2004, p. 122) argues that the lack of a strong political and parliamentary opposition 
raises concerns about citizens can ensure government remains accountable to its them. 
Increased parliamentary power creates the risk of shifting of real authority away from the 
constitution to the ruling party and with the assurance of electoral dominance, it poses a 
significant threat to government accountability and responsiveness to the needs of citizens 
(Brooks, 2004, pp. 143/144). 
 
Furthermore, at local governance level the Constitution of South Africa establish the basis 
for accountability. Section 152 (a) states that local communities must be provided with 
democratic and accountable government. It was the White Paper on Local Government that 
discussed accountability in much more detail. The White Paper defines accountability as 
“being willing to account for one’s decisions and actions”. It goes further to explain that 
“*d+evelopmental local government requires a political leadership which creates 
opportunities to account to the community over and above regular elections.” The White 
Paper creates ward committees in this regard. It states that “*w+ell-functioning Ward 
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Committees will provide every metropolitan resident with a local point of access to 
municipal government and strengthen the accountability of ward councillors to local 
residents.” Ward committees was, therefore, partly created to make ward councillors more 
accountable to communities. In this regard it, states that “*t+he establishment of ward 
communities should go hand in hand with strengthening support to ward councillors and 
building accountable and effective leadership.” 
 
It was the Municipal Systems Act that created institutionalised features for accountability. 
The Municipal Systems Act makes it the responsibility of the municipal council and the 
municipal manager. According to section 4 (2)(b) “*t+he council of a municipality within the 
municipality’s financial and administrative capacity and having regard to practical 
consideration, has the duty to provide, without favour or prejudice, democratic and 
accountable government.” In addition to this, section 51 (i) states “*a+ municipality must 
within its administrative and financial capacity establish and organise its administration in a 
manner that would enable the municipality to hold the municipal manager accountable for 
the overall performance of the administration.” Furthermore, the Code of Conduct for 
Councillors also ensures that councillors uphold accountability. According to the Preamble of 
the Code of Conduct for Councillors, “*c+ouncillors are elected to represent local 
communities on municipal councils, to ensure that municipalities have structured 
mechanisms of accountability to local communities …” This is, therefore, how accountability 
ideally have to work especially given the legal framework.  
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Further, the WPLG encourages municipalities to establish partnerships with civil society 
especially community-based organisations (CBOs), as the White Paper see civil society as 
fundamental to the realisation of developmental local government. As aforementioned, 
local government legislation does not recognise this partnership that was advocated by the 
White Paper. The closest the Municipal Structures Act and Municipal Systems Act gets to 
recognising community organisation and civil society is for consultation purposes. According 
to section 19 (3) of the Municipal Structures Act “*a+ municipal council must develop 
mechanisms to consult the community and community organisations in performing its 
functions and exercising its powers.” In addition, section 17 (2) (d) states the municipality 
must provide for “consultative sessions with locally recognised community organisations.” It 
is evident that local government is uninterested in a partnership with local community 
organisations or civil society. This essentially begs the question of accountability at local 
government level. 
 
3.3.1 Who has to account? 
 
From the previous section it is clear that local government legislation (the Local Government 
Acts) in terms of accountability solely focus on the elected political office bearers and the 
municipal manager as chief financial officer. This, therefore, suggests a shortcoming in how 
accountability was conceptualized in local government legislation. It is also important to 
extend measures of accountability to traditional leaders and ward committees as they are 
representatives of the community. One can make the case that traditional leaders are 
leaders whose subjects must follow but that would not be democratic, and this raises the 
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relevance of traditional leaders in a democracy. Any representative needs to be held 
accountable for the decisions or the lack of decisions he or she makes when in office. 
 
In addition, Mdoda (2011, p.78) argues that “the position held by traditional authorities 
within a democratic system where they are entitled to salaries, as public officer-bearer, but 
are unwilling to be subjected to accountability requirements similar to those that apply to 
other public servants in general.” In addition to this, Bailey (2011, p. 76) reported that 
Impendle traditional leaders are not attending council meetings. Given that succession in 
traditional authorities is hereditary, it is imperative for traditional leaders to attend council 
meetings as that is the only place where they would have to account. 
 
Furthermore, even though there are no measures in place to hold ward committees 
accountable, the Code of Conduct for Ward Committees obliges ward committees to account 
to local communities. The Code of Conduct for Ward Committees (n.d, p. 3) states that 
“members are accountable to the ward community that they serve.” Piper and Deacon 
(2008) found that partisan ward committees accountable to the political party whose 
interest they represent. In addition, Smith and Visser (2009, p. 62) found in their study of six 
ward communities in 3 municipalities that “*w+ard committees should be accountable for 
their activities to the communities they represent and not only to councillors or 
municipalities.” This is a clear indicate accountability measures for ward committees must 
be extended to ward committees and traditional leaders.  
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3.3.2 Mechanisms of Accountability at Local Governance 
 
Given the contextualisation of accountability in the previous section, the Community Law 
Centre has outlined and discussed four mechanism of accountability used at South African 
local government level namely: elections; open council meetings; report-back by councillors; 
and formal complaint, appeal and petition procedures (Community Law Centre, 2008, p.10). 
Notably, these mechanisms are merely designed for the elected office bearers. 
 
Firstly, meetings of a municipal council and those of its committees are open to the public, 
including the media. The council or committee may not exclude the public, including the 
media, except when it is reasonable to do so having regard to the nature of the business 
being transacted. It is up to the municipal council to specify the circumstances in which the 
council or such committee may close a meeting. Moreover, a municipal council or 
committee of the council may not exclude the public, including the media, when considering 
or voting on any of the following matters: 
 A draft by-law in the council 
 A budget tabled in the council 
 The municipality’s draft integrated development plan, or any amendment of the 
plan, tabled in the council 
 The municipality’s draft performance management system or any amendment of the 
system, tabled in the council (Section 17, Municipal Systems Act).  
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Elections are the second mechanism of accountability. Regarding this, councillors are elected 
through a system of proportional representation and first-past-the-post onto municipal 
councils. The White Paper on Local Government explains the reason for this in more detail.  
 
While a proportional representation system is most favourable in terms of gender 
representivity, the increased accountability offered by the ward component should 
not be lost. The enhanced accountability will result from strengthening the role of 
ward councillors will benefit all groups within the community, including women 
(White Paper on Local Government, 1998).  
 
If one considers this it becomes clear that “PR councillors are not … directly accountable to 
constituencies …” (Community Law Centre, 2008, p.11). In addition this, all district 
councillors are not directly linked to a constituency. According to the Community Law Centre 
(2008, p. 11) “*s+ixty percent of district councillors are directly elected by the constituent 
local councils while the rest are directly elected through proportional party representation 
list.” Apart from this, Smith (2007, p. 14) argues that district municipalities are more likely to 
be accountable to the National Government then to local communities. The reason for this is 
that “*u+nlike local municipalities, which derive an average of 85% of their income from local 
sources, district municipalities are largely … dependent on national financial transfers” 
(Smith, 2007, p. 14).  
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Furthermore, it does not mean that ward councillors are more accountable than PR 
councillors. The Community Law Centre makes the following observation: 
 
Because of the crucial role that the party is made to play in the choice of candidates, 
these candidates, who are too often unknown to their localities, labour to appease 
not their constituency but the political party that fielded them (Community Law 
Centre, 2008, p. 12).  
 
This is therefore clear that the electoral system bring about certain gaps with regards to 
accountability.  
 
Thirdly, the Municipal Systems Act determines that “councillors must be accountable to local 
communities and report back at least quarterly to constituencies on council matters …” 
(Municipal Systems Act, Schedule 1). The Community Law Centre notes something very 
interesting in this regard. According to them: 
 
It is not, however, clear how the report-back obligation applies to PR councillors. This 
has to do with the fact that PR councillor’s constituency is not clear as the election 
does not directly link them to a constituency (Community Law Centre, 2008, p.17).  
 
Once again it highlights some of the shortcomings of the local government legal framework 
to enforce accountability amongst political office bearers. It is an open secret that PR 
councillors are accountable to their political parties and not to the broader community. 
According to Smith (2007, p.13) “*w+hat is clear is that there is a need to improve contact 
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between councillors and citizens.” But with political parties calling the shot this will not 
happen soon.  
 
Lastly, there are formal complaint, appeal and petition procedures. According to section 62 
(1) a person whose rights are affected by a decision taken by any office bearer in the 
municipality “may appeal against that decision by given written notice of the appeal and 
reasons to the municipal manager …” In addition to this section 5 (a) (ii) states that members 
of the community have the right to “submit written or oral recommendations, 
representations and complaints to the municipal council or to another political structure or a 
political office bearer or the administration of the municipality.” The Community law Centre 
raises the following point: 
 
The effectiveness of the right to petition and complain depend on the manner in 
which the municipality gives effect to it … Submissions from the public may thus 
feature at a council meeting depending whether the Speaker chooses to place them 
on the agenda (Community Law Centre, 2008, p. 18).  
 
This signals that the complaint, appeal and petition procedure does not carry a lot of weight 
and is an inefficient mechanism for holding the council and the municipal administration to 
account.  
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3.3.3 Shortcomings of Accountability in South African Local Governance 
 
Apart from the shortcomings outlined above, a study conducted by Memela et al (2008) on 
South African local governance found a number of shortcomings to accountability at the 
local level. Firstly, there is a poor flow of information from municipal councils to citizens on 
matters that directly affect them. According to Memela et al (2008, p. 7), “*t+he lack of a 
good performance monitoring system in most municipalities makes it difficult for councillors 
and CSOs to monitor progress and therefore to hold the administration accountable.” 
 
Secondly, civil society organisations are also to blame because they “don’t make full use of 
existing mechanisms to hold the council accountable, partly because most they have a 
humanitarian objective and are not strong in advocacy and lobbying” (Memela et al, 2008, 
p.8). Thirdly, most municipalities do not have mechanisms in place “for citizens to review 
council resolutions or to lodge complaints. If such mechanisms do exist they do not function 
properly as complaints are not dealt with systematically” (Memela et al, 2008, p. 8).  
 
Fourthly, municipal users are not aware of the service standards that customers are entitled 
to, “which makes it difficult for the customer to hold the *service+ provider accountable” 
(Memela et al, 2008, p. 8). Lastly, Memela et al (2008) also found that ward committees do 
not function properly as communication channels between the council and the community. 
They report that the cause for is that “in most instances *there are a+ … lack of proper 
organisational structures in the speakers’ offices to support the ward participatory system” 
(Memela et al, 2008, p. 8). These shortcomings signal that representation needs to be done 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
urgently to reform the South African local governance system.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to determine specific reforms in terms of participation, 
representation and accountability at South Africa local governance. The South African 
Constitution lays the foundation as to how participation, representation and accountability 
must take place. The White Paper on Local Government, the Municipal Structures Act, the 
Municipal Systems Act and the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 
provide more detail as to how participation, representation and accountability must work. It 
must be noted that more empirical research was conducted on participation at local 
governance level in comparison representation and accountability. The chapter also 
highlighted the mechanisms and forms of participation that have been applied in the South 
African local government system. These forms of participation have been ineffective so far 
and this has resulted in communities protesting for better service delivery. 
 
Furthermore, in terms of representation the chapter have indicated that the number of 
women councillors in local councils has increased and this is mainly due to the ANC’s gender 
quota system. This chapter also indicates that traditional leaders ward committees, civil 
societies are representative of communities. However, the quality of representation in 
representative structures at local governance level is poor. In addition, the chapter also 
indicated that ward councillors are more accountable to their political parties than the 
communities that elected them and this is mainly due to the electoral system. It also shows 
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that measures of accountability must be extended to ward committees and traditional 
leaders. 
 
Furthermore, most research currently on local governance is reiterating the findings of 
research prior to it and therefore more research need to solution driven. The current state 
of local governance needs solutions especially in terms of representation and accountability. 
However, this can only be done if more research is conducted on cases where accountability, 
representation and participation seem to be working. Lessons from those cases can inform 
solutions to the existing system. Given this, the research assessed the VPUU methodology in 
Harare Khayelitsha in democratic terms. The VPUU methodology show promises in many 
regards and the next chapter will focus on this in more depth. 
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Chapter 4 - The Case of VPUU in Harare Khayelitsha, Cape Town 
 
4. Introduction 
 
The overall argument of this research is that local governance needs to be reformed in terms 
of accountability, representation and participation to strengthen the system of participatory 
local governance. Chapter two argued that democratic deficits relating to participation, 
representation and accountability are common in democracies in the global North and the 
global South. Chapter three established that South Africa’s local governance needs to be 
reformed in terms of participation, representation and accountability as the mechanisms for 
these are currently inadequate. This chapter aims to investigate the VPUU methodology in 
democratic terms as it appears as a successful model of participation, representation and 
accountability. In so doing, it will seek to investigate the methodology for practices of 
participation, representation and accountability. This chapter is divided into two sections: 
the first explores literature on VPUU and the second investigates the VPUU methodology 
empirically.  
 
The first section specifically illustrates how the township of Khayelitsha was established and 
intentionally underdeveloped to contextualise the environment in which the VPUU operates. 
It continues to show how and under what circumstances the VPUU came about in 
Khayelitsha. Thirdly, it discusses the VPUU methodology, as outlined in theory and it will 
show how participation, representation and accountability are conceptualised in the project. 
The second part is discusses the empirical findings and looks at the actual practices of 
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participation, representation and accountability in the VPUU methodology. Some findings 
include the SNACs in Harare and Monwabisi Park were not elected but co-opted, the SNAC is 
not accountable to the larger community but to the VPUU management and that politics in 
Khayelitsha is substantially and diversely contested.  
 
4.1 Background of the Khayelitsha Township 
 
To understand the underdeveloped nature of Khayelitsha, it is necessary to explore its 
history and its development since 1994. Khayelitsha was established to remove black people 
from Cape Town to the Cape Flats and to provide housing to residents of overcrowded 
townships of Gugulethu and Nyanga (Ndiganye 2005, Zonke 2006 and Sawyer 2007). 
Furthermore, the comprehension of certain historical facts is necessary regarding the 
underdevelopment of Khayelitsha. In the 1950s, the National Party Government created the 
policy of apartheid. Apartheid was an ideological project that was created to showcase white 
supremacy (Pienaar and Monteith, 2006, p. 12). It was firmly believed by the National Party 
that ‘black’ people in South Africa are different nations divided by their different ethnicities. 
By dividing South Africa along racial and ethnicity lines it ensured that white people were 
the political majority and through this the National Party was able to pass a number of 
policies to entrench apartheid.  
 
The aim of these laws was to segregate South Africa in all aspects of life. Chief amongst 
these laws were the Group Areas Act, the Bantu Education Act, the Population Registration 
Act and the Immorality Act (Pienaar and Monteith, 2006, p. 44). The Population Registration 
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Act (no. 30 of 1950) classified South Africans into four categories: white, black, coloured and 
Indian. The aim of this act was to create a political, economic and social hierarchy with 
‘white’ people at the top of the hierarchy and ‘black’ people at the bottom of the hierarchy. 
Economic resources were also distributed along this particular hierarchy, with the ‘white’ 
people receiving the bulk of the resources and the rest very little.  
 
In addition, black, coloured and Indian people were not allowed the right to vote or 
participate in any form of government. Furthermore, the Bantu Education Act (no. 47 of 
1953) ensured that ‘white’ people received the best education whilst the majority received 
education that made them mere tools for ‘white’ people’s usage (Kallaway, 1984). In 
addition to the Bantu Education Act, the Immorality Act (no. 23 of 1957) made it illegal for 
interracial relationships and marriages. ‘White’ people were supposed to marry ‘white’ 
people and ‘black’ people were supposed to marry ‘black’ people. The Group Areas Act (no. 
41 of 1950) reconstructed the physical space of which South Africans lived in. Geographic 
areas were identified for different race groups and it was expected for these racial groups to 
stay in their allocated areas. ‘Black’, ‘coloured’ and ‘Indian’ people who lived in ‘white’ 
declared areas were forcefully removed and relocated to the areas that was allocated to 
them. The story of District Six in Cape Town is an applicable example of these forced 
removals. This Act allowed ‘white’ people to live in the best developed areas whilst ‘black’, 
‘coloured’ and ‘Indian’ people were moved from the CBD to the outer skirts of the city 
(Trotter, 2009). Furthermore, a number of laws controlled the movement of black labour 
across South Africa which included the Group Areas Act and the Coloured Labour Preference 
Policy. During the 1980s, the Western Cape was declared as Coloured Labour Preferential 
Area. This led to an influx of ‘black’ people to Western Cape from the former homeland 
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Transkei and the overcrowding of townships such as Langa, Nyanga and Gugulethu 
(Ndiganye, 2005, p.2).  
 
In February 1983, residents of the overcrowded townships occupied a piece of land between 
Nyanga and Gugulethu opposite New Crossroads. According to Zonke (2006, p.2) it was 
“*t+he proliferation of squatting around Crossroads *that+ resulted in the establishment of 
Site-C transit camp in 1983-1984.” The establishment of Khayelitsha was announced in 1983 
by Dr Piet Koornhoff, former Minister of Plural Relations (Ndingaye, 2005). Consequently, 
the place was named Khayelitsha which means ‘new home’. Initially, numerous individuals 
rejected the move to of Khayelitsha from Crossroads (Sawyer, 2007). Individuals who desired 
to move were either forced to stay or killed by a small group of vigilantes (Zonke, 2006). 
While this fighting continued in Crossroads, residents from Gugulethu, Langa and Nyanga 
moved to a new development near Swartklip, and since then Khayelitsha has expanded 
rapidly into the massive township it currently is. According to Zonke (206, p.4) “*f+rom 1982 
to 1990 other areas such as site B, Green Point, Macassar, Town Two and Harare was 
established mainly in terms of shacks.” Additionally, from 1999 until 2001 Kuyasa was 
created.  
 
The discrimination against ‘black’ people in general and the underdevelopment of 
Khayelitsha resulted in serious socio-economic problems. According to Thompson and Nleya 
(n.d), the top three problems facing Khayelitsha are unemployment (59%), housing (52%) 
and crime and security (41%). Furthermore, according to the City of Cape Town Urban 
Renewable Report (August 2006, pp. 1-17), the population of Khayelitsha is estimated at 
about 500 000 of which 91 per cent is African and 95 per cent speak isiXhosa. Furthermore, 
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45 percent of the households are headed by females, 75 percent of the population is under 
the age of 35 and 29 percent of the population is younger than 14 years.  
 
The 1996 Census painted a picture of a very underdeveloped Khayelitsha. Statistics South 
Africa reported that 40.2 percent of the population was unemployed, 80.6 percent were 
living in informal dwellings, 73 percent had access to piped water, 70.2 percent had access 
to flush or chemical toilets, 67.1 percent had access to electricity, 75.5 percent to refuse 
removal and 10.6 percent to telephones. Since 1996, the situation improved in certain 
instances and worsened in others. According to the 2007 report of the Department 
Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) 71 percent of the population live below the poverty 
line, 24 percent are without electricity, 17 percent are without piped water, 60 percent are 
without telephone services, 5 percent are without waste removal, 7 percent of the residents 
have no education, 3 percent have tertiary education, 25 percent of the population is 
infected with HIV/Aids, 32 percent live in formal houses whilst 39 percent live in shacks. This 
not only paints a picture of an environment ridden with socio-economic problems but it also 
highlights the government’s struggle to render service delivery.   
 
4.2 The Role of Civil Society in Khayelitsha’s Development 
 
Civil society played a significant role in championing the development of Khayelitsha, most 
notably South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) and Khayelitsha Development 
Forum (KDF). SANCO is a national civic structure that was established in 1992 during the 
negotiation process in Uitenhage. Its current membership is estimated at 6.3 million, with 
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4300 branches in 56 regions (Zuern, 2006). It is a unified structure of all the civic 
organisations that had been part of the internal front of the ANC during the struggle for a 
democratic South Africa. The ANC needed its voice during the negotiation process and it also 
helped drafting the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). It is largely 
perceived as an ANC-based organisation and due to its link with the ANC, in 2008, with the 
recall of former president Thabo Mbeki, SANCO in Khayelitsha was divided into two sides 
with the one supporting COPE and the other supporting the ANC (Thompson & Conradie, 
2010, pp. 7/8). This is also perceived as SANCOs biggest weakness. According to Thompson 
and Conradie (2010, p.8) the current status of SANCO “is that of an organisation struggling to 
define a role for itself that is distant enough from government to be able to be critical of it.” 
 
The KDF on the other hand is a localised structure that was established in 1992. It currently 
consists of about 100 NGOs working on community development, empowerment and 
capacity building. KDF also has a number of sub-structures that focuses on business, 
disability, education, health, human settlements, sport, religion, safety and security, social 
development and youth. The KDF also has two arms: the Khayelitsha Development Trust 
(KDT) and Khayelitsha Community-Based Development Company (KCBDC) (Thompson & 
Conradie, 2010, pp. 9). In addition to this, KDF is also divided into sectorial forums and ward 
development forums (WDFs). According to Thompson and Conradie (2010, p.9) sectorial 
forums are established in a number of areas such as business, disability, education, health, 
human settlements, religion, safety and security, social development and youth. The aim of 
these forums is to support the executive committee of KDF. Furthermore, WDFs were 
established in the 12 wards of Khayelitsha. Each WDF consist of 15 members who meet on a 
weekly basis around Khayelitsha (Thompson and Conradie, 2010, p.9).  
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The KDF has aligned their governance structure with that of the CoCT to ensure they are part 
of the decision-making. The governance structure of the City of Cape Town can be divided in 
a super structure and a lower structure. The super structure consists of the City Council, 
Executive Mayor and the Mayoral Committee, and the lower structure consists of the sub-
councils, councilors and the ward forums (ward committees). According to the City of Cape 
Town Council Overview (2011, p.9) the City of Cape Council “is governed by a 221-member 
City Council, which elects the Executive Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Speaker.” Furthermore, 
“*the+ Council elects the Executive Mayor, the Executive Deputy Mayor, the Speaker and the 
chairs of section 79 committee, and appoints the City Manager, the Chief Whip, and the 
Section 57 managers” (City of Cape Town Council Overview, 2011, p.10).  
 
In addition, the mayor is appointed as the head of the City of Cape Town and hence the title 
Executive Mayor. As Executive Mayor, he or she is elected for five years and has statutory 
powers and functions (City of Cape Town Council Overview, 2011, p.10). Moreover, the 
Executive Mayor has the power to appoint members of the Executive Mayoral Committee 
(Mayco). The Mayco “exercises the powers, functions and duties designated to it by Council 
and delegated by the Executive Mayor” (City of Cape Town Council Overview, 2011, p.10). In 
addition to this, the Mayco is divided into Portfolio Committees called section 79 
committees (Municipal Structures Act of 1998).  
 
Furthermore, as part of the lower structure of the Cape Town City Council there are the sub-
councils, the councilors and the ward forums (ward committees) (Thompson and Conradie, 
2010, p.12). According to the CoCT website 
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(http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/subcouncils/Pages/Home.aspx) the City has 24 sub-
councils. Khayelitsha falls under two of these sub-councils; sub-council 9 and 10. Given this, 
KDF has aligned their WDFs with the structure of the City of Cape Town; KDF has a WDF in 
every ward of Khayelitsha to ensure that they advance the development agenda of 
Khayelitsha. However, since 2005, the City of Cape Town is running a Violence Prevention 
through Urban Upgrading project to upgrade the infrastructure in parts of Khayelitsha to 
make public spaces safer. The VPUU and the City of Cape Town have partnered with KDF to 
implement the project in Khayelitsha.  
 
4.3 The Case of VPUU in Harare Khayelitsha 
 
 From the onset the researcher must clarify the issue of Harare and Monwabisi Park. The 
researcher mentioned in Chapter one that he had a meeting with Mr Benu (chairperson of 
KDF) and that he was asked by Mr Benu to include Monwabisi Park in the study as 
Monwabisi Park is considered as part of Harare by the people of Khayelitsha (personal 
communication, May 31, 2012). However, technically Monwabisi Park is not part of 
Khayelitsha but part of Mitchell’s Plain. According to the Municipal Demarcation Board 
(August 2009, p. 29) Monwabisi Park, Tafelsig and Eastridge are part of ward 99 and this 
makes Monwabisi Park part of Mitchell’s Plain. It is important to raise this as the people of 
Khayelitsha consider Monwabisi Park as part of Harare but the government and VPUU see it 
otherwise. For the sake of clarity the researcher must mention that VPUU have establish a 
SNAC in Harare and one in Monwabisi Park. The researcher where it is necessary will make 
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comparisons between the Harare SNAC and the Monwabisi SNAC, but essentially the 
research is about the Harare VPUU project.   
 
Harare is home to Khayelitsha’s middleclass and is urbanised but regardless of this, it is also 
crime ridden. Bliss and Zagst (2011) reported that before the VPUU project was launched in 
Harare, murder robbery and domestic violence was the top three crimes committed in 
Harare. In addition, Everatt and Smith (2008, p. 91) indicates in their report to the 
Department of Social Development that the most vulnerable groups in Harare and 
Monwabisi Park were unemployed youth (young women), the aged (women) people living 
with HIV/Aids, seasonal workers and informal traders. Clearly, crime prevention and 
development are needed in Harare and VPUU was initially piloted in Harare to actualise 
these needed changes.  
 
The Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) Project started in September 
2005 in Harare Khayelitsha but as an idea it can be traced back to 2001. It is a co-operative 
agreement between the City of Cape Town and the German Development Bank and it is also 
co-financed by the City of Cape Town and the Federal German Ministry for Economy and 
Development. The goal of the project is to achieve a demonstrable and sustainable increase 
in the safety of the residential population (Giles and Marco, 2008, pp. 1-2). Furthermore, 
according to Pollack (28 May 2009) safe public spaces such as a library, a youth centre, sport 
facilities, toilets and pedestrian walkways were created to increase the safety Khayelitsha’s 
population.  
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VPUU as an idea started when the City of Cape Town applied for donor funding from 
Krefitanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Kfw). The VPUU project ties into two bigger policies: (i) 
Khayelitsha Urban Renewal Programme and; (ii) the National Urban Renewal Strategy. This 
led to a feasibility study in 2002. German Financial Cooperation Funding (FinCoop) 
contributed R60 million and another 60 million was made available from the City of Cape 
Town, the Western Cape Provincial Government and the National Government and local 
NGO funds (Executive Summary Feasibility Study, 2002).  
 
Kfw Entwicklungsbank has been co-funding many programmes similar to VPUU since the 
1990s. Kfw’s work proceeds from the following assumption: poverty causes social issues 
such as poor housing, ill health and increasing levels of violence, which in turn create a fear 
of certain public spaces. With this in mind the ultimate goal “is to achieve socially inclusive 
and sustainable development” (Bauer, 2010, n.p). The approach is, therefore, poverty-
orientated and uses participatory urban development projects to overcome the culture of 
violence. Kfw also make sure that programmes funded by them “are implemented in 
cooperation with local partners" (Bauer, 2010, n.p). A criterion set by Kfw is that 
municipalities are the prime partners and act as project executing agencies, managing and 
coordinating the implementation of the programmes, hence the CoCT’s involvement.  
 
The VPUU claims that since its inception in 2006 in Harare and site C Khayelitsha crime has 
reduced by 33 percent, and the murder rate in particular has declined by 20 per cent 
(Ndenze, May 04, 2011). According to Krause (April 20, 2011, vodcast) VPUU started with 
three sites in Khayelitsha namely: Harare, site C and Kuyasa. Since then the funding has 
increased from R120 million to R 494.5 million (De Lille, May 03, 2011) and the project 
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added three sites in Khayelitsha which are the TR section, Monwabisi Park and BM Section. 
The VPUU was expanded to Hanover Park and Mannenberg in 2012 (Krause, April 20, 2011, 
vodcast). The VPUU claims that these projects are not state-driven but it includes the 
advocacy for and mobilisation of community–based groups to ensure that the community 
actively participate in securing their rights. In this regard, VPUU makes three claims: (1) 
VPUU successes are contributed to their community participation model (Graham and 
Krause, 2007); (2) they have “a representative leadership forum *which+ aims to integrate 
the wealth of social capital in an area” (Krause, 2012, p. 3) and; (3) one of VPUU’s guiding 
principles is accountability (Krause, 2012, p. 3). Furthermore, VPUU specifically focuses at 
violence prevention on three levels namely: (1) situational violence prevention; (2) social 
violence prevention; and (3) local governance promotion.  
 
Situational violence prevention focuses on the physical infrastructure. The aim is to make 
unsafe public spaces safe, as Bauer (2010) put it “… the recovery of public spaces.” By this it 
meant to eradicate existing crime hotspots through improving the existing infrastructure or 
to improve the “general access to basic infrastructure …” (Bauer, 2010). Since the start of 
the project in Harare a number of public facilities were constructed for this purpose (Bliss, 
n.d). So far VPUU built a football pitch for the youth at Kwam Fundo School, the Love Life 
Centre in Harare Square, the Harare Library and an Active Box which includes mall shops 
rented out to street traders (Bliss, n.d).  
 
Social violence prevention aims to community involve in the project. According to Bauer 
(2010, n.p) “… the success and sustainability of programmes is contingent upon community 
involvement in decision-making, implementation and operation and maintenance.” This is 
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done through cooperating with the support of non-governmental organisations; by 
supporting initiatives of community education in neighbourhoods; and by operating 
demand-oriented funds for small upgrading projects, administered and managed by the 
community (Bauer, 2010). In terms of social crime prevention, the project is financing 
smaller community based organisations’ projects. The project trained about 420 volunteers 
in conflict prevention and so far between 250 and 300 volunteers is taking part in unarmed 
citizen patrols. In addition, there is an Anti-Rape and Gender Violence Project which entails 
NGOs working together to support victims of rape and gender based violence. VPUU also has 
a strategic partnership with the University of the Western Cape to provide legal aid to 
families who have legal problems (Bliss, n.d).  
 
Institutional crime prevention or “local governance promotion first and foremost aims at 
mainstreaming principles of good governance in public administration” (Bauer, 2010, n.p). 
This is to “… to increase the institutional capacity of public authorities and encourage active 
participation of civil society organisations in decision-making process.” A key feature of 
financial cooperation projects is to enable the “active involvement of the target group in 
political decision-making by introducing and consolidating legitimate, elected structures in 
the neighbourhoods” (Bauer, 2010, n.p). In addition, local governance promotion focuses on 
strengthening the participatory processes by involving community leaders in municipal and 
national structures (Bauer, 2010). Currently in Harare, the project promotes local economic 
development, skills training, the management and maintenance of spaces and places. For 
local economic development, the shops at the Khayelitsha Metro Station are a way to 
promote economic development for street traders. Moreover, through skills training they 
are able to employ individuals from the community permanent to run the public facilities 
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(Bliss, n.d). Most projects funded by the German Development Bank must adhere to this 
model of violence prevention. The financial cooperation project in Khayelitsha, Cape Town, 
uses the same model of violence prevention.  
 
Furthermore, the implementation and the successes of this project would not have been 
possible without VPUU’s network of stakeholders. VPUU has a range of stakeholders such as 
the City of Cape Town, the German Development Bank, the Khayelitsha community, ward 
committees, SAPS, ward councilors, the community policing forum, the WDFs, 28 non-
governmental organisations, the Khayelitsha Development Forum, the Western Cape 
Government, the National Treasury, the Legal Aid Clinic of the University of the Western 
Cape, the University of Cape Town, Simelela and the Development Bank of South Africa 
(Mtwana, October 2007, p. 22; Graham & Krause, October 2007, pp. 6-8 and Bliss and Zagst, 
2011, p.4). Apart from VPUUs stakeholders and their three pronged model of violence 
prevention, VPUU has a specific methodology for implementing and managing a project.  
 
4.4 The VPUU Project Methodology and Principles 
 
The City of Cape Town appointed AHT Group AG as consultants for assistance with the 
implementation of the project. The City also established a special Project Management Unit 
that is headed by Alastair Graham (Bliss and Zagst, 2011, p.4) who is co-managing the 
project with Michael Krause. The VPUU project methodology was developed by AHT Group 
AG to make the financial cooperation model of violence prevention (situational violence 
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prevention, social violence prevention and local governance promotion) possible. The VPUU 
methodology has nine main stages: 
i. Formation of Representative Community Structure (SNAC) 
ii. Baseline Survey 
iii. Development of Local Strategy (CAP) 
iv. Prioritising Interventions 
v. Design Interventions 
vi. Implementation of Interventions 
vii. On-going Monitoring and Evaluation 
viii. Operation, Maintenance and Management (Krause, 2012, p. 3).  
 
In addition to this, VPUU are guided by the following principles: (1) people-centred 
development; (2) trust; (3) accountability; (4) a participatory approach; (5) voluntarism; (6) 
sustainability; (7) process of integrity; and (8) partnerships (Krause, 2012, p. 3). The project 
methodology and the principles of the project inform a great deal of the VPUU community 
participation model. 
 
4.5 VPUUs Community Participation Model 
 
Upon investigation, of the VPUU ‘community participation model’, the model is theoretically 
a merger of two models. The first model VPUU borrows from is John Turner’s Housing model 
of 1976. Turner argues that there are essentially two models for housing development. The 
first was the central administrative system and the second was the local autonomous 
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system. According to Krause (October 2007, p. 20) VPUU are heading towards the ‘local 
autonomous system’ where “the community is taking charge most of the planning, 
implementation, and most importantly, the management.” The second model that VPUU 
uses is Abbot’s model of community participation. Abbot’s model of community 
participation has three levels of community participation, namely: (1) empowerment; (2) 
community development; and (3) negotiated development.  
 
According to Krause (2007) VPUU has adopted the local autonomous system of participation. 
In order to ensure it becomes the permanent model of participation, VPUU has identified 
levels in community development. These levels can be seen as stages. The first level will be 
community empowerment, the second level is community development and the third level 
is negotiated development. It can be conceptualised as follow. 
 
 
Diagram 4.5-1: John Turner's Housing Model 
 
According to VPUU, a Baseline survey via a participatory Rapid Urban Appraisal methodology 
is a form of empowerment. Secondly, interactions with community base organisations are a 
form of community development and lastly, the Reference Group of VPUU, where different 
stakeholders of different levels engage around development and what is best for the 
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community is negotiated development.  
 
Piper (2012) critically takes this model apart after a number of interviews with Krause. Piper 
(2012) proceeds by outlining the VPUU model of decision-making and according to him, 
Krause has indicated that there are generally six stages. The first stage would be to develop 
a Safe Nodal Area Committee (SNAC). According to Piper (2012) the objective of the first 
step as outlined by Krause is to establish an inclusive and non-partisan leadership. The SNAC 
ought to consist of representatives who are 50 percent from civil society and 50 percent 
from government and political parties. In addition, the process of establishing a SNAC is as 
follows: (1) VPUU will conduct an audit of local organisations to develop a knowledge base, 
to identify potential leadership and to inform local organisations of the project; (2) invite all 
relevant organisations to submit nominations of candidates to serve on the SNAC and will be 
15 members strong of which there will be a chairperson, deputy chairperson, a secretary 
and 12 functional position; (3) all vetted organisations in the area will be invited to an 
electoral meeting and it is here where the election of the 15 members would take place 
(Piper, 2012).  
 
The second stage involves Saturday training sessions for the newly elected SNAC leadership 
The training includes topics such as leadership skills, how to build trust, monitoring and 
evaluation techniques, financial management, accountability, etc (Piper, 2012). Piper (2012, 
n.p) notes that this particular process “is an explicit socialisation into some key practices and 
norms of mainstream developmental governance.” The third stage is a visioning exercise by 
the SNAC leadership and this particular process will eventually inform the developmental 
project (Piper, 2012). The visioning exercise is usually a two day workshop and aims to 
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develop a wish list with short-term, medium-term and long-term goals. Once the visioning 
exercise by the SNAC leadership and the project management staff is complete, the project 
management will run a 10 percent household survey. The results of this survey will be 
synchronised with the vision of the leadership into a manageable action plan called the 
Community Action Plan (CAP) (Piper, 2012).  
 
The fourth stage is to garner municipal support for the CAP. This stage includes getting the 
buy-in of line manager and reaching an in-principle support for the plan. In addition, VPUU 
will also consult the community at a public meeting, and once this is done VPUU will ask the 
mayor to sign this plan publically (Piper, 2012). The fifth stage is the implementation of the 
CAP and the SNAC is tasked to drive this process in the community. However, the VPUU 
appoint community liaison officers who are skilled professionals and are tasked to assist the 
establishment and working of the SNAC. This stage also consists of quarterly community 
meetings, monthly SNAC meetings and the Reference Group (Piper, 2012). The final stage 
involves working with the City of Cape Town. The involvement of the City of Cape Town in 
the decision-making process of VPUU is more ad-hoc and there is no regular meeting around 
VPUU in the City of Cape Town. Most of the decisions are made on a one-on-one basis and 
quarterly at the Executive Management Team (Piper, 2012).  
 
It is important to note is that VPUU is driven and designed by a private consulting company. 
In the first five stages, the City of Cape Town plays a very minimal role. It appears as if the 
most strategic decisions are taken by the VPUU professional team. Piper (2012, n.p) notes 
that “the VPUU methodology is one of building a particular kind of elected trustee who is 
responsible to the project outcomes rather than local preferences.” This is important to note 
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because the next section reveals the actual forms of democratic practices which have been 
documented so far in VPUU literature.  
 
4.6 Actual Forms of Participation in VPUU 
 
To inform their actual practices of participation and render them meaningful, VPUU has 
established a number of objectives for community participation. These objectives amongst 
others are the following: 
 To promote democratic values and decision-making processes by engaging all 
relevant stakeholders from within Khayelitsha with special focus on the identified 
Safe Node Areas; 
 To communicate the goals, principles, instruments, and of VPUU to the broader 
community of Khayelitsha including its leadership; and 
 To enable the broader community and its leadership to engage in a dialogue with 
both the AHT Khayelitsha Consortium consulting team and the VPUU project 
management unit of the City of Cape Town on the needs of the community in 
relation to safety and violence prevention issues (VPUU Website, September 09, 
2012).  
 
There is limited information on the actual forms of community participation in VPUU 
literature. According to Piper’s (2012) interview with Michael Krause, participation in the 
VPUU process takes place on a monthly and quarterly basis. There are internal SNAC 
meetings and the Reference Group that are happening on a monthly basis. The SNAC 
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meeting is not open to the public and can be considered as a “closed” space. The aim of this 
meeting is to review the CAP and where they can engage the community (Piper, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, the Reference Group consists of a wide range of stakeholders such as 
representatives from KDF, councillors and other stakeholders that operate in the area. The 
initial representative group that was formed was the Inception Group and it was an advisory 
group which consisted of stakeholders in Khayelitsha (Krause, 2007). The Reference Group is 
the VPUUs pride in terms of community participation. According to Graham and Krause (p.7, 
2007) “*c+ommunity participation has been embedded in the programme through regular 
meeting with community representatives”, this amongst other includes the Reference 
Group. “The Reference Group is made up of representatives of the Khayelitsha Development 
Forum, the councillors from the areas, and representatives of groups operating or with an 
interest within the four Safe Node Areas” (VPUU website, September 09, 2012). In addition, 
Piper (2012) indicates that the Reference Group takes place once a month with all VPUU 
stakeholders across all projects and about 100 to 150 people present. Piper (2012) further 
point out that it is used as a decision-making structure where only members of VPUU have 
voting power.  
 
Moreover, there are also quarterly public meetings. According to Piper (2012) the aim of 
these meetings is to report back on the progress on the CAP. This is the opportunity to share 
information with the broader public and it is the duty of the SNAC to lead and organise these 
meetings. According to Piper (2012), Krause indicated that there are cases where these 
meetings are not held as the SNAC looks hide behind technocrats to avoid being held 
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accountable for poor progress. The second part of this chapter will investigate these forms 
of participations further. 
 
4.7 Actual form of Representation: Safe Nodal Area Committee 
 
Representation of the community in the VPUU operations is manifested through the Safe 
Nodal Area Committees (SNACs). According to Graham and Krause (2007, p.6) “VPUU 
implements an integrative strategy combining social, situational and institutional crime 
within four designated areas called Safe Node Areas (SNA)”, and they created SNACs to 
oversee the implementation of the project. According to the VPUU website, the SNAC 
members are elected from community organisation and not by the broader community. In 
additions, a SNAC consists of 15 members of which 50 percent of the representatives are 
from elected civil society and the other 50 percent from government structures and political 
parties. Since the first conception of the SNAC, they currently consist of the following 
portfolios:  
 Chairperson 
 Deputy Chairperson 
 Secretary 
 Portfolio Head Public Relations/Communications 
 Portfolio Head Social/Cultural Interventions 
 Portfolio Head Early Childhood Development/Youth Development 
 Portfolio Head Safety and Security 
 Portfolio Head Economic Interventions 
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 Portfolio Head Skills Development 
 Portfolio Head Facility Management Committees 
 Portfolio Head New Infrastructure – Construction of Community Facilities 
 Portfolio Head New Infrastructure – Bulk Infrastructure 
 Portfolio Head Operation and Maintenance 
 Portfolio Head Monitoring and Evaluation 
 Portfolio Head Social Development Fund Interventions (see Appendix 4).  
According to Krause (2007) “representatives are tasked to disseminate information to the 
broader community, explaining their decisions and raising concerns in the participatory 
process.” Therefore it is the responsibility of SNAC members to keep the community up to 
date with the progress of the project and also be accountable for the decisions that were 
taken. The second part of this chapter will discuss the SNAC in more-depth.  
 
4.8 Establishing a Frame of Reference  
 
To establish a frame of reference the researcher asked participants about the history of 
VPUU. This served as an indicator of the participant’s knowledge about the practices of 
VPUU. Most participants have indicated that the VPUU project has its roots in the Urban 
Renewal Strategy that was announced by President Thabo Mbeki in 2001. According to Beja 
(personal communication, July 27, 2012) Khayelitsha is “an area that has been declared in 
the urban renewal programme by the then President, president Thabo Mbeki [and] it means 
*that+ all the government departments need to prioritise Khayelitsha.” It was after the Urban 
Renewal Strategy was announced that the “South African government through the office of 
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the president and the office of the premier” (Beja, ibid.) approached the German 
Government for funding. Before the funding was availed, they identified Harare as a 
potential site for a project. According to participant 9 (personal communication, July 26, 
2012) “they started at Harare doing their work” and the aim was to decrease crime in 
Harare. Participant 2 (personal communication, March 04, 2012) was one of the initial 
fieldworkers and “was the one that showed them the hotspots because Harare was a well-
known area that has high rate of crime.” Furthermore, according to participant 9 (ibid.) and 
participant 2 (ibid.) the aim was to start in Harare and later to move to site B and site C. 
Furthermore, Beja (ibid.) indicates that the project has mainly three sponsors: KfW bank in 
German, the National Treasury and the City of Cape Town, and each donated a R60 million 
towards the project. To operationalize VPUU in Harare, “they also select*ed+ some of the 
groups … and then they partnered with KDF” (participant 9, ibid.). The groups mentioned by 
participant 9 are called Safe Nodal Area Committees (SNACs). Participants were also 
engaged about the democratic practices of VPUU and the following sections will discuss the 
actual forms of representation, participation and accountability. 
 
4.9 Representation: Establishing a SNAC – the Ideal Situation 
 
As mentioned earlier, the SNAC is a representative structure of VPUU. In Harare, Khayelitsha 
this structure consists of civil organisations and politicians. Krause (personal communication, 
January 26, 2011) indicates that they have a particular process of establishing a SNAC. 
Firstly, “*VPUU+ get *their+ information from the sub-council database because in theory all 
the organisations should register with the sub-council” (Krause, ibid.). Secondly, they would 
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invite “all the organisations ….if they can prove in some sort *of way that they are an 
organisation and+ … if it is a one man show *VPUU+ basically say sorry” (Krause, ibid.). These 
organisations can be “a crèche, a sports club, … a dancing club, a stokvel, etc.” (Krause, 
ibid.). Thirdly, ward councillors are also invited but have to serve ex-officio on the SNAC once 
elected. Therefore, “no individuals except for the councillors” (Krause, ibid.) are to be 
included in the SNAC.  
 
Membership is, therefore, is only extended to civil society and political representatives. This 
means “50 percent can come from political organisations … and 50 percent need to come 
from NGOs and CBOs” (Krause, ibid.). Krause states that (ibid.) “in Monwabisi Park we got 
four sections, we say four can come from SANCO, four can come from the WDF, four from 
[political] parties and eight have to come from other areas. The area committees are 
basically represented by one representative [and] we got 4 areas [so] they can send one 
area representative *each+.” The next step would be the formation of the SNAC. According to 
Krause (ibid.) an election would take place and those stakeholders will be invited to having a 
chance to elect a SNAC. To this election “only the stakeholders *are invited because+ … it is a 
delegated election [and] it is not a mass [election] otherwise [they would be] contesting the 
ward” (Krause, ibid.). It is crucial for Krause to emphasize that the election for the SNAC is 
not open to the broader community as it might be perceived that VPUU is contesting the 
ward. In democratic terms the member on the SNAC would be a trustee rather a delegate. 
According to Rehfeld (2009, p. 218) a trustee is a representative that should be the ultimate 
judge of what constitute good, whereas a delegate must remember that his or her 
constituent are the source of judge (Rehfeld, 2009, p. 218).  
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4.10 Representation: Establishing a SNAC – In Practice 
 
In Harare this process is not exactly the same as outlined above and deviates somewhat 
from the ideal. Firstly, like in the ideal situation membership is extended to organisations 
and political representatives. Participant 1 (personal communication, February 08, 2012) has 
observed that organisations need to be registered on the sub-council database. He has also 
confirmed that only organisations can be part of the SNAC and that VPUU look at the 
competencies of these organisations for them to be part of the SNAC. In addition to this, 
Participant 5 (personal communication, May 07, 2012) indicated that the “SNAC is coming 
from the stakeholders … *and+ … SNAC is from the Harare stakeholders such as NGOs and 
SANCO.” A Harare SNAC member has indicated that no individuals are part of the SNAC. “For 
SANCO you must have two members, WDF must have two members, my project has two 
members that is how we get that together” (Participant 8, personal communication, July 09, 
2012). Beja explains why only structures and not just any individual can be part of the SNAC. 
“We want people that are accountable to people. You cannot just go there and say you want 
to be elected. No matter how eloquent or how sophisticated you are you must be a member 
of a structure or else the community must appoint you and inform you that based on you 
expertise we want you to be there on that particular day” (Beja, ibid.). 
 
Secondly, the formulation of the SNACs in Monwabisi Park and Harare was not done through 
elections but through co-option. Once VPUU has the names of the organisations they extent 
invitations to these organisations to form part of the SNAC. According to participant 3 
(personal communication, April 12, 2012) “VPUU gives people the chance to apply to be a 
member of the SNAC. VPUU told them that each and every individual from any organisation 
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must apply, *their+ application must be *accompanied+ … with an organisational letter, with a 
letter head *and must be+ send to … VPUU’s office …” Krause (ibid.) has indicated that 
sometimes “there is either an existing steering committee … *because+ … the CDW has a 
committee, there is a ward forum, there is a [ward] development forum in Khayelitsha, etc. 
So, you [are] up against all sorts of things. So you are starting to make concession 
immediately. So basically we say we want to co-opt some members of you.” 
 
Participant 7 (personal communication, July 07, 2012), a SNAC member from Monwabisi 
Park, has indicated that he was co-opted because “they only send *his+ name *and+ all *his+ 
particulars [to VPUU] and after that VPUU call*ed+ him.” Participant 8 (ibid.) recalled a 
similar process when the SNAC in Harare was established. According to him “*VPUU+ told us 
what they actually wanted to do and they wanted all various stakeholders; the youth and 
some political organisations, etc. all those that they could get and they say that they are 
here to advance the community” (Participant 8, ibid.). Thereafter, “they decided that each 
project in the area should have two representatives to represent them at the meetings with 
VPUU” (Participant 8, ibid.). He further explains how the process worked in his case:  
 
VPUU writes a letter to your particular organisation or project. ‘We would need two 
members to represent you in VPUU’s programmes.’ You send in the members you 
want with a letter [because they+ want a letter with your stamp and everything … 
You cannot just walk in you must be send by your organisation (Participant 8, ibid.). 
 
The process outlined by participants 7 and 8 is not for an election but a process for co-opting 
members representing local civil society formations. However, co-option is not formal 
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democratic representation as a formally democratic representative must be elected to 
office. Thus, the SNACs in Harare and Monwabisi Park are not formal democratically 
representative structures.  
 
Elections of other SNACs might have taken place elsewhere because Krause indicated that 
“nomination should come from ‘*organisations+” (Krause, ibid.). Beja (ibid.) observed that in 
cases where there were elections VPUU would have:  
 
… a meeting to prepare a stakeholders. [The] kind of meeting where everybody is 
going to be told what is going to happen in that particular ward … and what are the 
credentials. The credentials will be explained to the structures of that particular ward 
so going to an election date everybody is aware of that and that take place 
approximately a whole month informing the structures about what is going to 
happen (Beja, ibid.). 
 
Beja (ibid.) further notes that in cases where there was an election, “people will nominate a 
person for a certain position and then if that person accept that notion, a nominee will be 
call to go out of the venue and people vote democratically” (Beja, ibid). However, this 
particular process was not followed in Harare. In democratic terms, representatives 
(whether they are delegates or trustees) must be elected (Pitkin, 1972). Therefore, if 
organisations are invited and individuals are nominated without an election took place they 
cannot be considered as formal representatives of any kind. 
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Furthermore, according to Krause (ibid.) the size of the SNAC must 16. However, the SNAC in 
Harare consists of 15 or less members (Participant 8, ibid.) and in Monwabisi Park it is 16. 
Moreover, the term of the SNAC is supposed to be two years (Participant 5, ibid. and 
participant 8, ibid.). However, according to participant 7 (ibid.) since the inception of the 
SNAC in Monwabisi Park in 2009, no other elections took place. Participant 5 (ibid.) also 
noticed that since March 2011 there were no elections for a SNAC in Harare. Besides 
presenting legitimacy challenges, without any elections the SNAC members cannot be 
considered as representatives of the community. In addition, any democratic structure must 
have regular elections to keep representatives accountable to their constituents and without 
any elections SNAC members cannot be held accountable. 
 
Furthermore, once the SNAC is established VPUU would “give *them+ training, training of 
leadership actually knowing how to lead the people and from there the SNAC members 
going to be solid until *they+ know how to settle with the people” (Participant 7, ibid.). 
Furthermore, Beja (ibid.) explains the role of the SNAC as follow: 
 
WDFs are sub-sectorial structures of KDF which are responsible to act on the decision 
of the development of those particular areas. Then SNAC is the VPUU mouth piece of 
that area and the WDF assist in terms of informing – reaching out to other people 
that are not in reach in terms of the community because you must understand not 
everybody will be accepted. You must accept that some person out of this 
progressive movement [might] take part in terms of reaching out to other and as 
long as the role they play it is in line with moral and ethics of KDF we will partner 
with those people (Beja, ibid).  
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It is important to note is that Beja referred to the SNAC a “mouth piece of VPUU” and this 
raises issues in terms of the autonomy of the SNAC.  
 
4.11 Participation 
 
There are mainly three types of meetings in the VPUU methodology that can be related to 
public participation. The first meeting is the SNAC meeting, the second is the community 
meeting and the third one is a multi-stakeholder meeting (the Reference Group) that takes 
place once a month. Each of these meetings has a particular aim. Furthermore, if one uses 
the framework of Cornwall (2002) and Gaventa (2006) the VPUU community meetings and 
the Reference Group are invited spaces of participation because VPUU invites the 
community and stakeholder to participate in these forums.  
 
4.11.1 SNAC Meetings 
 
SNAC meetings can be divided into two types which are a monthly meeting and a monthly 
mentoring session (Krause, ibid.). This means that every two weeks there is either a 
mentoring session or a SNAC meeting and it will “usually take place at six o’clock in the 
evening” (Participant 9, ibid.). Even though the project leader wants the SNAC to meet on a 
bi-weekly basis, it does not seem to be the case everywhere. According to a SNAC member 
in Monwabisi Park they have “a meeting each and every quarter as a SNAC” (Participant 7, 
ibid.). However, the SNAC in Harare “has fortnight meetings but … *sometimes it is+ … so 
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much work *that they+ would have weekly meetings” (Participant 8, ibid.). The frequency of 
internal SNAC meetings is, therefore, appears to depend on the amount of work the SNAC 
has.  
 
Furthermore, according to participant 8 (ibid.) in the SNAC meetings “*they+ discuss *their+ 
different problems with the community, it might be gardens, it might be a crèche, it might 
be something.” If there is problem they would forward it to VPUU. Participant 7 (ibid.) has 
also indicated that in their SNAC meeting they would “discuss … matters or go to call VPUU”. 
The mentoring session on the other hand consist of leadership issues and skills 
development. According to Krause (ibid.) the mentoring meeting was not part of the original 
model and it is something new in the pilot project. The monthly mentoring session is 
conducted by VPUU and also takes place every two weeks at six o’clock in the evening. If one 
applies Gaventa’s (2006) framework, this type of meeting is considered as a ‘closed’ space. 
These spaces are not open to external stakeholders and this is where most of the decisions 
are finalised. 
 
4.11.2 Community Meetings 
 
Both SNACs in Harare and Monwabisi Park do not hold community meetings on their own. 
The community meetings that they have are usually in conjunction with the VPUU 
management. According to participant 7 (ibid.) “*w+hen there is something of VPUU *they 
would+ take that issue with VPUU *and they would+ go to the hall.” He explains further 
“*they+ are there as part of VPUU *because they+ are between VPUU and the community. 
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[They] meet in each and every hall; Monday [they] there, Tuesday [they] there, Wednesday, 
all until *they+ are finished” (Participant 7, ibid.).  
 
These community meetings led by the VPUU management follows this process. According to 
participant 5 (ibid.) VPUU must have a meeting in the community through the ward 
councillor. Participant 5 (ibid.) explains further in practice VPUU must inform the councillor 
and they would have a mini-presentation first, and there after the information would be 
taken to the community. The reason for this is “VPUU is dealing with the stakeholders *civil 
society+ … *and the councillor+ … is dealing with the community” (ibid.). The ward councillor 
will then call a public meeting for VPUU. The process the councillor refers to is more a 
process of gatekeeping than participation. The councillor is clearly nervous about the effect 
VPUU might have on how the community might perceive him as the councillor and, 
therefore, he has to screen the information of VPUU and if he is comfortable with the 
information he will take it to the public.  
 
Furthermore, it also became apparent that in order to setup a community meeting, most 
stakeholders will follow a particular process. According to participant 2 (ibid.) “the only 
specific way of informing the community is like what [she would] do. [She would] inform the 
SANCO executive and the ward development forum (WDF) and they will just call people 
because … those executives … are representative *of+ the community.” She further explains 
that “in those executives there is a youth desk, there is a women desk, there is the ANC, the 
UDM, there is the DA, *and+ there are NGOs … All those forums, all forums are represented 
more especially in the WDF. All the structures are represented” (Participant 2, ibid.). In 
addition to informing KDF and SANCO, whoever calls the meeting would make use of official 
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notices, pamphlets and loud hailers to inform the community (Participant 1, ibid.). 
  
Moreover, participants have indicated that the most appropriate times to have meetings are 
either over the weekend or in the evening after work. The meetings in the evening have pros 
and cons. According to participant 2 (ibid.) “… after working hours … is good because they 
back from work but it is also not good because they [have to] hurry to cook for themselves 
and … *it+ is dark outside and for some people it is not easy to go out of their houses 
[because] they will get grabbed by the tsotsi (gangster or thug)”. 
 
Participants also observed that attendance to these meetings vary. Participant 7 (ibid.) 
estimates about 200 people attend the meetings in Monwabisi Park. Krause (ibid.) also 
indicated that sometimes “you end up with 18 or 20 people rather than 200”. Participant 2 
sheds some light on the fluctuation in the number of people attending the meetings. 
According to her “sometimes plus minus 20 turn out or plus minus 100 people turn out. So it 
differs on that particular day on how much people are busy” (participant 2, ibid.) This means 
that attendance will be affected by events or programmes in and around Khayelitsha. This 
situation might have implications for democracy because the number of people you reach in 
a democracy matters. If important decisions need to be taken on a day when most people 
are busy, the majority would not be happy with the outcome of that meeting. Providing that 
officials and politicians are aware of the pattern of community attendance they would be 
able to use it to manipulate decision-making. 
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Apart from the community meetings held by VPUU, SNAC members also use other local 
meetings to promote VPUU in the community. According to participant 8 (ibid.) in Harare 
“*they+ have local meetings, *they+ have street committee meetings, [they] have local 
meetings, [they] have SANCO meetings [and] that is where [they would] discuss and [they] 
preach and … try selling VPUU to those that do not understand.” Participant 1 (ibid.) has also 
observed that sometimes SNAC members use street committees to have meetings. 
Furthermore, the representation at these meetings also varies. Participant 2 (ibid.) indicated 
that “some *parents+ go there to represent their children; if the [children] are not there they 
can give them the information.” She also knows from experience that the meetings were 
fairly attended by both genders. Participant 5 (ibid.) also indicates that a variety of people 
attend the meetings. However, participant 1 (ibid.), who is not a resident of Khayelitsha, 
observed that meetings are mostly attended by women and individuals who are in their 
early twenties, mid-fourties, fifties and older.  
 
The nature of these meetings is mostly defined by feedback from VPUU to the community. 
According to participant 7 (ibid.) his SNAC uses these meetings to report back on what they 
have done but they would not talk on behalf of VPUU as “VPUU must … represent itself …” 
According to him, VPUU management staff chairs these meetings. Participant 2 (ibid.) 
observed that “*t+he community is expected to say this is what [they] want [and] this is what 
[they] like. [They] are not happy with A, B, C, [or they] are happy with what [VPUU] have 
done … It is more of a communication but an advisory thing at the same time people are 
raising their expectations.” Important to note is that even though the nature of the meeting 
is advisory it does raise the expectations of the community, and this contrary to what Krause 
wants. Krause wants the community to totally buy into the community action plan (CAP) 
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which is a plan drawn up by the SNAC and VPUU. In addition, she has also observed that it is 
similar to IDP meetings:  
 
It is like doing an IDP as a government official you go to those people and listen to 
what they want to say and when you come back you have already gone through your 
budget and you know what you can do, at what time, for how long and then you 
know that the other ones that keep asking or keep expecting that you give the right 
answer for them … ‘I think it is going to be possible in 5 years to come’ (Participant 2, 
ibid.).  
 
This means that “they are going through their budget and give answers according to what 
they have and according to what they know is going to be done, although it is going to be 
*over+ a long term” (Participant 2, ibid.). In addition, participants indicated that these 
meetings can be quite lengthy. Participant 1 (ibid.) observed that a formal meeting can take 
between four to five hours and participant 2 (ibid.) knows community meetings can take 
between two and four hours as she attends it on a frequent basis According to participant 2 
(ibid.) “usually they would come with an agenda for a meeting that will take two to three 
hours.” Lastly, she also noticed that “if you do attend the meeting you are going to benefit 
[by establishing] your own business or starting your own organisation or you are going to get 
experience because VPUU also give out jobs to people” (Participant 2, ibid.). This shows that 
there are material benefits for attending community meeting, especially community 
meetings chaired by VPUU. 
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In summary, it seems that the councillor feels threatened by VPUU and therefore screens 
the information of VPUU and thereafter he calls a public meeting of which he chairs. This 
enables him to censor the information that is shared with the community. In addition, the 
community have certain patterns of attending public meetings and attendance usually 
depends on which events are happening in and around Khayelitsha. Politicians and public 
officials are aware of this and can exploit this as an opportunity to run unpopular decisions 
past the community. Furthermore, the nature of these meetings is information sharing and 
no real decisions are taken in these platforms.  
 
4.11.3 The Reference Group 
 
The Reference Group is a monthly multi-stakeholder meeting that takes place in the KDF 
boardroom on the first Saturday of every month. Attendance is extended to all VPUU 
stakeholders and the larger public. According to Krause (ibid.), the Reference Group is 
created for “representatives of NGOs and beneficiaries of VPUU”. According to Participant 2 
(ibid.) “each and every month they have a plenary meeting where they invite all the people 
of Khayelitsha, all the stakeholders from Khayelitsha not necessarily the ones staying in 
Harare.” Participant 8 explains this in more detail: 
 
VPUU has a monthly Reference Group where all our representatives are there, 
councillors, ward councillors etc. all the different stakeholders and the various 
organisations and all these various small townships. I am talking, about 
organisations. You know you will found that Harare have organisations there [there 
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are+ … crèches, the gardens, sowings, etc. all these people have their representatives 
that meet with VPUU because VPUU want to get involved in every sector of the 
community (Participant 8, July 09, 2012).  
 
Participant 2 (ibid.) also observed that “the faith organisations are represented, your 
SANCOs are represented, your WDFs are represented.” Furthermore, all VPUU Projects are 
there every month. Stakeholders from VPUU projects in Gugulethu, Mannenberg, Site A, Site 
B and Site C (Participant 5, Participant 7, Participant 8 and Participant 9) are also presented. 
Apart from these stakeholders, the Reference Group is also attended by the various SNACs 
(Beja, ibid.) and by the patrolling neighbourhood watch and general workers. It is evident 
that the Reference Group is a multi-stakeholder platform for all “those that belong to VPUU” 
(Participant 8, ibid).  
 
Notably, in order to be part of the VPUU, an organisation must somehow be a beneficiary of 
VPUU. Krause (ibid.) explains that a Social Development Fund was created to fund social 
networks or NGOs or community groups. This has certain implications for democracy if only 
those organisations that belong to VPUU are the beneficiaries of the VPUU. It is not hard to 
imagine how this dependence might undermine the democratic potential of the decision-
making process. Furthermore, even though the Reference Group is open to the public, it is 
only VPUU structures and beneficiaries that can vote and discuss matters pertaining 
Khayelitsha’s development. According to Participant 8 (ibid.) “you can come in if you apply 
and say you would like to come and observe … but you do not debate.” 
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Moreover, the size of the reference group is formidable. Participant 8 (ibid.) estimated that 
about 200 people attend the Reference Group on a monthly basis. Beja (ibid.) has indicated 
that it is a “full house” and participant 7 (ibid.) also indicated that “it is full.” Krause (ibid.) 
said that the Reference Group is currently about “a 100 to a 150 … *and have asked+ … the 
community facilitator to bring in more consistency”; referring to number of people that 
consistently attend the Reference Group. Furthermore, the nature of the Reference Group is 
to provide feedback about the progress of the VPUU Projects. It is important to make this 
distinction because the participants - even those on the SNAC - refer to the VPUU as 
something they are not part of. For example, “VPUU consults all these various stakeholders 
… VPUU gives report as to what they are doing among ourselves” (Participant 8, ibid.). Also: 
 
Michael Krause, he is one of the main characters of VPUU and [he usually bring] 
interpreters … So *he+ is talking on behalf of all these areas. Now if there is a need for 
one of the SNAC members to appear on something that was done by VPUU in the 
area, he is the one that is going to stand in front and tell the people ‘OK on behalf of 
the SNAC VPUU have done this and this in that area’(Participant 7, ibid.).  
 
Likewise, participant 8 (ibid.) sees it as the place “where VPUU give a review of all the work 
that VPUU is doing in Khayelitsha.” Essential to note is how participant 7 and 8 who are 
SNAC members alienate themselves from VPUU even though the SNAC is a VPUU structure. 
So even though autonomy is not granted, they see themselves autonomous from VPUU. 
Moreover, Krause chairs the Reference Group and that the Reference Group is no elected 
structure (Participant2, ibid. and Beja, ibid.). Krause explains: 
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OK, I am chairing that meeting. It is very much my baby but I think the reason why I 
am chairing; there were attempts by other organisations to take over and I was 
thinking about, I mean, I asked a number of people should I hand over the 
chairmanship and everybody said no. ‘You are politically seen as a foreigner, you are 
white and you are not from the community so you do not have a vested interest’ 
(Krause, ibid). 
 
Evidently, the Reference Group is driven by Michael Krause, the project leader of VPUU and 
who represents the interest of the donors and the CoCT. Without Krause, it is unlikely that 
the Reference Group will survive as it does not have an elected structure with a chairperson, 
a secretary, etc. Krause represents the interest of VPUU and not that of the community and 
this might have potential implications for democracy, as the community’s voice is 
marginalised in the Reference Group.  
 
This gives one an indication that the nature of the Reference Group is about feedback and 
not about decision-making. Participant 9 (ibid.) indicates that “since VPUU was said to work 
in Khayelitsha, [they] invite those particular areas to come to [the] Reference Group to 
report … and ask questions”. In addition, participant 2 (ibid.) observed that “the 
representatives are expected to report about the programme, the progress … and about the 
problems they have encountered. What are they proposing and what are they suggesting 
that should be done …” For example, “let say *they+ plan to go to ward 99 *because+ maybe 
there is a project and VPUU was there without [KDF], and now there is a conflict. So [KDF] 
will ask them in the Reference Group and address that …” (Participant 9, ibid.). In addition to 
this, participant 7 (ibid.) will have to “go to represent *the SNAC+ … at the Reference Group 
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*and+ … have to say what *was+ done *in+ … Monwabisi Park.” Lastly, another SNAC member 
explains that sometimes “the people … think they do not understand but when *they+ get 
there VPUU explains to the people what they want and the people go back to VPUU and say 
what they want and also [the representatives] go back to [their] various projects and discuss 
matters” (Participant 8, ibid.).  
 
In applying the framework of Cornwall (2002) and Gaventa (2006) the Reference Group 
qualifies as an invited space. Cornwall (2002) has showed that power pervades any space of 
participation and the party that demonstrates the most power interests’ would be served. If 
one applies this framework, Krause would be representing and protecting the interest of 
VPUU, the donors and the CoCT.  
 
The Reference Group meeting is very lengthy. Participants have indicated that it can take 
between 4 and 5 hours. It starts at 09h00 and usually either ends at 12h00, 13h00 or 14h00 
(Participants 9, 7, Krause and Beja). However, the Reference Group is not without any 
shortcomings. According to Krause (ibid.) “people are coming for two meetings and they are 
dropping out and I say look if you want development in your area as a community facilitator 
you need to make sure you got a coherent consistent group.” Krause (ibid) makes this point 
“the Reference Group should not be under estimated *because+ it actually starts to level it 
through the different areas and you have a glitch in that one area and you can balance it out 
overall.” This simply means at the Reference Group, the different projects will use one 
another to benchmark their progress.  
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In conclusion, even though the Reference Group seems to be a good initiative for multi-
stakeholders engagements, it has a number of shortcomings. Firstly, the Reference Group is 
an invited space which was created to protect the interest of VPUU and with Krause as the 
chairperson the interest of VPUU, the donor and the CoCT will be protected. This also shows 
that VPUU dominates this space and hence has the power to control the agenda. Secondly, it 
also marginalises the voice of the broader community because as participant 8 indicated the 
Reference Group is for “those that belong to VPUU”. However, one cannot take away the 
potential the Reference Group holds to reform some multi-stakeholder engagements at local 
governance level.  
 
4.12 Accountability 
 
Firstly, there are different levels of accountability in the VPUU project. For example, at the 
Reference Group the focus is horizontal accountability. According to Krause: 
 
if there is a conflict [in Monwabisi Park] and everyone in the room knows there is an 
elephant in the room and somebody from another area say ‘You know guys you *are+ 
not interested [because] we agreed on this process and if you not interested why 
isn’t VPUU coming to site C *because+ we are moving forward in site C’ that is a 
wakeup call for the guys in Monwabisi Park (Krause, ibid.) 
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Here Krause uses the example of how SNACs keep one another accountable in the Reference 
Group. In addition to the SNACs, according to Beja (ibid.) VPUU is also horizontally 
accountable to KDF and vice versa. Furthermore, there is also an upwards or vertical 
accountability to the project sponsors. According to Beja (ibid.) SNACs are “accountable both 
to community and to VPUU.” However, participant 5 (ibid.) disagree that SNACs are 
accountable to the community and indicated that the SNAC is accountable to stakeholders. 
Beja (ibid.) further indicated that apart from vertical accountability between SNAC and 
stakeholders, “VPUU as a statutory body is accountable to the City of Cape Town, GTZ, KDF 
as its partner and the Treasury.” Participant 9 (ibid.) agrees with this notion as he indicated 
that “VPUU has done the report to the City of Cape Town, also to the National Treasury and 
also the German government and also to us.” 
 
Secondly, according to the participants, SNAC is accountable to their member organisations 
and VPUU, and not to the broader community. This means that the broader community is 
not included in the decision-making and feedback processes of VPUU. The community is 
merely used for the ratification of decisions already taken by the project. The broader 
community also do not have a say in who are elected and who are not elected. This became 
evident when participants were asked to whom the SNAC report. Participant 8 (ibid.) 
explains that “SNAC members report back where they come from, their various 
organisations or projects … *they take+ the agenda of the meeting and *they+ explain to the 
people … If it is a SANCO member within a SANCO meeting [he or she would] report to 
SANCO. If it is the crèches *they+ report back to the crèches.” In addition to, this participant 7 
(ibid.) indicated “*they have+ a chairperson *and+ he normally on behalf of the SNAC report 
as a whole” to VPUU at the Reference Group. Participant 9 (ibid.) also point out that the 
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“SNAC … report to VPUU.”  
 
Thirdly, in terms of access to information, the findings indicate that not all of the 
participants know who the funders of the VPUU project are. The majority of them know that 
the German government and City of Cape Town sponsors the programme, but the majority 
of them do not know that the National Treasury is a partner too. For example, participant 5 
(ibid.) was under the impression that the project was solely sponsored by the German 
government. Participant 2 (ibid.) “only know the Safety and Security, the City of Cape Town 
and the Germany Consulate.” Sadly, the Department of Safety and Security is not a sponsor 
of the project. Participant 2 (ibid.) can also re-call that “in their first meeting they told *the 
community+ that the funding that they … got is from Germany.” Participant 7 (ibid.) 
indicated that they were told the money was coming from VPUU but he does not know who 
the sponsors of the VPUU project are. The only participants who knew who sponsored the 
project was Beja, participant 8 and participant 9. According to participant 8 (ibid.) “the 
German government [has] put in money, the provincial government [has] put in money, 
[and] the City of Cape Town has put in money” in the VPUU project. Upon visiting the sites, it 
was found that the advertisements of the VPUU project only acknowledge the City of Cape 
Town and the German government as sponsors of the project (see Appendix 5).  
 
Furthermore, participant 5 made it clear that access to information such as annual and 
financial reports was denied because they are official documents. According to him “you 
cannot get official information” (Participant 5, ibid.) because it is the responsibility of the 
ward councillor and the project coordinator to release that kind of information to the public. 
In addition, participant 2 (ibid.) also indicated that she does not know whether information 
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such as financial reports is accessible to the community. The researcher also found that most 
participants do not know how much money is invested in the project. According to 
participant 2 (ibid.) she “heard … that VPUU got R5 million to upgrade … Harare and other 
stuff.” Beja (ibid.) was the only participant that was able to give the researcher a breakdown 
of the amount of money that went into the project. According to him “Kfw bank has donated 
an amount of R60 million and the Treasury has donated R60 million and the City of Cape 
Town has donated that R60 million for this programme to be implemented in Khayelitsha.” It 
is sad that only one person know how much money are pump into the project as it is an 
indication that even SNAC members are not allowed to access certain types of information.5 
From the above it is also clear that there are issues with access to information in the project. 
Access to information is a cornerstone for any democratic practice and especially 
accountability. Where access to information is denied, democracy is limited (Schumpeter 
1976 and Dahl 1998).  
 
Lastly, it appears as if the SNACs shy away from direct interaction with the broader 
community. This might be because they know that politics and development is much 
contested in Khayelitsha. According to participant 7 (ibid.) “if *the SNAC] can see [the 
community+ are not satisfied with … some of the things … VPUU has to go and represent 
themselves but actually it was the duty of the SNAC to delivery that information to the 
community.” Krause (ibid.) refers directly to this particular situation “We want a SNAC to 
lead them not us although in practice it annoys me. We obviously leading those but we 
                                         
5 The participants who were most likely to know the amount of money that is spend in the VPUU project are the SNAC 
members, the ward councillor and the KDF participants. The VPUU is a special project of the CoCT and the budget thereof 
would have been discussed in council and sub-council meetings. KDF is a partner of the VPUU and they share information, 
and SNAC members participate in the Reference Group where this information should have been shared. If most of the 
participants do not know how much money is spent in the project it signals that this information is not made available to 
the public. This was confirmed by a conversation I had with a councillor of the City of Cape Town.  
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saying to the SNAC you should lead them and you can get us technical experts, you can rope 
us in, but you need to break the good or bad news to your constituency (sic).” 
 
In summary, there are horizontal and vertical forms of accountability taking place in the 
VPUU project. SNACs are reporting to their member organisations and to the VPUU 
management but not directly to the broader community. Furthermore, the VPUU project 
reports horizontally to KDF and vertically to the sponsors of the project. A possible 
explanation for this kind of accountability may be Cronin and O’Regan’s (2002) finding. They 
found that accountability in development projects in most cases is directed upwards to 
funders and not downwards to communities (Cronin and O’Regan, 2002). Therefore, this 
may explain the upward notion of accountability in the VPUU project. Furthermore, it seems 
that access to information in the VPUU project is restricted. Dahl (1998) has indicated that 
one of the requirements for any democracy is access to information and this is, therefore, an 
important requirement that is neglected in the VPUU project.  
 
4.13 Community Contestations 
 
Politics in Khayelitsha can be easily being described as vibrant but that would take the 
complex and contested nature of the local politics in Khayelitsha away. Initially the VPUU 
struggled to set-up a SNAC in Harare. The initial aim was to establish a SNAC within 18 
months but it took them “three years or four years” (Krause, ibid.) because “KDF failed, the 
ward development forum failed. [They] very strongly challenged although [VPUU] made it 
clear that [they] do not want to contest KDF and the ward councillors felt challenged 
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because suddenly they see it as a process” (Krause, ibid.). In addition to this, “what *they+ 
have in the past was that representatives of political parties would sort of come [with] a 
number supporters and destabilise meetings” (Krause, ibid.). Furthermore, there were also 
issues with the newly formed DA council in 2011. According to Krause (ibid.) “the DA 
councils felt they need to give [VPUU] instructions and public meetings and something like 
that and [VPUU] basically said [they] acknowledge the council but these are the rules and 
regulations here … and that obviously frustrated them.” In addition to this, VPUU also had 
trouble with new political parties. According to Krause (ibid.) “you have a formation of a new 
party and suddenly the new party thinks which project can [they] highjack and that is 
reality.” VPUU also had problems with businesses. According to Krause (ibid.) some 
businesses “*will+ basically muscle in their businesses and give unreasonable demands.” 
Apart from these tensions Krause (ibid.) has indicated that they “are struggling with the 
implementation phase *because+ … *they would+ have a committee of sixteen people but 
*they+ have about 3 people that are committed.” 
 
Firstly, there is tension between the ward councillor and the SNAC. Participant 5 (ibid.) is 
“not happy with the way VPUU are working with the SNAC.” He further indicates that “*he+ 
do not know what the role of the SNAC to VPUU is ... I cannot say the SNAC is playing and 
important role” (Participant 5, ibid.). According to him, “SNAC is supposed to fight the 
programme of the young people, old people, whatsoever. They must fight the programmes 
of the community, that is the task SNAC is supposed to do but [he] does not see them 
playing that role” (Participant 5, ibid.). Judging from Krause and the councillor’s statements 
about the SNAC, says it is clear that the SNAC is scared to face the larger community on their 
own. This might be due issues of legitimacy. According to Plano, Riggs and Robin (1982, p. 
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74) legitimacy is the “quality of being justified or willingly accepted by subordinates that 
converts the exercise of political power into ‘rightful’ authority.” Taking this into 
consideration, the SNAC cannot claim authority as it was not elected by the community. 
 
Secondly, there is also tension at the SNAC level. According to participant 8 (ibid.) “at the 
present moment [they] discovered that some community members, leaders who 
disappeared from VPUU’s meetings for reasons *they+ do not know, seem to be questioning 
the SNAC.” He further explains that “the problem is some people sometime are looking for 
quick solutions and once people cannot get what they want for their organisations they drop 
out. They do not think of the long term” (Participant 8, ibid.). Furthermore, at a SNAC level 
party politics also leads to tensions. According to participant 8 (ibid.) “coming to politics we 
had political guys within VPUU but I have discovered that it is slightly of a stumbling block 
because at the latest stage we start fighting over political ideologies (sic).” Participant 8 
(ibid.) “has noticed whenever *they+ form such an organisation … *they+ always end up 
fighting and *they+ lose *their+ focus” and they do not get the results they actually want. This 
indicates two things: Firstly, that the SNAC is not immune to party politics despite all the 
efforts of Krause to insulate the SNAC against party politics. Secondly, there is some level of 
conflict amongst SNAC members, and it might be due to this conflict that there are issues of 
commitment amongst SNAC members.  
 
Thirdly, there seems to be tension between KDF and VPUU. According to participant 9 (ibid) 
“the challenge is when VPUU went the other way to the sub-council meeting and present a 
project and then the councillor would come with his own view and find some difficulties … 
because sub-councillors have their own way of running the development of Khayelitsha. And 
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we as KDF have volunteered; those councillors are working for the City of Cape Town. So 
that is our challenges that we have to sit down with all the time.” Fourthly, there is tension 
between KDF and ward councillors and the sub-council. According to participant 9 (ibid.), 
“*when+ the sub-councillors … have a meeting … there is no need to take their own mandate, 
they must take the mandate from the KDF … a mandate that was taken with VPUU and the 
sub-councillors so that they can work together.” In addition to this, Beja (ibid.) explain that:  
 
the IDP for Khayelitsha has been hindered by political interference of some councillors of 
this particular area of not allowing democracy to take its place. One need to make 
mention of one issue that hindered this process of IDP. In this current year the role that 
has been played by the members of the community. People bus people from ward 95 
and 96 to go and de-stabilize the IDP programme that has been visited by the mayor of 
the City of Cape Town, Patricia de Lille, where stakeholder of site C … talked to the 
mayor about their IDP related matters. It has been jeopardized by people toi-toiing (Beja, 
ibid.). 
 
It is interesting that KDF experiences tension at two fronts from VPUU and ward councillors. 
KDF has been on the scene longer than VPUU and for a long time KDF has been one of the 
biggest beneficiaries of the CoCT. Therefore, given that VPUU is a project in the CoCT which 
achieved so many successes in a short period, it might threaten future funding for KDF and 
hence KDF’s defensive mode when VPUU does not comply with agreements (as alleged by 
participant 9). The second tension is towards councillors especially if they jeopardize the 
development of Khayelitsha which KDF has been mediating since the 1990s. KDF realises the 
importance of working with the party that govern but it is not a sentiment that ANC ward 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
councillors share.  
 
4.14 ‘Development Trustees’, Political Gatekeeping and Partisan Politics 
 
Table 1 gives one an indication of how participation, representation and accountability work 
in the VPUU project. Firstly, in terms of participation, the community meetings and the 
Reference Group are the main forms of participation and it can be considered as invited 
spaces, if one applies the framework of Cornwall (2002) and Gaventa (2006). Secondly, the 
SNAC is considered by VPUU as a representative structure of all community organisations 
but the findings indicate that the SNACs in Harare and Monwabisi Park are not elected but 
co-opted. There is also no downwards accountability to the community and therefore agrees 
with the research of Cronin and O’Regan (2002) that in most cases accountability in 
development projects tend to upwards towards the funders or sponsors of the development 
project. Lastly, there are horizontal and vertical levels of accountability where SNAC 
members are accountable to VPUU and their member organisations.  
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Structure Participation Representation Accountability 
 
 
Safe Nodal Area 
Committee (SNAC) 
Forms of Participation 
 Community 
meetings 
 Reference Group 
 SNAC meeting 
(internal) 
 
Spaces of Participation 
 Invited  
 Closed 
 
No election took 
place 
 
Co-option of 
community 
organisations 
onto the SNAC 
 
 
Category of 
Representation – 
‘development 
trustee’ 
Horizontal and vertical levels of 
accountability. 
 
SNAC members are accountable to 
VPUU and their organisations. 
 
VPUU is accountable to funders and 
KDF. 

Broader community cannot remove 
any SNAC member as power lies 
with VPUU. 
Table 1: Summary of participation, representation and accountability in VPUU 
 
4.14.1 ‘Development Trusteeship’ 
 
The VPUU claims that the SNACs represent their communities. Table 2 unpacks how 
representation works within the VPUU project. From the table, it is clear that the broader 
community does not have any power over the SNAC. Apart from councillors, no other 
individuals can be elected or co-opted into the SNAC. SNAC members must be delegated by 
their organisations. This means that those representatives may represent the interest of 
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their organisations in VPUU. It can be argued that a structure like the SNAC might be a 
representative structure as members represent organisations of the community however it 
fails to represent the broader community as this structure consists of community 
organisations and politicians. Ordinary community members cannot be elected to the SNAC 
and, therefore, the SNAC would ideally represent civil society in the community. 
Furthermore, SNAC members are being trained to think accountability is upwards to the 
VPUU project and not to their organisations or to the community.  
 
Structure Who is 
represented? 
Representative Whose interest 
is being served? 
Setting 
 
 
 SNAC 
Community based 
organisations 
 
 
Political 
organisations
 
Delegate from 
community 
organisations 
Community 
organisations 
and VPUU 
Local 
government 
Table 2: Making sense of representation in the SNAC 
 
Furthermore, it if difficult to categorise the SNAC into any of the major categories of 
representation (Pitkin 1972 and Mansbridge 2003) as it falls short of all major categories. 
Firstly, it cannot be formalistic as the SNAC was not elected and this specific type of 
representation looks at the mechanism that brought the representative to power. Secondly, 
it is not descriptive as appearance is a very important qualifier for this type of 
representation. Thirdly, it cannot be symbolic representation because the qualifier here is 
what the representative symbolizes and it cannot be substantive as representatives are not 
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elected based on the promises they make. The closest fit by a long shot is Mansbridge’s 
promissory representation. Promissory representation focuses on the idea that during 
campaigns representatives makes promises to constituents whom they then keep or fails to 
keep (Mansbridge, 2003, p.515). However, in this case there is no campaign but there are 
promises. VPUU through the SNAC promises the Harare and Monwabisi Park communities’ 
development. This becomes trickier because the SNAC are not elected by the broader 
community. The reason for not considering the SNAC as representing the community is the 
following: “a representative is someone who has been authorised to act” (Pitkin, 1972, p. 
39). In the case of the SNACs in Harare and Monwabisi Park the community did not elect 
them because the SNAC came about through a process of co-option this means that the 
community has not authorised them to act on their behalf, as this process of authorisation 
can only take place through election.  
 
Moreover, Beja (ibid.) refers to the SNAC “the VPUU mouth piece.” A mouth piece is a tool 
and in this case a tool that VPUU utilises to spread information. The “mouth piece” also has 
another connotation, meaning it is owned by someone. In this case the SNAC is owned by 
VPUU and, therefore, another reason why SNAC cannot be considered as a representative 
structure of the community. Piper (2012) sheds light on this particular dilemma. According 
to Piper (2012), the model VPUU applies is anti-majoritarian, consociational and anti-
partisan. He states that representatives are held accountable in instrumental terms linked to 
project outcomes and not whether they represent the views of the community, their 
organisations, or some higher principle. Piper (2012) terms this form of representation as a 
‘developmental trusteeship’. The researcher has to agree with Piper (2012) that the SNAC 
model can be considered as a ‘developmental trusteeship’ as the SNAC is entrusted with 
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power and resources to manage specific aspects of the VPUU project in Harare on behalf of 
the community. Considering that “trustees are representatives who follow their own 
understanding of the best action to pursue” (Dovi, 2006, n.p), the SNAC member becomes a 
‘development trustee’ rather than a representative of the community. The SNAC develops a 
community action plan with the assistance and guidance of the VPUU management in order 
to implement this action plan; they receive training and a series of workshops. In this regard, 
the SNAC “follow their own understanding of the best action to pursue” (Dovi, ibid.).  
 
But even here representation is closer to a form of co-option designed to assimilate 
community leaders in such a way they legitimises the project. According to participant 12 
(personal communication, January 24, 2013) when “an organisation like VPUU (a resource-
based organisation) which is bringing resources to an area like Khayelitsha where there are 
not any resources it is issue for representatives of communities to be co-opted and to 
become part of or assimilated inside an organisation with resources and for their agendas 
become VPUU’s agenda”. Participant 12 (ibid.) also noticed from a similar development 
project in Langa that “people do not trust HDA6 but then the task team that represents the 
community trust HDA as a result most of the people who are part of the task team which are 
the leadership are employed by HDA they are the facilitators, they are the developers, they 
are the project managers and so the agenda of the community becomes secondary to the 
agenda of the developer.” Their first aim was to find a suitable host that have popular 
legitimacy in the community which in case is KDF. Once it finds a host it extends 
employment opportunities to the community leadership to secure loyalty which gives VPUU 
                                         
6 Housing Development Agency 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
carte blanch to decide on and drive the development agenda. It is clear that VPUU uses co-
option as a way to ‘buy’ support amongst community leaders.   
 
Furthermore, evidence for ‘buying’ support would be the employment of KDF leaders of 
which the chairperson is the most prominent. Participant 11 (personal communication, 
January 24, 2013) noticed that there is an “overlap between the VPUU and KDF 
deliverables”. Participant 11 (ibid.) is of the opinion that this happened when the KDF 
chairperson became an employee of VPUU because it was only after that, that she noticed 
“the VPUU and KDF agenda started to merge when it comes to development projects.” 
Participant 11 (ibid.), however, does not “think it is a deliberate kind of favouring of the 
VPUU agenda but [she does] think it just happened by the fact that he [Benu] is working for 
both organisations.” Presumably, it appears as if KDF might possibly be the driving force 
behind the merging of the agenda but what participant 11 (ibid.) gathers from other role 
players in Khayelitsha “it is more a VPUU agenda that is starting to overpower the more 
previously community generated agenda.” Therefore, based on the argument above 
representation is best describe as a form of co-option. 
 
4.14.2 Political Gatekeeping and Pseudo-Participation 
 
The SNACs create two types of spaces: closed and invited spaces. The internal SNAC meeting 
is a form of closed space. This space is only accessible to VPUU and the SNACs. Furthermore, 
the community meetings and the Reference Group are examples of invited spaces. 
According to Ballard (2008, p. 180) inviting participation might allow an authority to claim 
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that there should be no need for anyone to operate outside of those invited spaces. With 
this in mind, evidently the community of Harare does not have real decision-making power 
as these meetings are merely a process of information sharing and feedback. Real decision-
making power is in the hand of the SNAC, KDF and VPUU management as they are the only 
ones that have the power to vote at the Reference Group. In addition, through the 
leadership training workshop and the community action plan (CAP), SNACs decide which 
plan fits the community. Clearly, both spaces (community meetings and the Reference 
Group) are open to a fraction of the public and were created to legitimize the VPUU project. 
 
Furthermore, participation in the VPUU project falls short of the criteria set by Midgley 
(1986). According to Midgley (1986, p. 25): 
 
participation requires the voluntary and democratic involvement of people in (a) 
contributing to the development effort, (b) sharing equitably in the benefits derived 
therefrom and (c) decision-making in respect of setting goals, formulating policies 
and planning and implementing economic and social development programmes. 
 
In applying this criteria to the VPUU methodology, it becomes clear that the community is 
not involved voluntary and democratically in the development effort. Firstly, the community 
meetings and the Reference Group are merely information sharing sessions. Furthermore, 
the community is not directly involved in making decisions, setting goals and planning VPUU 
programmes. In this regard, the SNAC establishes the developmental vision and the 
community action plan and they use the community to ratify their plan. According to 
Midgley (1986) there is a difference between authentic participation and pseudo-
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participation. Authentic participation will involve all three criteria that were set above but 
pseudo-participation will limit community involvement to implementation or to ratify 
decisions already taken by external bodies (Midgley, 1986, p.26). Pseudo-participation, 
therefore, best describes the type of community participation in the VPUU methodology. 
Participant 11 (ibid.) has noticed that VPUU’s “structure of participation in terms of reaching 
communities, it is very top down”. From the research done on KDF, participant 11 (ibid.) 
knows that “KDF’s longevity in Khayelitsha is based on that it has managed to get approval 
from the community” and in this regard KDF’s agenda is nominally shaped from below. If 
one considers this VPUU is not interested in a process of participation that is driven from 
below but rather one that is shaped from the top.  
 
Furthermore, the Reference Group is the most successful forum of ‘participation’ in the 
VPUU project but even the Reference Group is mainly for feedback purposes and no real-
decisions are taken there. According to Cornwall (2002) spaces that are made available by 
the powerful may be discursively bounded to permit only limited citizen influence, colonizing 
interaction and stifling dissent. Therefore, the agenda in the Reference Group is firmly 
controlled by the VPUU management and through this it is possible for them to assert power 
and ensure their interest are served. Additionally, even the community meetings are chaired 
by the VPUU management. Consequently, the terms and conditions for participation are 
clearly dictated by VPUU management.  
 
It can be argued that the community meeting and the Reference Group is a form of political 
gatekeeping. Kurt Lewin first conceptualised the theory ‘gatekeeping and his theory was 
developed by scholars of communication studies. Gatekeeping refers to “the process of 
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culling and crafting countless bits of information into the limited number of messages that 
reach people each day” (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009, p.1). According to Anokwa, Lin and 
Salwen (2003, p. 90) “the news media select and reject stories that the news audience 
receives. This selection and rejection process is media gatekeeping … At each gate in this 
process a gatekeeper has the power to stop, alter, or reshape the news that will affect 
millions of people’s lives.” Shoemaker and Vos explain this by drawing on the period when 
the United States invaded Iraq in 2003: 
 
few journalists from the mainstream American news media questioned their 
country’s actions. Those who did were reprimanded as unpatriotic by the 
government, as well as by audience members, and some lost their jobs (Shoemaker 
and Vos, 2009, p.1).  
 
Evidently, individuals who disagree with ‘gatekeeping’ measures can be negatively affected 
and marginalised. Political gatekeeping occurs in public participation process of the SNAC 
and VPUU. The councillor clearly practices ‘political gatekeeping’ because the councillor 
holds popular support amongst the majority of voters. VPUU is aware of this and, hence, 
they need his cooperation in the community. Thus, as indicated earlier when it comes to 
community meetings, the councillor will first screen the information before it can go out the 
community. Here the councillor gladly demonstrates his power to determine which 
information the community does or does not receive, and to ensure VPUU does not put him 
in a bad light.  
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The same can be said about VPUU in the Reference Group. The action that occurs at the 
Reference Group is also practised at community meetings. The Reference Group is chaired 
by Krause. This enables Krause to manage the flow of information to the larger public. 
Krause also has the ability to decide who is getting what and when they are getting it. The 
aim of this process is also political as it ensures that VPUU is to a certain extent insulated by 
partisan politics as it can buy support amongst civil society in Khayelitsha. Clearly even 
though there are forms of participation where the larger public is involved, the flow of 
information is regulated by Krause and the councillor. 
 
4.14.3 Limited Access to Information 
 
While there seems to be some level of accountability within the VPUU project there is room 
for improvement. The Reference Group as multi-stakeholder forum allows for transparency 
and openness amongst VPUU stakeholders. There are also some sort of transparency and 
openness towards the community especially through the community meetings. However, 
access to information is difficult to access. Financial Reports are not available to the broader 
community and certain information is withheld from the community on purpose. For 
example, the National Treasury are not mentioned as one of sponsors on the advertising 
boards. Dahl (1998) has indicated that one of the requirements for any democracy is access 
to information and it is, therefore, an important requirement that is ignored in the VPUU 
project. 
 
The SNAC is not accountable to the broader community but to their stakeholders. Apart 
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from the values of transparency and openness, it must also be possible for the public to 
remove non-performing SNAC members. Pitkin (1972) makes it clear that the ultimate way 
of holding a representative accountable is by removing him or her from office to remove 
them. In Harare and Monwabisi Park the SNACs were not elected and this makes it difficult. 
Regular elections in any structure ensure accountability because it is through regular 
elections that you can remove members that are not performing but this is not the case in 
Harare. 
 
4.14.4 Partisan Politics and Community Contestations 
 
At the heart of the current contestation in Khayelitsha is the ANC’s defeat in the 2009 and 
2011 elections. According to Beja (ibid.) “to be regarded as people that are delivering they 
*the ANC ward councillors+ have to accept that … the Western Cape Province is being ruled 
by the DA … therefore they must change their mind-set and try to be accommodative in 
terms of the structures. They [ANC councillors] want people that are subordinate to them.” 
Therefore, understanding the political environment VPUU operates in one has to take into 
account party politics and especially the political battle between the DA and the ANC in the 
Western Cape. 
 
Furthermore, according to Krause (ibid.) “*VPUU+ acknowledge the political dimensions the 
political context, but it is a development project and not a political project.” The reality is 
politics cannot be divorced from development. Development can be seen a process whereby 
something is transformed from an undesired state to a desired state. This process of 
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transformation is very much political as it will require engaging different stakeholders with 
different vested interests. The ANC is aware of the threat that such a development project 
can pose to its existence in Khayelitsha, especially if the project is driven and endorsed by 
the DA in the Western Cape. In this regard, the DA went as far as claiming the successes of 
VPUU (De Lille, May 03, 2011). According to Barnard (August 29, 2010) “the DA-led City of 
Cape Town has reduced crime in Khayelitsha by 70%. A township once synonymous with 
violent crime, conditions in Khayelitsha have markedly changed since the introduction of the 
Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) programme …” This gave one an 
indication that the DA is claiming the VPUU project and the successes thereof. 
 
Furthermore, the DA blame the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) for the 
recent protest marches in Khayelitsha and that it is part of the ANCYL’s ‘ungovernability’ 
campaign against the DA administration (Zille, H, August 26, 2012). The latest to the DA and 
ANC saga in the Western Cape is the inquiry into the inefficiency of the police in Khayelitsha. 
Essop (October 30, 2012) reports that the commission of inquiry was established by Zille in 
the wake of increased vigilante killings in Khayelitsha. This came after civil society 
organisations wrote to Zille to investigate police inefficiency in Khayelitsha.  
 
Moreover, participant 12 (ibid.) also picked up a number of tensions between VPUU and the 
councillors. Participant 12 (ibid.) was in a sub-council meeting where VPUU gave feedback 
with regards to the progress of the project in the informal settlements. In this particular 
meeting, one of the councillors who lives in the area “felt that the changes that they *VPUU+ 
mention is cosmetic and in his own words they have not seen any changes” (Participant 12, 
ibid.). This sentiment was shared by the Monwabisi SNAC member. Participant 7 (ibid.) 
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expressed that he felt ashamed because nothing so far had come from the VPUU plans in 
Monwabisi Park. Another tension in that particular sub-council meeting was with regards to 
accountability especially since the CoCT co-fund the project. A third tension is related to 
VPUU’s community action plan is similar to the IDP of the CoCT as councillors were 
concerned with the overlapping of the developmental agenda.  One needs to consider all of 
this to contextualise the volatile environment in which VPUU operates and, therefore, even 
though it is not a political project the undertone of project is political. 
 
4.15 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to investigate the VPUU methodology in democratic terms, and 
it was to this end that it investigated the methodology for practices of participation, 
representation and accountability. It started by outlining how the VPUU methodology was 
theoretically conceptualised and once a framework was established the attention was 
turned to the empirical data. Empirically, researcher found that in the case of Harare SNAC 
members cannot be considered to be representatives as they were co-opted to form the 
SNAC and members of the SNAC are best described as ‘development trustees’. Furthermore, 
the researcher also found that the SNAC is not accountable to the broader community but 
upwardly to VPUU and horizontally its member organisation. VPUU as a project is upwardly 
accountable to their donors and horizontally to KDF. In addition to this, the research found 
that ‘political gatekeeping’ and pseudo-participation best describe the nature of 
participation in the VPUU project. Community meetings and the Reference Group are used 
to inform the public and VPUU stakeholders of decisions already taken. Lastly, the research 
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found that partisan politics to some extent influence the project. Participants have reported 
tensions among SNAC members over political ideologies and there are tensions between the 
ward councillors, KDF and the SNAC. This is important because it contextualises the volatile 
environment in which the project operates, and helps explain the tendency to manage from 
above in a context of often vigorous contest from below.  
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Chapter 5: Lessons Learnt 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The main argument of this thesis is that urgent reforms are needed to deepen democracy in 
South African local governance especially in terms of participation, representation and 
accountability. The VPUU was launched in 2005, as a cooperative agreement between the 
CoCT and the German Development Bank, to prevent crime through upgrading public spaces 
in Harare and Site C Khayelitsha. Since its inception in Harare Khayelitsha, the VPUU has had 
a number of successes in its attempts to reduce crime in Khayelitsha and they claim they 
achieved this by operating in a participatory way. Since, its implementation in Harare the 
VPUU claims to have reduced crime in the site by 33 percent and the murder rate in 
particular by 20 per cent (Ndenze, May 04, 2011). The VPUU methodology in generally 
appeared to yield better results in comparison to the local governance participatory model, 
hence the investigation. It was for this purpose that the researcher asked the following 
question: Is the VPUU methodology of community participation, representation and 
accountability, a suitable model to reform the South African local governance model? Firstly, 
the researcher established a theoretical foundation for the study and secondly conducted 
empirical research to answer the research question. Below follows the reflections on the 
outcomes of the research, the limitations and recommendations for further studies.  
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5.3 Weaknesses of Local Governance: Participation, Representation and 
Accountability 
 
Chapter three indicated that a system of participatory democracy was introduced in local 
government by a number of policies such as the WPLG, the Municipal Structures Act and the 
Municipal Systems Act. The investigation revealed that more focus is place on participation 
in both practice and theory but literature and practices on representation and accountability 
is restricted, even though in theory participatory democracy is more than just participation 
as it extends to new forms of representation and accountability. The investigation also 
revealed that there are a number of weaknesses with regards to participation, 
representation and accountability.  
 
In terms of participation, research indicates that ward committees have no clear role in local 
governance and ward committees do not have any real decision-making power to influence 
the municipal council. In addition, tensions exist between ward councillors and ward 
committee members as some members also aspire to become ward councillors (Buccus et 
al, 2007). In addition, research indicates that service delivery protest is often the preferred 
way of citizens engaging the state (Municipal IQ 2012, Jain 2010).  
 
Furthermore, pertaining to representation, it can be concluded that the role of ward 
councillors is ambiguous in that they are directly elected by the community but their political 
future is dependent on the political party. This research also highlight that a small number of 
women represented in local councils (Morna and Mbadlanyana, 2011) and ward committees 
are not representative of the whole community as set out by the Municipal Structures Act 
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(Smith and Visser 2009, Piper and Deacon 2008). Civil society is poorly if not represented at 
all in municipalities as the importance of civil society representation is not recognised by the 
Municipal Structures Act and the Municipal Systems Act. The partnership between the CoCT 
and KDF is refreshing and more of these partnerships are needed between civil society and 
municipalities because community-based organisations in many cases know how best to 
facilitate or implement a particular intervention. 
 
In terms of accountability, there are five major shortcomings at local governance level. 
Firstly, there is a poor flow of information from municipal councils to citizens on matters 
that directly affect them. Secondly, civil society in communities is weak and do not make full 
use of the existing mechanisms to hold the municipal council accountable. Thirdly, most 
municipalities do not have mechanisms in place to review council resolutions or to lodge 
complaints. Fourthly, municipal users are unaware of the service standards that customers 
are entitled to and this makes it difficult to keep service providers accountable. Lastly, ward 
committees do not function properly as the communication channel between the council 
and the community (Memela et al, 2008). In addition, it can be concluded that measures of 
accountability must be extended to traditional leaders and ward committees, as they are 
representatives of their respective communities. The current local government legislation 
only has measures in place for councillors and the municipal administrative staff. 
 
Moreover, the weaknesses of local governance can be a result of extensive research that is 
focuses on reiterating the problems of local governance and limited research aimed at 
generating solutions to fix the current system. Government have responded positively to the 
crisis in local government. Evidently, since 2004 the government has released the Project 
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Consolidate (2004), the State of Local Government in South Africa (2009) and the Local 
Government Turnaround Strategy (2009) but nothing significant has come of these policy 
documents.  
 
 
5.4 VPUU Outcomes 
 
The empirical aim of the research was to assess the VPUU methodology that was applied in 
Harare Khayelitsha in democratic terms and to evaluate whether it could enhance the local 
governance model in terms of participation, representation and accountability. Firstly, this 
research found that no real representation is taking place in the VPUU model that was 
applied in Harare Khayelitsha. SNAC members were co-opted and no elections for SNAC took 
place and since it was established, no other elections have occurred. For any structure to 
claim that it is representative they must have regular elections and it must be done in a 
democratic manner. In Harare this was not the case. Piper (2012) initially argued that the 
VPUU’s ‘community participation model’ is actually a form of representation (development 
trusteeship) – a notion which is validated. However, the SNAC representation is closer to a 
form of co-option designed to assimilate community leaders in such a way they legitimises 
the project. 
 
The research reveals that the form of participation practised is pseudo-participation and that 
both projects and the councillors is using ‘political gatekeeping’ to regulate the flow of 
information to the community at large. Pseudo-participation is merely a necessity for 
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ratifying decisions that has already been taken. This is evident in this case as the real 
decision-making process happens in the SNAC meeting and the Reference Group and not in 
community meetings. Community meetings are used to inform the community about 
decisions already taken. Participation is also a top down driven process and not a bottom up 
process and this allows VPUU to firmly control the agenda and the terms of participation. 
However, the Reference Group to a certain extent promises a process of consensus-building 
and that is needed for the South African local governance model.  
 
Thirdly, the research also found that the SNAC in Harare is not accountable to the broader 
community but to its member organisations and VPUU. In addition, the SNAC in Harare was 
elected but came into power through a process of co-option. In democratic terms, 
representatives must be elected and held accountable by those that have elected them. In 
the case of VPUU this did not happen. However, there is openness and transparency in some 
of the matters of VPUU although that access to information is limited. Financial Reports are 
not available to the broader community and certain information is withheld from the 
community on purpose. For example, the National Treasury is not mentioned as one of 
sponsors on the advertising boards. 
 
Even though the VPUU methodology at face value appears to be a very successful model of 
participation, representation and accountability promises, in practice it is not the case. 
Consequently, the VPUU methodology cannot be used as a general template to reform or 
enhance representation or accountability at local governance level but some features or 
mechanisms of their community participation process can be adopted to enhance 
participation at local governance level, especially the Reference Group.  
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5.5 Recommendations 
 
Recommendation 1: Use the Reference Group to enhance participation at local governance 
level. There is a need for a multi-stakeholder engagement forum at local governance which 
ties all sectors of society together. It will be a useful platform to discuss matters of service 
delivery and development in the municipality. The researcher would suggest that this forum 
must be chaired by the Municipal Manager and not a political office bearer. So far, it has 
worked for VPUU as it is a platform where stakeholders not only have to account but to 
share in the successes and failures of one another.  
 
Recommendation 2: Furthermore, empirical research is needed to find ways to enhance and 
reform local governance in South Africa. Most of the research that has been conducted on 
South African local governance is on participation. Scholars have neglected representation 
and accountability in particular. More empirical research is needed in terms representation 
and accountability.  
 
Recommendation 3: Proposed empirical research must investigate cases where 
participation, representation and accountability are successful and to see whether it can be 
used to reform the current local government system. Promising in this regard are Equal 
Education, the Treatment Action Campaign and Section 27.  
 
Recommendation 4: Local Government legislation must enhance the role of civil society in 
the decision-making structures of municipalities, as strategic partnerships with civil society 
are needed to facilitate development in communities. This enhancement of local 
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government legislation must safeguard these partnerships from covert interests. The current 
legislative measures do not protect the interest of communities as it is made clear by the 
small number of partnerships local government (municipalities) has with community-based 
organisations. This gap in the legislation allows external forces to take over community 
initiatives to drive their agendas.  
 
Recommendation 5: Local Government legislation must extent measures of accountability to 
traditional authorities and ward committees. The current legislation do not have any 
measures of accountability in place for them.  
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
The VPUU started off as a project for the prevention of violence but developed to serve a 
bigger purpose. Clearly, VPUU has become synonymous with the development of 
Khayelitsha and it cannot be a responsibility that cannot be taken likely. The researcher’s 
concern is the sustainability of the VPUU project. The top-down approach of the VPUU 
operational methodology in practice in this case begs a further question: What would 
happen if the funds dry up?  
 
Based on how the SNACs are formulated, they would cease to exist once the project is done 
as the broader community will not take ownership of the SNAC as they did not elect them 
and the SNACs do not account to them. It would become another multi-stakeholder forum 
and it is to this end that the researcher does not see the SNAC existing alongside the WDFs. 
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WDFs are elected by the community and it is not a structure like the SNAC that shy away 
from community interaction. Furthermore, other development organisations in Khayelitsha 
are not viable because KDF has captured every sector of the Khayelitsha society and created 
WDFs to oversee the development in their wards.7 
 
Moreover, the fact that none of the participants mentioned the ward forums (ward 
committees) signals the insignificance of ward committees to local governance and 
development in at least this section of Khayelitsha. Lastly, the most successful forum of 
participation is the Reference Group and this kind of forum might be ideal to incorporate 
into the local governance system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
7 Based on the interviews with participants and independent researchers from the African Centre for Citizenship and 
Democracy (ACCEDE) it became apparent that KDF has captured every sector in Khayelitsha.  
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Appendix 1 – Informed Consent 
 
With your signature at the bottom of this page, this form has the power to protect your 
autonomy. Please read it in full, and if you understand and agree, sign below.  
The purpose of this research is to explore the way the Violence Prevention through Urban 
Upgrading (VPUU) project operates, especially with regards to processes of community 
participation, representation and accountability. The idea is to learn what the project does 
well, and assess whether this could be basis of a similar approach for other development 
projects.  
Individually, you have been identified as a potential participant for this research because of 
your involvement in VPUU processes, and may have valuable insights for this research. All 
that is required is your participation in this interview which should last no longer than sixty 
minutes.  
Please be advised that participation is voluntary. You are at liberty to withdraw from the 
research at any time without any negative or undesirable consequences for yourself. All 
responses will be treated confidentially and only used for references purposes. Anonymity 
will be ensured, and there are no limits to confidentiality, unless you are willing to be 
named. This research will be used for articles to be published in academic publications. The 
findings of the research will also be reported back to participants.  
Yours faithfully 
 
Jacob Cloete 
Tel: 076 314 4908 
Email: 2704645@uwc.ac.za 
I………………………………………………………………………………….. (Full names of participant) herby 
confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research 
project, and I consent to participating in the research project. 
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT: ……………………………………………..        
DATE: …………………………………………….. 
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Appendix 2 – Interview Schedule for Stakeholders 
 
Questions 
1. What work do you do? 
2. How long have you been ward councilor/volunteer? 
3. Have you been involved in VPUU? 
4. If yes, in which capacity are you involved? 
5. How did you get involved in VPUU?  
6. Who do you represent in VPUU? Organisation? Ward Committee? 
7. For how long have you been part of VPUU? 
8. What does your organization do specific for the Harare/Site C community? 
9. What is your role on VPUU? 
 
Participation 
10. How often does VPUU have community meetings? 
11. At what time do these meetings usually take place? (Morning, afternoon or evening?) 
12. How do you usually inform the community of the meeting? (Newspaper, community 
radio, posters, flyers, word of mouth, loud hailing) – Can I see some? 
13. Who attends these meetings? (gender, age, race, unemployed) 
14. How many people usually turn up at a VPUU meeting? (Give an estimate?) 
15. What is the nature of these meetings? (feedback, decision-making, etc) 
16. How long are these meetings usually? (An hour, 30 minutes) 
17. What is the typical agenda of a VPUU community meeting? (Do you have a copy an 
agenda?) 
18. Do VPUU keep an attendance register? (Is it possible to see it?) 
19. What is expected of the community in these meeting? 
20. Who usually speaks in these meetings? 
21. Who usually take the decision in community meetings? 
22. Does the community have a voice in these meetings? (Can they log complaints, 
concerns, etc) – Can I have some of your minutes? 
23. Are there any other ways of involving the community in VPUU decision making? 
(apart from the URP and community meetings) 
24. In what ways are the meetings important to VPUU?  
25. Are there any challenges to get the community involve in VPUU? 
 
Representation 
26. What is a SNAC/Reference Group? 
27. What is the role of the SNAC/Reference Group? 
28. How does the election of the SNAC/reference group works? (Do you need a 
constitution, members, etc?) 
29. How many committee members are on the SNAC? 
30. What is the ratio gender representation on the SNAC/reference group? 
31. How is civil society represented in VPUU/SNAC/reference group? 
32. How is the broader community represented in VPUU/SNAC/reference group? 
33. How many representatives of civil society attend these meetings? 
34. Do you know anything about the Inception Group? 
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35. What was the Inception Group all about? 
 
Accountability 
36. Is there a relationship between SNAC/Reference Group and the community? 
37. If yes, what is the nature of this relationship? 
38. Do members of the SNAC/Reference group need to perform? (Yes/No) 
39. Whose responsibility is it to ensure that members on the SNAC and Reference Group 
perform? 
40. Can you remember of any instances where members did not perform? 
41. What happen to this member? 
42. How do you go about making sure that members do what is required of them? 
43. If members are not doing what they are supposed to do, how do you deal with 
them? 
44. How do VPUU account to the sponsors of the project? 
45. What are some of the technical details that funders of the project need? 
46. Do you report? 
47. What is the nature of these reports? 
48. Does this include financial reporting? 
49. To whom do you report? 
 
 
Appendix 3 – Interview Schedule for SNAC Members 
 
Questions 
1. How do you become a SNAC member? 
2. Name a few of the organisations that are part of the SNAC? 
3. What do you do on a daily basis? 
4. How often do you have meeting with the community? 
5. How do you inform the community about the meetings? 
6. What do you discuss in these meetings? 
7. What is the Reference Group? 
8. What is the role of the Reference Group? 
9. Who are the funders of the project? 
10. To whom do you account/report? 
11. How long to you hold office? 
12. What is the Community Action Plan (CAP) about? 
13. What are some of the challenges of the project? 
14. What are the benefits of the project? 
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Appendix 4 – SNAC Composition 
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